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Abstract 
In this thesis I show how narrow representations of 'the economy' in urban 
poverty discourses and practices have channelled the attention of academics and 
policy makers in particular ways as they have attempted to address urban 
poverty. I explore representations of the relationship between poverty and 
economic growth by these groups to show how dominant urban poverty 
discourses and practices tend, at best, to place poor people in the informal 
economy or at worst, outside of the economies of cities. One reason for this is 
traced to poverty studies' understanding of poor people as independent units 
undertaking survivalist activities or livelihoods. However, thinking of poor 
people as making up dispersed sets of networks connected into a diverse 
economy opens up new spatial imaginations of the city and new possibilities for 
policies aimed at achieving social justice. Drawing on the example of the city of 
Durban, South Africa, I explore how thinking about poor people's activities in 
different ways makes it possible to move beyond formal/informal economy 
dichotomies which dominate scholarly and policy analysis. I demonstrate that 
poor people are already connected to, and are part of, economic growth processes 
and that these growth processes would not be possible without including poor 
people. The 'poverty politics' to which this research refers relates to ways in 
which it is possible to see and write poor peoples' economic activities into a 
broader story of economic growth. 
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One 
Conceptually, professionals are caught in their own poverty trap 
Robert Chambers (1992, 305) 
Introduction 
It is the argument of this thesis that approaches to poverty, through their 
understanding and investment in a conception of economic growth, thwart 
attempts to reduce poverty in South Africa. In stark contrast to the daily 
encounters with poverty, the diversity of research and the policy priority status 
accorded it, the ways of approaching poverty in South Mrica appear remarkably 
narrow and restrictive. 
Poverty in South Africa is visceral and starkly evident. Everyday life persistently 
snags on ever-present reminders of deprivation, suffering, anxieties and misery. 
Sometimes this brutal intimacy with drudgery and vulnerability is presented as a 
failure to realise the promise of a post-Apartheid South Africa. More commonly 
though, poverty is understood 'simply' as an important societal issue to be 
urgently addressed, and it should be noted that South Mrica is little different in 
this respect from other countries in prioritising poverty as a social issue (0yen, 
Miller, and Samad 1996). 
The urgency of addressing poverty is reinforced and made ever more palpable 
through the investments that various agencies and institutions make in diverse 
ways of addressing poverty. Indeed the debates and discussions over the causes 
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and effects of poverty trace a discursive thread that binds respected religious 
leaders and prominent business people to the general public and considerably 
exercises the minds of those in government and those involved in poverty 
research. There is no shortage of research attention paid to the relationship 
between poverty and a wide range of social issues. l 
Another expression of the urgency of addressing poverty is reflected in the 
priority policy status accorded poverty since 1994 in South Africa's post-
Apartheid government (Mrican National Congress 1994). Indeed poverty has 
consistently remained as a policy priority since that time (Everatt 2003; Hindson 
2003; Wilson 2005). In the light of this priority policy status and the immediacy 
of daily encounters with poverty, what might be surprising is that the most recent 
studies of poverty have shown that while the severity of poverty may not have 
deteriorated since 1994, more people can be classified as poor than ever before 
(Bhorat, Poswell, and Naidoo 2004; Meth and Dias 2004; United Nations 
Development Programme 2003; Carter and May 2001; Hoogeveen and Ozler 
2004; Agilero, Carter, and May 2005). The estimated growth in those considered 
poor has increased from 20.2 million in 1995 to 21.9 million in 2002 (United 
Nations Development Programme 2003, 41). While I have no intention of 
entering the furious debate these findings have provoked between those in 
government and researchers in the field, these findings and the level of debate 
alert us to the continuing importance of addressing the issue of poverty. Given 
the socially unacceptable levels of suffering that remain stubbornly high, there is 
a good argument to be made for creative thinking on the issues. 
11 Recent examples of such work include poverty and: labour (Bhorat and Leibbrandt 1998; 
Leibbrandt and Woolard 2001; Leibbrandt, Bhorat, and Woolard 2001); gender (Budlender 
2001); land access (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002); social policy (May 2004; Maitra and 
Ray 2003); formal politics (Everatt 2003; Ali, Thorbecke, and Shimelis 2000; Zegeye and Maxted 
2002; Barberton, Blake, and Kotze 1998); economic policy (Bracking 2004; Fosu 2004; Green 
1998; Luiz 2002; May 2003; Bratton and Mattes 2003); infrastructure and urban development 
(BeaU, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2000b; Abrahams and Goldblatt 1997; BeaU, Crankshaw, and 
Parnell 2000a; Parnell and Mosdell 2003; Bouillon 2002b; Rogerson and May 1997; Rogerson 
2001); vulnerability (Carter and May 2001; Aliber 2003; Roberts 2000) and inequality (Pillay 
1996; Whiteford, Posel, and Kelatwang 1995; Terreblanche 2002) as well as how to monitor and 
measure these relationships (Qizilbash 2002; Ngwane, Yadavalli, and Steffens 2001; May et al. 
2000; Scott 2002). 
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The diversity of daily encounters, poverty research and policy work in South 
Africa raises the questions of: what does it mean to 'see' poverty? How is poverty 
'seen'? Why are some ways of 'seeing' poverty more authoritative than others? It 
is these questions that this thesis will begin to address. The ability to 'see' poverty 
is, in turn, closely related to what is to be done about reducing poverty. 
Inevitably, what is to be done about poverty is expressed in some way through 
policies of the state at different levels. There is often a close link between poverty 
research and development policies but, more directly, how poverty is spoken of 
also shapes policies (Bebbington 2005; Hickey 2005; Hossain 2005). 
The interweaving of understandings of poverty and the formation of the liberal 
state has a long history (cf. Dean 1991; Himmelfarb 1984). Henry Mayhew's 
(1971) survey of the poverty of London's street-workers in 1849-50, Charles 
Booth's (1902) poverty survey (1886-1903) in London, and Seebohm Rowntree's 
(1910) poverty study in York in 1901 are all cited as seminal events in the history 
of poverty research (Kanbur and Squire 1999). That such parochial studies 
during a particular period of England's process of industrialisation and 
urbanisation should be so influential over time and space is remarkable (Seers 
1976). But, this is perhaps partly explained by the conjunction between these 
poverty studies and changes in the nature of knowledge (Novak 1995) and how 
this knowledge was able to be used in the practice of modern governments (Dean 
1992; WaIters 1994; Miller and Rose 1990). Thus, Lucinda Platt (2003) argues 
that these three studies were part of, and informed by, processes such as the 
changes in the meaning of numbers and the emergence of statistics as means of 
governing by the state. 
Within the context of South Africa's recent political struggles and transitions, it is 
perhaps inevitable that the state and politics more generally looms large in 
authoritative accounts of poverty. I agree with Francis Wilson and Mamphele 
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Ramphele's (1989) simple, but powerful claim, that poverty is 'profoundly 
political'. South Africa's turbulent political history has saturated many aspects of 
everyday life with politics and issues of poverty are no different in this respect. 
Faced with the evidence of sustained high rates of poverty, researchers in South 
Africa have tended to renew their efforts to achieve greater levels of accuracy in 
the definition of poverty to ease the movement of knowledge about poverty into 
policy and to be able to target policy making processes more successfully.2 While 
their efforts have led to many new insights into poverty and policy-making 
processes, my concerns here are different. 
In this highly politically charged atmosphere and concern with politics I want to 
make, what might be considered, a surprising claim. My claim is that the power 
relations that are constitutive of the understanding of poverty itself have 
remained beyond debate - obscured, unacknowledged and unexplored - and 
following from this claim, that this has particular effects for poor people and 
policy makers. 
Certainly, researchers, academics and activists working around poverty issues in 
southern Mrica are aware of the dangers of de-politicising poverty. These 
dangers arise from relying on overly narrow, technically-driven accounts of 
poverty alleviation, thoroughly analysed by James Ferguson (1990) in his 
account of development politics in Lesotho. Although the prevention of the 
erasure of politics from poverty alleviation and development practice through 
such technicist accounts requires constant vigilance, this is not the politics to 
which I want to draw attention. Rather my concern is with how information and 
the 'facts' of poverty can be claimed and stated. Who is able to make 'truthful' 
and legitimate claims? What can be stated? 
2 This process has not been limited to South Africa and for an international perspective see (Piron 
and Evans 2004; 0yen 1996; Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, and Stewart 2003; Wilson, Kanji, and 
Braathen 2001). 
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Indeed it is specifically those researchers and academics working within what is 
termed 'Poverty Studies' that I wish to focus on as one of the most important 
sites in which poverty is 'seen' and 'talked' about and where dominant 
understandings of poverty are 'produced'. By Poverty Studies, I refer to those 
attempts to deal with issues of hardship and suffering that start from an 
assumption that different definitions of poverty represent the truth and that the 
research task is to measure, describe or record it in more or less accurate ways.3 I 
therefore look to Poverty Studies as one of the most important sites in which 
progress in understanding hardship and suffering is co-ordinated, evaluated and 
disseminated, and how poverty and politics are made to interrelate. 
1.1 Making poverty 'visible' and 'sayable' 
The insight that power is productive and holds together what is 'visible' and what 
is 'sayable' is traced back to Michel Foucault (1990 [1988]; 1991; 1991 [1977]). 
Claims to the 'truth' are bound up with the power to label and categorise and to 
pronounce on these, just as much as they are with the ability to 'see' poverty 
(Kendall and Wickham 1999). In the light of the statistics above depicting 
alarming levels of 'chronic poverty' in South Africa (Aliber 2003), my intention is 
to query what is 'visible' and 'sayable' about poverty and more specifically urban 
poverty. I will argue that urban poverty offers a useful lens through which to 
consider the ways in which poverty and economic growth are discursively bound 
together by researchers and policy makers in Durban and many other cities. The 
intention of this study is to disrupt the relationship of power that holds what is 
'visible' and 'sayable' together. In addition to the questions raised above, I pose 
the questions of: what is not visible? Whose voices are silenced? What lens is 
used to 'filter' what we see? Which concepts are used to shape what we can state 
3 I understand 'Poverty Studies' to cross a number of formal disciplinary boundaries and includes, 
but is not limited to, contributions from economists, sociologists, geographers anthropologists 
and scholars working in development studies. ' 
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about poverty? In posing these questions I focus in on the relationship between 
poor people's economic activities and economic growth, from the perspective of 
poverty studies. 
As noted above, the concept of poverty is informed by a range of activities that 
include, but are not limited to, daily experiences, poverty research and policy 
formulation. Equally complex to comprehend is the concept of economic growth 
and how it occurs. It follows that the relationship between poverty and economic 
growth is neither simple nor static (although it is often presented in the popular 
press as if it is so (cf. The Economist 2006)). 
That the understanding of the relationship between poor people's economic 
activities and economic growth is unduly narrow, while each of these concepts is 
so complex, suggests the need for further investigation. In this respect, I chose to 
approach the topic in three different ways - an analysis of the processes of 
defining poverty, an analysis of dominant theories of poverty and an analysis of 
institutional poverty practices at the level of the local state. This approach, taking 
three different perspectives from different 'sites' in the process of poverty 
studies, is intended to be disruptive of dominant understandings of poverty. In 
addition, within each of the three perspectives I continually seek to disrupt the 
'obviousness' of poverty. I looked for opportunities to interrupt the taken-for-
granted, to unsettle dominant terms and pose questions against the grain in 
order to shift what is 'visible' and 'sayable' about poor people's economic 
activities in relation to economic growth. 
I do this by considering the processes of defining and theorising poverty in South 
Africa more generally, as well as the politics of poverty policy making in the city 
of Durban. The analysis of the broader processes is thus complemented by a 
focus on Durban. I draw on semi-structured interviews with lead researchers 
and/ or project managers of all the five national studies of poverty in South Mrica 
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in Chapter Two. Chapters Four and Five draw on interviews with people involved 
in urban development, economic development and poverty reduction in Durban. 
Those interviewed included municipal officials, former-municipal officials, 
academics, and consultants involved in research, policy formulation and the 
implementation of programmes and projects within the city. Chapter Four also 
introduces Inanda Newtown Section C-Extension by way of drawing on data 
generated through a participatory timeline exercise with long-standing 
residents.4 Inanda Newtown Section C-Extension is a northern, poor peripheral 
area in the city of Durban and a site of fieldwork for the analysis of Chapter 
Seven. Chapter Seven thus builds on both quantitative and qualitative research 
data generated in C-Extension with the intent of shifting the dominant 
understanding of economic growth. Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five are all 
also informed by documentary analysis. 
To anticipate some of the conclusions, I note how the inability to 'see' and make 
'sayable' the ways in which poor people's economic activities might contribute to 
economic growth has certain effects for poor people and policy makers. In a 
context where economic growth is understood as a means to uplift the entire 
society, it is crucially important to consider how the poorest might be considered 
to be related to economic growth. There is a long-standing (and historically 
racially discriminatory) assumption behind urban policy in South Africa, which is 
that the level of infrastructural investment and provision of amenities should be 
pegged against the perceived importance of the role of the social group/racial 
group and its contribution to the economy or 'society' (occasionally conflated) 
(Parnell1997, 895). In terms of this logic, a perception of a low contribution to 
society justifies a lower provision of public resources. This effect points to one of 
the concerns that animate my overall research question. The concern is that the 
exclusionary discourse of Apartheid that systematically dispossessed Black 
people is being replaced by an exclusionary discourse of economic growth that is 
4 For ease of reading and following the vernacular, I will refer to the area as 'C-Extension'. 
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concentrating and centralising the 'commonwealth' of the city in new ways. The 
distribution of investment in infrastructure in particular, is skewed towards the 
areas of historic privilege. In this regard, Khan and Lootvoet (2002, 309) note 
that the "question of how infrastructure can be made developmental remains 
unresolved in the case of Durban." As Jo BeaU et al. (2000b, 836) suggest, 
constant vigilance is required so that institutional forms of racism do not find 
new forms in a post-Apartheid South Mrica. 
In response to these concerns, I look for ways to disrupt the dominant 
understanding of the economy and economic growth in accounts of poverty. 
Drawing primarily on the work of JK Gibson-Graham (1996), I set out to open 
the understanding of 'economy' by shifting attention from concerns with outputs 
and profitability to economic activities. This brings a diverse range of economic 
activities, including those of poor people, into view as part of the economy. 
Gibson-Graham have suggested that binary understandings of the economy 
(such as capitalist/noncapitalist) work to secure particular understandings of the 
activities which can be considered generative and propulsive. They seek to 
disrupt the dominance of these binary understandings so that no economic 
activities are assumed to be necessarily dominant. This analysis starts to dislodge 
the coincidence of economic growth with those parts of the economy and city 
considered to be formal/capitalist and allows for a wider range of activities to be 
thought of as being able to contribute to economic growth. 
1.2 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis begins by examining the ways in which what is 'sayable' and 'visible' 
about the relationship between poverty and economic growth is held together at 
three different 'sites' and thus outlines how poor people's economic activities are 
considered by researchers and policy makers as unable to contribute to economic 
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growth. The notion of 'diverse economies' is offered as a means of disrupting how 
the 'visible' and 'sayable' are held together. Within the space that is opened up, 
the economic activities of C-Extension are used to show how poor people's 
economic activities can be written into a broader story of economic growth in 
Durban. 
In Chapter Two, I suggest that definitions within discourses of poverty in South 
Mrican poverty studies since 1980 have always been incomplete and partial. This 
partiality, I contend, is inevitable because any definition is generated in contexts, 
which are complex, contingent, and uncertain. The obviousness of this point is 
perhaps why the effects of such partiality are so frequently overlooked. I draw 
attention to the ways in which definitions of poverty are also representations of 
poverty and how this implicates poverty scholars and activists in (re)producing 
particular understandings of poverty. When definitions of poverty are considered 
as representations with effects in the world rather than immutable facts, this 
helps to imagine the possibility of representing poverty in ways that might be 
more advantageous to poor people. 
In Chapter Three, I consider one of the effects of partial discourses of poverty by 
exploring one of the fundamental relationships in poverty discourses - the 
relationship between poverty and economic growth. I examine the question of 
how poor people's economic activities are thought to contribute to economic 
growth. The answer to this question in the existing Anglo-poverty literature is 
that poor people are generally not considered to be able to contribute to 
economic growth. I question how three dominant theories of poverty drawn upon 
in South Mrican poverty research represent poor people's economic activities, 
economic growth, and the relationship between the two. I argue that all three 
theories imagine a separation between poor people's economic activities and 
economic growth, and that this leads to poverty reduction strategies that 
nevertheless constrain attempts to reduce poverty. 
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In Chapter Four, I consider how poverty came to be a policy priority for the 
eThekwini Municipality in Durban, South Mrica in the post-Apartheid period. I 
suggest that how poverty is understood as a priority cannot be divorced from a 
series of institutional activities. The concept of poverty was inscribed at the 
centre of understandings of a series of overlapping social and political processes 
that spilt over from the Apartheid era. As a result, there were many aspects of 
urban policy making which took poverty as a frame of reference. These urban 
processes were also the product of local histories and power relations which have 
shaped and inflected the understanding and practice of poverty policies in 
Durban. 
In Chapter Five, I reflect on how the institutional practices of eThekwini 
Municipality were complementary to broader processes of defining and 
theorising about poverty, since these practices operationalised the inability of 
theories to see poor people's economic activities as contributing to economic 
growth. I draw together a range of factors including the understanding of the 
concept of economic growth and local political processes to assess Durban's 
current long-term development policy in terms of its strategies for poverty 
reduction and their impacts in the city. 
The first part of the thesis, then, establishes that the way in which the 
relationship between poverty and economic growth is made 'visible' and 'sayable' 
has the inhibiting effect that poor people's economic activities are considered 
unable to contribute to economic growth. The second part of the thesis draws on 
a wider literature that sets out to shift the scholarly imagination of the economy 
and economic growth. The aim is to offer a richer, progressive view of the 
economy and economic growth for poverty studies to draw on. Thus, in Chapter 
Six, I explore the usefulness of the notion of 'diverse economies' as developed by 
JK Gibson-Graham as a means of opening up an understanding of the economy 
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which embraces the activities of poor people. I also show how the notion of 
diverse economies can itself be extended to unsettle the perceived dominance of 
the (formal) capitalist aspect of the economy. This, then, provides the basis for 
thinking how processes associated with economic growth might be found 
throughout a diverse economy. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I draw on field research in a poor area to the north of 
Durban - C-Extension - to illustrate how poor people's economic activities can 
be written into the story of economic growth and thus potentially shift the focus 
of initiatives to address poverty. I examine the different economic activities of 
poor people to show how they are a constitutive component of the economy and 
how, through the diverse interdependencies, overlaps and interconnections 
which shape these activities, they can be understood to contribute to economic 
growth. This is in contrast to current dominant understandings of poor people's 
economic activities that are considered to be marginalised, survivalist and 
trapped within the fragmented geography of South Africa's racially divided cities. 
I conclude the thesis by reflecting on the implications of this richer view in the 
hope that it might shift the dominant view of the economy and economic growth 
in poverty research (for poor people and the city of Durban) and, in so doing, 
open new possibilities for realising a socially just city. 
The thesis suggests that if one of the main purposes of economic growth is to 
reduce poverty, there is a need to shift the current dominant understandings of 
poverty in research and policy making and make it more responsive to poor 
people. The argument is that poverty research and policy making conceives of the 
economy and economic growth in specific terms, such as being coextensive with 
the formal and/or capitalist economy. I show that because of a range of 
assumptions about the economy and the subject positions related to these 
assumptions on the part of poverty researchers and policy makers, attempts to 
reduce poverty are channelled into a particular set of strategies that ultimately 
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conserve the existing social power relations between the non-poor and the poor -
even if they result in material improvements to some poor people's quality of life. 
Rather than understand the economy in these terms, this thesis sets out to 
explore how an economy and economic growth might be understood from the 
perspective of those people considered poor. 
two 
Definitions of poverty and their effects 
Definitions of poverty are typically presented as inclusive and coherent and are 
often, therefore, perceived as universally applicable. One of their most important 
purposes is to convince and persuade all relevant interests that the definition 
expresses a complete, accurate and truthful description of what poverty is. 
Definitions express the core and trajectory of different approaches to poverty. 
Consequently, definitions are often used as shorthand for wider approaches to 
poverty. For these reasons, definitions - although only a component of wider 
discourses and practices of poverty - are powerful and important. Cognisant of 
the power that emerges from claims to inclusivity and truth, I aim to explore how 
definitions of poverty are always only partial and how this partiality has effects in 
relation to poor people. 
I argue that different definitions can always only make certain 'facts' and 
processes of poverty 'visible' and 'sayable' and are therefore always incomplete 
and partial. Many others have pointed to the ways in which the definitions of 
poverty are partial (for recent overviews see 0yen 2005; Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, 
and Stewart 2003). Solutions are usually pursued along three main streams. The 
first stream is to seek greater accuracy of definitions of poverty. Else 0yen (1996, 
6) observes that these endeavours are based on the fallacious assumption that 
the "more we know about poverty the easier it will be to alleviate it". This, in 
turn, is based on an assumption that our knowledge is partial because this is the 
nature of the endless process of knowledge production. The second stream is to 
consider any single definition of poverty as partial because poverty is a complex, 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. The solution to this partiality is to consider 
different definitions and approaches to poverty as complementary (cf. Olsen 
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2004). The third relates to the inability to translate definitions and concepts of 
research into effective policy. In other words, the partiality emerges because of 
the inability of concepts and definitions to 'carry-over' in their entirety to 
research or policy. Consider Julian May's (2003, 1) reflection after reviewing 
recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Processes that "despite periodic declarations 
about reaching consensus, finding the appropriate instrument for the 
measurement of persistent poverty that is then employed for policy formulation 
continues to dog researchers and those using research alike." I endorse the 
attempts in these three streams to grapple with the complexity of poverty, but it 
is not the specific ways in which different definitions of poverty are partial that I 
want to discuss. I am also far from criticising the need for greater knowledge 
about poverty. I argue rather, that even as the stock of 'poverty knowledge' 
increases and our ability to integrate different approaches increases, definitions 
of poverty will always be partial. 
The reason definitions will always be partial is because the process of generating 
them occurs in contexts that are always contingent, complex and uncertain and 
can therefore only be comprehended partially. This is an obvious point, but not 
always acknowledged. Critics are correct to argue that partial knowledge is 
unavoidable and, in the meantime, something must be done to alleviate the 
misery and deprivation of the poor (Streeten 1998). But my purpose in drawing 
attention to the partiality of definitions of poverty is to focus on the effects of this 
partiality, rather than to judge the partiality or to propose that it could ever be 
eliminated. I aim to show that the effects of partiality go beyond - or, more 
precisely, come before - the ways in which definitions are commonly presented 
as complete and truthful descriptions (Hastings 1998; Mawdsley and Rigg 2002) 
and have consequences for poverty reduction policies and ultimately, poor 
people. 
I intend to develop this argument by highlighting the ways in which the different 
definitions of poverty in five national studies in South Africa are contingent on 
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factors such as the contexts in which they were generated, wider political 
processes and the motivations of the researchers themselves. This list will be 
enriched as the different definitions of poverty are considered. The purpose of 
drawing attention to the contingency of the definitions is to signal the ways in 
which they are partial and to identify which factors, out of the welter of social 
processes, were prioritised and responded to in each case. The partiality in turn, 
means that only certain poverty 'facts' and processes become 'visible' and 
'sayable' in any given study. Following Foucault (1991 [1977]), what is 'visible' 
and 'sayable' is bound together by power and, in the following chapters, I will 
suggest that the power that holds what is 'visible' and 'sayable' together in 
poverty studies has effects for poor people. I believe that the neglect of these 
effects has had important consequences for lowering the horizon on creative 
responses to improving the quality of life of those considered to be in poverty. As 
the argument develops it will become clear that the economy and economic 
growth have become increasingly important to poverty reduction and, in the 
following chapter, I explore in more detail the specific relationship between poor 
people's economic activities and economic growth in poverty studies. For now, I 
wish to establish that definitions are historically and politically contingent and 
do indeed have effects. To do this, I will point to how definitions have the effect 
of authorising specific voices and silencing others, as well as legitimating certain 
actions and not others. 
I begin with an overview of the five national poverty studies. The purpose of the 
overview is to locate the studies within particular moments in a complex period 
of South Africa's history. As studies of poverty in the late 1990S have already 
shown, responses to poverty in southern Africa are deeply influenced by both 
local and international processes (cf. Wilson, Kanji, and Braathen 2001b). The 
chapter will then proceed through the five studies to illuminate how the 
definitions of poverty that have emerged are each in their own way contingent 
and therefore always partial. I suggest ways in which this partiality has effects for 
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the poor. This will open up the possibility of exploring a specific effect within 
broader theories of poverty in the following chapter. 
2.1 An overview of poverty studies in South Africa between 
1980 and 2000 
This overview serves to introduce the five studies of poverty that have been 
undertaken since 1980 and their relationship to each other as these are presented 
in the texts and clarified in interviews with the lead authors (May 1998a, 2000; 
Wilson 1996a; Wilson and Homer 1996). I propose that 1980 is a useful starting 
point because it marks an important discontinuity in South Mrican poverty 
research and it is the point at which the notion of 'South Mrican poverty' first 
emerges. I will return to this claim later and for now keep the analysis at the level 
of an overview. 
The five studies have been selected because they have all been framed at a 
'national' South Mrican level.s I must acknowledge that, in addition to the five 
studies I have chosen, countless other studies have been undertaken. These 
include censuses, income and expenditure surveys, qualitative and ethnographic 
studies and a range of activities such as those associated with non-governmental 
organisations. Some of these, such as censuses and household surveys, have been 
framed at a national level. 6 However, despite sharing a national compass, these 
censuses and household surveys have not necessarily started from an assumption 
about the nature of poverty. The five studies I have chosen have all started from 
5 The label 'national' has been highly contested in South Africa as the Apartheid government 
attempted to excise 'independent' ethnic homelands from South Africa. I use the term 'national' 
to refer to the entire area of South Africa as realised in 1994. 
6 For a review of the October Household Survey and the Income and Expenditure Survey of 1995 
conducted by Statistics South Africa, see Budlender (1999). 
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an assumption concerning the nature of poverty and have been the most 
'productive' in the sense of having generated authoritative (and dominant) 
definitions of poverty. The authority and dominance stems both from the 
national scope of the research exercises, the collective intellectual weight they 
mustered and the assumed scientific objectivity and neutrality that affords 
universal acceptance. 
Since South Mrica's transition to a non-racial democracy in 1994, the 1980s 
came to be known as the period of 'late-Apartheid' (see Figure 1 for a schematic 
timescale). In this period, during which "the monster [of the Apartheid State and 
system] was still alive and kicking all too hard" (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, ix), 
the South Mrican Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU)7 initiated a 
major poverty study known as the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty in 
Southern Africa.8 The research described and established the 'facts' of the 
impoverishing effects of Apartheid, primarily on Black9 people, and the 
conference to close the research process drew an acrimonious rebuke from the 
Apartheid regime. to A book, summarizing the findings of the research, was 
published in 1989, entitled Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge 
(Wilson and Ramphele 1989). The analysis of this study in this chapter focuses 
on this book - as a synthesis of the research and conference - rather than the 
conference papers themselves. ll 
7 SALDRU is a non-governmental organisation based at the University of Cape Town. 
S I will refer to this study as the Carnegie Inquiry and to the first Carnegie Commission on the 
Poor White problem in South Africa by its full title for ease of reference and differentiation. 
9 The terms Black, White, Indian and Coloured reflect the racial categorisations of Apartheid. I do 
not agree with these categorisations. Their usage here reflects the historical usage and the present 
and foreseeable need for reparations in accordance with these categorisations. My hope is that 
they will lose their potency in the future. 
10 Francis Wilson, Interview 22/07/04. 
11 See the Methodological Appendix for a motivation for this choice. 
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The unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-Apartheid 
organisations marked the beginning of what has come to be termed, a 
'transitional phase' of political systems and government. The formal handover of 
State power occurred during this phase. This transitional phase provoked a flurry 
of research to inform new policies befitting a new non-racial, non-sexist, and 
democratic South Mrican society. 
The Carnegie Inquiry provided substantial documentation of the conditions of 
poverty in South Africa but it had not commissioned any major surveys that 
could inform key policy-making processes. Non-racial representative data, such 
as the demography and location of the poor, was urgently required. The Project 
for Statistics on Living Standards Development (PSLSD) was the first, nationally 
representative Living Standards Measurement Survey of about 9000 
households.12 This study was again managed by SALDRU and in 1995 an 
enormous data set was publicly released entitled South Africans: Rich and Poor 
(SALDRU 1995). 
Following South Africa's acclaimed political transition in 1994 and shortly after 
the completion of the PSLSD, a further need was identified to complement the 
quantitative data of the PSLSD with more qualitative data (May and Norton 
1997). A participatory research project known as the South African Participatory 
Poverty Appraisal (SA-PPA) was completed in 1996 and published as a report 
entitled Experience and Perceptions of Poverty in South Africa (May 1998a). 
The study is recognized by Robert Chambers as succeeding in assessing "the 
multi-dimensional experience of being poor and the perception of 'the poor' 
12 This study is popularly known as the 'SALDRU Survey'. However, I will refer to the study by its 
official title and acronym - PSLSD. This is to reflect the intent that the researchers identified with 
the study through their choice of title and to differentiate the study from the many other surveys 
that have been undertaken by SALDRU. 
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towards the causes and relief of their poverty" (in foreword May 1998a, 1). 
Following the SA-PP A, two important poverty initiatives ended within months of 
each other in 1998. The first to conclude was an initiative from a coalition of civil 
society organizations known as the National Speak-out on Poverty Hearings.13 
From the Poverty Hearings, a report entitled The People's Voices was published. 
This documented the "dismal and ongoing drudgery, hunger and struggle ... [but] 
also provided ample evidence of the ingenuity and creativity of people who 
survive against the odds" and highlighted "ongoing poor service and delivery by 
government" (Budlender 1998,1). 
The second initiative concluded a little later. Known as the Poverty and 
Inequality Report (May 1998b) it built on first the PSLSD, and then the SA-PPA. 
It was essentially a review of how the post-Apartheid government's policies were 
impacting on poverty and what actions could be taken to improve the 
effectiveness of policies. The report was later edited into a book entitled Poverty 
and Inequality in South Africa. Meeting the Challenge (May 2000). This is the 
source for the analysis to follow. Although the research drew on new 
understandings of poverty such as capabilities, entitlements and assets, its 
impact seems to have been more as providing an overview of poverty14 rather 
than having an immediate impact on the activities of government. 15 
Despite the implied linearity of Figure 1 and this overview, I am concerned to 
show that there is no simple unfolding of definitions of poverty. Instead, 
definitions merge into one another and are characterised as much by 
discontinuities in their meanings and effects, as continuities. While the timing 
and sequencing of the studies is an issue, to proceed to present the five studies 
13 Henceforth referred to as the Poverty Hearings. 
14 Sue Pamell, Interview 23/07/04. 
15 Julian May, Interview 13/08/04. 
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sequentially is not to frame my analysis solely in terms of their temporalities. I 
will now consider each of the five studies in terms of their stated definition of 
poverty, how the research that generated or deployed particular definitions was 
contingent on a range of historical and political factors, what they made 'visible' 
and 'sayable' about poverty, and what some of the effects were for poor people. 
2.2 National poverty studies in South Africa 
2.2.1 Second Carnegie Inquiry into poverty in southern Africa 
Analysing the definitions of poverty in the Carnegie Inquiry is interesting in the 
context of my overall argument, because the researchers initially publicly 
presented the definition of poverty as something not to be taken as complete and 
certain.16 Established 'scientific' definitions of poverty17 were deliberately 
eschewed in favour of a definition that was deliberately kept 'open' and uncertain 
so that: 
" ... research workers were not provided with a nice clean definition of poverty that they 
could measure (and compare with other places and other times), but were told instead to 
go out into the highways and byways of the country to meet people who endured poverty 
and those who lived or worked with them and to listen to what they, from their own 
experience understood poverty to mean" (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, 14). 
16 Morag Bell (2000; 2002) points insightfully to the uncertainties engendered by the Carnegie 
Inquiry. She discusses how attempts to resolve the anxieties surrounding these uncertainties 
were made. Here I intend to develop these insights in another direction by pointing to how this 
uncertainty was productive of a specific definition of poverty. 
17 By the early 1980s, income theories of poverty were well established and were being applied 
internationally (see for example, Edwards and Homer 1974; Galbraith 1979). Basic-needs 
theories of poverty had gained currency (for example, Streeten et al. 1981; ILO 1977) and Amartya 
Sen's (1976; 1977; 1981) ideas of assets and capabilities were filtering into the circuits of poverty 
research. 
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While the dominant poverty theories certainly inform the analysis in the book 
that summarizes the Carnegie Inquiry research,18 the analysis is built on the 
undefined 'lived experience' of the poor in South Mrica (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989). 
My contention is that the Carnegie Inquiry tended to downplay established 
definitions of poverty because of the politically astute recognition that these 
definitions were bound up with expert (White) voices and particular racial 
political strategies. If poverty was to 'matter' in new ways, it first needed to be de-
defined. In this way, the Carnegie Inquiry is different to the subsequent studies 
considered here. 
The motivation for the Carnegie Inquiry 
The motivation for an Inquiry19 lay in the reflections of Francis Wilson, and 
others, that the issue of poverty - specifically of the majority Black population -
had very little currency amongst those with political and economic power at the 
time. He commented on the theme of 'making poverty matter' that I will return 
to in subsequent studies, insisting that: 
" ... people were not conscious of poverty - when I say people, those who were rich, were 
not conscious of poverty .... [So] I would say that what the Carnegie Inquiry did do was to 
18 There is an initial reference to the poverty lines that emerge from an income theory of poverty 
(pages 16-21) and minor references to the notion of assets and capabilities (for example page 
354). Arguably, basic-needs theory provides a structure for some of the chapters (Chapters 4-7). 
19 The South African government had the power to appoint ad hoc committees with limited scope, 
powers and duration to investigate issues of socio-political importance. This device allowed for 
issues to be conducted at arms-length from the state and for the state to select amongst the 
conclusions and recommendations. By styling the research as an 'inquiry', then, the Carnegie 
Inquiry borrowed on a historically developed aura of national importance and political 
independence for the consequent investigations and concluding recommendations. 
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contribute to a growing consciousness of poverty as an issue. Now you've got to be very 
careful in this because you hardly need to explain to poor people that they are poor for 
them to be conscious about it. But in terms of political discourse, let's put it that way. In 
terms of public political discourse ... ". 20 
And so: 
" ... we were needing to persuade people, I mean at one level, Uprooting poverty is trying 
to be a scientific report at another level it is a crusading document and part of doing a 
crusading document is to persuade people that poverty actually matters. "21 
The desire to make poverty 'visible' in a non-racial way had existed for a long 
time. Although there is a substantial history of poverty studies in South Africa 
prior to 1980 (Wilson 1996b), studies focused either on the local scale or a 
particular racial group, at times on both (for useful bibliographies see Edwards 
and Homer 1974; WentzeI1982).22 However, these studies were either too small 
or too locked into the racial schema of Apartheid to be able to redefine poverty in 
a significant way.23 Various people had mooted the idea of a second 'Carnegie 
Corporation type of Inquiry' from time to time as a possible way of overcoming 
these limitations. This was because in the 1930S the Carnegie Corporation had 
supported a racially exclusive Inquiry known as the Carnegie Commission on the 
Poor White Problem in South Africa. The results of this Inquiry had fed into an 
array of racially biased social policies that had secured dramatic improvements 
for 'poor Whites' (Fleisch 1995). That said, the environment had not yet proven 
conducive for a similar venture. 
20 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
21 Francis Wilson, Interview 23/07/04. 
22 The Apartheid State and White employers used the studies primarily to determine and justify 
minimum wage and public housing rental levels. But, by the 1970S the growing Black Trades 
Union movement was beginning to use poverty research of their own to contest the research 
results of the State and employers (Maasdorp and Humphreys 1975). 
23 This is not to suggest that these studies were not powerful or insightful (see for example, 
Wilsworth 1980). 
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The realisation and success of the Carnegie Inquiry was contingent on many 
factors and here I highlight three: the financial and philanthropic interest of the 
Carnegie Corporation, SALDRU's institutional location and Francis Wilson's 
personal history which appears to have facilitated the Camegie Corporation and 
SALDRU engaging in a joint venture. Firstly, the Carnegie Corporation had 
historically provided significant funds for educational initiatives in South Mrica 
until it withdrew from the country in moral support of the anti-Apartheid 
movement in the 1960s. But by the late 1970S it was quietly investigating the 
possibilities of renewing its support for the anti-Apartheid movement.24 
Secondly, SALDRU was dependent on grant funding for its financial survival and 
was always looking for ways to achieve financial security.25 SALDRU's reputation 
for forward-thinking and institutional association with the University of Cape 
Town also meant that it could be regarded as a legitimate organisation for the 
Carnegie Corporation to contract with. Thirdly, I argue, Francis Wilson's 
personal history is important. For example, Francis Wilson recalled an 
introduction to Alan Pifer (President of the Carnegie Corporation)26 as a child 
when his parents were working as anthropologists at Lovedale College27 in the 
Eastern Cape.28 Growing up in the milieu of Lovedale College was also important 
in providing Francis Wilson with the basis for many personal and scholarly 
relationships with leading Black intellectuals in the anti-Apartheid movement. 
The relationships were later strengthened through a range of familial 
interactions and his own critical scholarly work on southern Mrican labour 
24 Bell (2000, 495) and Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
25 Dudley Homer, Interview 22/07/04. 
26 Alan Pifer had become the President of the Camegie Corporation in 1967 and remained so until 
1982 (Bell 2000). 
27 Lovedale College was one of the few respected schools available for Black people because it 
offered an education beyond that provided by the Apartheid State. It counts amongst its alumni: 
Nelson Mandela, JK Mathews, Thabo Mbeki and Steven Biko. The institution closed down 
voluntarily in protest against being forced to implement the racist Bantu Education Act of 1954. 
28 Interview 21/07/04. 
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migrancy associated with the White-owned South African mining industry. These 
relationships provided credibility and access to important intellectuals and 
activists of the anti-Apartheid struggle of the late 1970S and uniquely provided 
the legitimacy for an Inquiry. Thus, as Francis Wilson noted when he started 
motivating for an Inquiry, the intellectuals and activists that he networked with: 
" ... were very responsive to the call. They knew who I was. We understood the importance 
of research and the political power of it so that everybody was very supportive. But, it 
needed a lot of quiet work, moving around and talking to people".29 
The political context 
The 'quiet work' that Francis Wilson refers to in the quote above continued for 
two years before the Carnegie Inquiry was publicly announced and was 
"absolutely critical ... I mean the [Carnegie Inquiry] would have been dead 
without those two years" .30 The reason for this sensitive approach in establishing 
an Inquiry lies in the hostile political environment of the late-Apartheid period. 
If an Inquiry was to proceed, the researchers had to remain free from detention 
or banning orders, so that the research would be allowed to proceed. The 
politically hostile environment was a constant feature of the Carnegie Inquiry. 
Dudley Horner, deputy director of SALDRU at the time of the Carnegie Inquiry, 
remarked that: 
" ... the context was extremely difficult - it was hard working on the Carnegie [Inquiry]. 
The political climate was very hostile. The State itself was doing all sorts of surveys. So 
you often went into areas where the army had been carrying out surveys. Of course 
people were very suspicious ... ".31 
This was because by the 1980s the Apartheid state had become increasingly 
internationally isolated and faced mounting internal and external opposition. 
29 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
30 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
31 Interview 22/07/04. 
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The state's response was the ever more violent suppression of critical voices. This 
was matched by an intensification of the liberation struggle against Apartheid by 
the anti-Apartheid movements. This left little space for equivocation and within 
this environment any new initiatives attracted suspicion from both sides engaged 
in this conflict. 
The hostile political context affected the research stages of the Carnegie Inquiry 
differently. While the two-year period of building support could best be 
characterised as a period of 'under cover' activities, this contrasts diametrically 
with the implementation period of the project. 
Statecraft 
It is perhaps paradoxical that within the secretive (often necessarily so) 
environment of the anti-Apartheid movements and the deliberate attempts by 
the state to suppress information and groups from networking, the Carnegie 
Inquiry insightfully and deliberately chose not to define poverty. Instead, it 
successfully deployed an expansive political strategy of 'openness' and 
uncertainty. 
This 'open' definition of poverty meant that the research was: 
" ... open to everybody. We didn't have to define poverty in that context because politically 
everybody knew what poverty meant. I mean there had been the poor White problem. So, 
paradoxically, while we were being very open about our new definition of poverty, we 
were talking about a concept that everybody understood. Particularly, the regime in 
power. [But] ... we were dealing publicly with a political concept that everybody 
understood and this gave us protection because, uncovering poverty was like, 
motherhood and apple pie. I mean this was a good thing to be doing."32 
And Francis Wilson comments that to continue with the Carnegie Inquiry: 
32 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
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..... part of our protective mechanism was to be totally open about everything. We also said 
to the Security Branch, if there is anything, let us know ... [because] ... we knew that the 
[Security] Branch were around and we knew that they were itching to stop it, if they 
could. But it was difficult - we just didn't give them the space to do it".33 
Thus the strategy of 'openness' functioned as a means of absolving the research 
from any form of bias. The 'uncertainty' of the definition also had effects. For 
example the 'scientific space' of the university had to be opened to allow 
different, non-expert (Black) voices to be heard. It also had the advantage of 
positioning SALDRU as the mere co-ordinators of public opinion rather than 
directors of a critical social process. In this way, Francis Wilson notes the "centre 
of gravity" of the study was shifted towards Black people34 - particularly those 
doing the research.35 Among the achievements of the process, in the view of 
Francis Wilson, was the establishment of a broad network36 of people addressing 
the issue and the conference held in Cape Town, which provided an opportunity 
for many of the recently unbanned members of the anti-Apartheid movement to 
be heard (Bell 2000).37 
The open and uncertain 'lived experience' definition of poverty located the truth 
about poverty in the voices of the poor, primarily Black people who did not have 
a (political) voice under Apartheid. This served to make the claims about poverty 
'true' to the anti-Apartheid movements by allowing the voices of the (Black) poor 
33 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
34 An achievement of the research was that almost 25 per cent of the researchers were Black 
which was a significant improvement on any study done previously (Francis Wilson, Interview 
21/07/04). 
35 Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
J6 The network that was created spanned twenty-two universities and a large number of agencies 
and organisations (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). 
'S7 The networks also extended into the future because on the strength of the work done on water 
issues in the Carnegie Inquiry, Francis Wilson was made Chairman of South Africa's Water 
Commission - an appointment made by the new Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry in 1994 
(Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04). 
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to catalogue the effects of Apartheid. The result was that the struggle against 
poverty melded into the struggle against Apartheid. Part of the struggle against 
Apartheid was to see South Africa as a single, non-racial country and therefore 
the researchers "were very conscious and very determined that [they] were going 
to see South Mrica as a whole".38 But, lest this is understood as a voluntarily 
chosen position, it needs to be stressed how intimately related such views were to 
the anti-Apartheid struggle and how the desired alignment with the struggle 
against Apartheid confined their options to a narrow range of possibilities. 
It was both politically and morally impossible for the Carnegie Inquiry to focus 
exclusively on 'Black' poverty. The notion of 'seeing the whole' was therefore a 
particular way of bringing 'Black poverty' into view which was thoroughly 
enmeshed in the researcher's reading of the political environment, Francis 
Wilson's intellectual interests in migrancy patterns, and the material effects of 
the discourses and practices of poverty. Francis Wilson remarked that through 
..... my own training in labour economics and learning about the migrant labour system, 
I'd always seen this as a single economy. So I was very keen to have a vision of that. 
Which is why also, we didn't want to have poverty just within the borders of South Africa. 
We wanted to include Lesotho and so on, because they were part ofthe picture".39 
The understanding of the origins of poverty that was adopted by the study 
reinforced this tendency to 'see the whole'. In the Carnegie Inquiry, the origins of 
poverty could be found in a process "that simultaneously produces wealth for 
some while impoverishing others" (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, 4). While the 
origins of poverty were traced to this simultaneous process, what made South 
Mrica unique was that the Apartheid State was identified as actively shaping and 
skewing the circuitry of this simultaneous process. The Apartheid State emerged 
as a major cause of poverty because it exacerbated the original 'equation' in 
favour of the rich and notably in this case, the White rich. The focus on the state, 
3B Francis Wilson, Interview 21/07/04. 
39 Interview 21/07/04. 
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however, also relates to the process in another way. Because the state was 
considered all pervasive, this reinforced the Carnegie Inquiry's ability to 
discursively produce a sense of an integrated South Africa. 
There was a very strong political view within the anti-Apartheid movement that 
any process or structure associated with the Apartheid state should be completely 
revolutionised and was beyond reform. However unpalatable, a minority of anti-
Apartheid activists and intellectuals realised that the livelihoods of ordinary 
people were bound up with the system of Apartheid, along with those considered 
to have 'sold-out' to the anti-Apartheid struggle. Recognising this: 
"the question then becomes how best to ease the process of transition so that those 
caught in the coils of a destructive system can move to a situation where their 
participation in a restructured economy is part of a process of enrichment for all .... 
Poverty is not simply a fact; it is also a process, and thus part of a system" (Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989,349). 
Without a view of 'the whole' the researchers would not have been able to pay 
attention to these nuances and still secure a perfect alignment between the 
struggle against poverty and the struggle against Apartheid, because the people 
within the anti-Apartheid movements would have been able to argue that the 
Carnegie Inquiry actually supported elements of the Apartheid regime. As 
Francis Wilson noted: 
"Oh, we had to walk such a careful line here - about - talking about agricultural 
development in the rural areas - now you had been co-opted by the State, you see? And 
that was another reason why one had to look at this thing as a whole".40 
The material effect of all these interacting processes, statecraft and political 
alignments was to produce the first notion of 'South African poverty'. In this 
notion of South African poverty, 'Black poverty' was equal and visible in relation 
to 'White poverty' and made a growing sense of a unified South African society 
40 Interview 21/07/04. 
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knowable specifically through including everyone in processes of 
impoverishment and the production of wealth. The difference that all these 
interactions made becomes more evident when it is realised that the Carnegie 
Inquiry drew on the existing methodology of local poverty studies prevalent in 
South Africa at the time, but was able to transform these local studies into a 
notion of South Mrican poverty. As such, South African poverty became an 
effective component of the arguments marshalled against Apartheid by the anti-
Apartheid movement and more people became conscious of poverty. 
As a result of including many more Black people in the Carnegie Inquiry, these 
and others had greater legitimacy and became authorised to speak about 'South 
Mrican poverty'. More broadly, the definition of poverty as 'lived experience' 
legitimated poor people to identify themselves in the discourse at the same time 
as de-legitimising expert (White) voices and the Apartheid State locked in its 
racial approach and certainties of definitions. This is clearly demonstrated in 
authenticating the voice of rural, Black women as the 'poorest of the poor'. As a 
result of the emphasis on the structural factors for these researchers rural, Black 
women carried the greatest societal burden. Racist state policies, patriarchal 
gender relations and geographical peripheralisation on land of marginal quality 
meant rural, Black women had the most to endure. Contemporary South African 
poverty research has continued to orbit around this dominant figure.41 The 
Carnegie Inquiry had the intended consequence of equating race with poverty in 
South Mrica. However, to the extent that this view supported, and was taken up 
by, the anti-apartheid movement, it came to be the dominant view of poverty. 
The unintended consequence was that the relationship between being black and 
being poor was configured in a way that has endured and informed broader 
political changes in South Africa. Without detracting from the miseries that the 
implementation of the Apartheid ideology wrought on Black people, the high 
levels of congruence has left little space for other understandings of poverty to 
41 Sue Parnell, Interview 22/07/04. 
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emerge.42 I will return to this later in Chapter Four in a consideration of urban 
poverty in South Mrica. The consequences of de-defining poverty in the Carnegie 
Inquiry thus reach far into the future and stand in stark contrast to subsequent 
research processes that sought to develop closely defined accounts of poverty, as 
I will show. 
2.2.2 The Project for Statistics on Living Standards Development 
(PSLSD) 
On the face of it, the PSLSD also presents no immediate definition of poverty. 
The title of the project implies that a definition relates to the improvement of 
'living standards' but this seems somewhat vague and unspecified. This 
generality is confirmed by Francis Wilson (again Project Director) that in this 
case poverty was defined as: 
" ... anything that you can measure with a number ... I think implicitly we tried to make it 
as comprehensive as Carnegie but were constrained by the fact that there are some things 
that you can't get number answers for."43 
The absence of a clear definition of poverty suggests strategic similarities with 
the Carnegie Inquiry and Francis Wilson's observation above indicates that the 
'open' definition of poverty as 'lived experience of being Black under Apartheid' 
simply continued through the PSLSD. But while the definition of poverty 
developed in the Carnegie Inquiry certainly informs the PSLSD, I argue that the 
absence of an immediate definition has more to do with a desire for neutrality 
than continuing to allow Black voices to be heard. I will show that this definition 
42 It should be noted that within broader political identities since the Carnegie Inquiry, the 
process of particular racial groups self-defining as poor has served as a political strategy to 
highlight the impact of Apartheid. 
43 Francis WiIson, Interview 21/07/04. 
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was itself contingent on the changed political context, the researcher's statecraft 
and the influence of a research methodology developed at the World Bank. I will 
point out how this different definition allowed the new voices of policy-makers to 
be heard and silenced those community voices previously 'heard' during the 
Carnegie Inquiry. An account of poverty in economic terms came to be 
authorised as the most 'truthful' understanding. 
The motivation 
In early 1990, all the main anti-Apartheid organisations had, somewhat 
surprisingly, been un-banned. Although this made the end of Apartheid 
inevitable, it created great societal uncertainty. Within this broad uncertain 
milieu, I identify two crucial questions contextually important to the PSLSD. The 
first asked what new policies would need to be developed to realise the 'new 
South Africa'. The second queried how the transition to a non-racial democracy 
would be managed and negotiated. As I will show, the definition of poverty that 
emerged in the PSLSD was contingent on both of these broader contextual 
questions. The former question provided an important motivation for the PSLSD 
research. In the turmoil of social change, the dominant line of reasoning became 
that the possibilities of realising a non-racial democracy rested on the ANC's 
ability to govern. The ability to govern, in turn, was understood to be dependent 
on effective policy-making and state policies. It followed that effective state 
policies were dependent on 'good data' and information. However, 'good data' in 
the sense of being nationally representative, and non-racial, did not exist. The 
data that did exist reflected the Apartheid government's insistence on collecting 
data in terms of 'ethnic', 'racial' or 'country /Bantustan' categories. This data was 
neither comparable nor reflected the values of a new non-racial democracy 
(Klasen 1997). 
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This need for new policy data is a fundamental motivation that informed the 
definition of poverty in the PSLSD.44 Two important points related to the 
definition of poverty follow. In Pundy Pillay's45 (1996, 14) terms, there was a 
need for the new government to know "who the poor are and where they live". 
This government, or policy, need for quantitative knowledge of (poor) subjects 
inclined the PSLSD primarily toward a task of measurement. However, this 
process is never neutral. Research does not simply observe the subjects of 
concern. It is also productive of research subjects, and in specific ways in policy-
oriented research (Hastings 1998). For this reason, Lucinda Platt (2003, 5) 
observes how "poverty research is impossible without a clear notion of a poor 
person and why it is a problem". I will return to the effects of this co-construction 
of policy formulation and the subjects of policy in later chapters. Now, I want to 
draw attention to the ways in which poor people's experiences were coming to be 
understood in largely quantitative terms. 
An important feature of the definition of poverty in the PS LSD follows from this 
requirement for quantitative data to inform policy. As a general observation, the 
quality of data generated through quantitative research is dependent on the 
consistent application of precise definitions of concepts. The quality and 
accuracy of measurement in the PSLSD therefore depended on very precise and 
specific terms that exhibited a high degree of certainty and common 
understanding to limit the possibilities of re-interpretation (and hence 
corruption and invalidation) in the process of generating the research data in 
diverse sites across South Africa. I argue therefore, that the need for quantitative 
data to inform policy and the need for definitional precision in this process was a 
significant factor that generally informed the PSLSD and shaped the way it 
44 The brief introduction to South Africans rich and poor: Baseline household statistics 
(SALDRU 1995, iii-v) focuses specifically on why the data is important and relevant for policy 
makers. 
4S Pundy Pillay was the Operational Director for the PSLSD. 
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unfolded. I have clarified that if poverty was to matter in the transitional period it 
had to be defined in policy terms. For poverty to make sense to the State meant 
quantifying it and this meant definitional accuracy of terms and concepts. I now 
want to turn to examine how the political context informed the definition that 
was developed. 
The political context 
The suspicions and animosities of the late-Apartheid period pervaded this 
volatile transitional period as political interests engaged each other. As a result of 
the dominant parties committing to a process of inclusive negotiations, tensions 
ran high and the negotiations often seemed to hang in the balance. This need to 
reflect inclusiveness filtered throughout society and informed the organisation of 
the PSLSD. As Wilson and Homer (1996, 4) reflected: 
"Given the historical circumstances [the] credibility [of the research] could only be won if 
the process of data collection was perceived not only to have been done as professionally 
and competently as possible, but also to have been done in such a manner as to restore 
public confidence that political bias had, as far as possible, been eliminated." 
The 'political bias' to which the quote refers is related to party politics and to 
erase this bias in the research, a non-political Steering Committee was 
established. Representatives from the entire spectrum of political parties were 
requested to participate, but in their individual capacities. The need to maintain 
a constant vigilance against political bias during the research process was 
intended to ensure the results of the research were politically acceptable to all. 
The process (and definition of poverty) had to be non-political in the sense of 
recognising all political interests, but treating them equally. This is a key 
difference with the Carnegie Inquiry that was presented as unconcerned with 
politics. Although, as I have suggested, the Carnegie Inquiry was highly political. 
In many ways the transitional political context afforded the PSLSD the 
opportunity of being non-partisan. Unlike during the Carnegie Inquiry, there was 
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no explicit need to align the research process and its outcomes with a specific 
political position to make valid claims about poverty. This was because it was 
almost inevitable that the ANC and its allies would secure control of the state and 
as Francis Wilson commented in relation to the transitional period: 
" ... the fact that we had a poverty discourse going in the 1980s involving practically every 
Black intellectual in the country, kind of helped to shape the discussions. I think it did .... 
I don't think it was a complete accident that poverty came out as the number one theme 
of the ANe government. I think that it was the obvious one."46 
To secure professional competence and ensure that the project had the requisite 
technical input, and hence 'scientific' legitimacy, a Technical Committee was 
established of social scientists from around the country. A group of survey 
organisations and companies were selected to actually carry out the survey. The 
Camegie Inquiry had generated a great network of researchers on poverty and 
this network provided a substantial base upon which to proceed with the PSLSD. 
However, the political climate still required that the PSLSD spend a lot of time 
introducing South Mricans to each other and also getting people in the survey 
organisations from across South Africa to meet and get to know each other 
(Wilson and Horner 1996). The institutional location of the research was also 
broadened beyond SALDRU and the University of Cape Town to include 
universities identifying with both ends of the political spectrum. 
This need to remain non-political, I argue, was another factor impacting on the 
definition of poverty. To be consistent, the definition of poverty also had to be as 
politically neutral and objective as possible. I turn to the World Bank as the last 
factor that I want to highlight in relation to the definition of poverty in the 
PSLSD. The World Bank is an important institution in relation to poverty and its 
definition. As such, I will return to consider its role and activities, at various 
points, into the next few chapters. 
46 Interview 21/07/04. 
The World Bank 
The World Bank were requested to provide assistance to the PSLS1)47 and they 
introduced a survey instrument known as the Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) (Chander, Grootaert, and Pyatt 1980). In a recent review, Angus 
Deaton (2003) draws attention to the quality of the data generated through this 
survey instrument over the years. The LSMS provided an internationally 
recognised means of measuring poverty in an objective way. It was also 
appropriate to South Mrica during the transitional period because the LSMS was 
geared toward gathering information considered relevant to policy-making . .As 
Chander, Grootaert, and Pyatt (1980,6) noted: 
... there are a great many factors which play a role in determining progress through time 
of individual and family circumstances. Those which are interesting from the perspective 
of LSMS are the ones which are amenable to being influenced by policy". 
But the congruence between the objectives of the LSMS framework and the 
South Mrican policy data requirements did not translate into an easy operational 
fit. The South African researchers questioned the format of the LSMS and, as 
Frands Wilson recalled, the research team 
U •••• got into a big slanging match with the World Bank for a while which then calmed 
down because it became a debate amongst really interested people about what a 
questionnaire could do and what we wanted it to dO".48 
The PSLSD needed to balance the need to be perceived as non-political in an 
uncertain political context, ensure technical competence, and resolve initial 
differences amongst South Mrican team members and with the World Bank. It is 
therefore not surprising that the process of drafting the survey questionnaire 
took a year and went through twelve major revisions (Wilson and Horner 1996). 
47 The origins of the PSLSD are traced to a visit by a high-ranking delegation of the ANC including 
the then deputy President of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, to the World Bank in Washington in 1992. 
48 Interview 21/07/04. 
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This process is also indicative of an earlier point about the care and precision 
taken over the terms and definitions of poverty. However, a critical factor 
shaping the definition of poverty in the PSLSD can be found embedded within 
the LSMS instrument. The original motivation for the LSMS was to provide 
policy-makers who already had a "picture of economic activity as portrayed by 
data on production, accumulation, the balance of payments, etc ... [with] ... facts 
on how individual living standards are geared to the production structure" 
(Chander, Grootaert, and Pyatt 1980, 1-2). This motivation, in turn, anticipated 
the probability of many developing countries having to "restructure their 
economies in the face of slower overall growth of export demand, and a 
worsening of the terms of trade ... [and being able to] ... formulate a policy for 
restructuring which is sensitive to its repercussions on different socio-economic 
groups" (Chander, Grootaert, and Pyatt 1980, 2). This understanding of (poor) 
households as essentially a passive adjunct to the economic 'production 
structure' is of critical importance to the positioning of the poor in relation to 
economic growth and I will return to it in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Thus through the use of the LSMS, poverty became defined in terms that made it 
easier to relate the phenomena and processes with the economy. Francis Wilson 
confirms this change. Reviewing the recent history of South Mrican poverty 
research, he reflected that: 
" ... the big shift has been that we have moved ... to the econometric type of research. So we 
have moved to questionnaires and ... the big shift came with the PS LSD of course ... ". 49 
As with the Carnegie Inquiry, the PSLSD is a complex and immense achievement 
under very trying and uncertain circumstances and it is difficult to do justice to 
all its effects. Nevertheless I want to point to the ways in which poverty began to 
be made 'visible' and 'sayable' in terms of a household's lack of access to 
resources, assets, infrastructure and commodities as measured by their income 
49 Francis Wilson, Interview 23/07/04. 
and expenditure. Living standards, or lack thereof, were defined in terms of 
income and expenditure. The origins of poverty remained rooted in decades of 
Apartheid dispossession but the solutions had changed. They were coming to be 
perceived as being found in the economy and would later be effected through the 
manipulation of state economic policy. As a consequence, the racial emphasis of 
the Camegie Inquiry could be dropped in favour of a more racially neutral and 
technical discourse of development. This chimed well with the dominant 
discourse of non-racialism and poverty came to be regarded by the State as a 
'lack of development'. This authorised the State to speak in policy terms about 
poverty. It also produced a key continuity with the Carnegie Inquiry because 
poor, Black, rural, women were defined as the most underdeveloped (Pillay 
1996). 
There are three effects that I would like to draw attention to. Firstly, the PSLSD 
provided the first set of nationally representative, non-racial data on South 
African poverty. However, quantitative social research tends to result in the 
homogenisation of poor people's experiences and expressions of poverty (cf. 
Shaffer 2002; Yapa 1998). While this feature may indeed be unavoidable in the 
formulation of social policy, Maia Green (2003) cautions that it is the 
technologies of measuring poverty that render diverse and individual experiences 
of poverty homogenous rather than these experiences being inherently 
homogenous (see also Rademacher and Patel 2002). The relative silencing of 
poor voices in this way, in this study, was recognised as problematic as I will 
show in the discussion of the SA-PPA below. However, policy-makers were 
powerfully equipped and authorised to proclaim the nature of the poverty 
problem and its solution. Indeed, the data powerfully informed the politics of the 
day through being incorporated in a range of social policies including the 
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influential Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)50 (RDP 1995). 
Pundy Pillay reflects that: 
"I think it has influenced a number of central policies. I think a number of sectors have 
drawn on [the PSLSD] - in housing, in education and ... the local government sector 
where the Equitable Share Formulasl was originally based on the household and income 
levels of RBoo per month".52 
Secondly, the discourse in which these problems and solutions were framed was 
strongly informed by income poverty theory. Since income and expenditure 
defined poverty, and formal employment was recognised as the optimal source of 
income, it was not surprising that the PSLSD concluded that, "life problem No. 1 
was unemployment" .53 This effect would prove to be of great significance in the 
formulation of local development policies in Durban and I return to the issue in 
Chapter Five. 
Thirdly, the Carnegie Inquiry's emphasis on processes of impoverishment 
through labour migration, and particularly those that extended beyond South 
Mrica's borders, could no longer be accommodated (Wilson 2005). This is not to 
detract from the importance of the data generated through the PSLSD,54 but to 
so The RDP was a developmental policy statement formulated by the ANC on coming to power 
and setting out a programme for reconstruction and redistribution of the nation's wealth, with 
the state playing a key role. It was widely seen as a manifesto for change and captured the 
imagination and hope of South Africa's historically disadvantaged groups. 
51 The Equitable Share Formula is the formula developed by the Finance and Fiscal Commission 
to determine the allocation of fiscal resources amongst South Africa's nine provinces. The 
Finance and Fiscal Commission was an agency established through South Africa's Constitution to 
fairly determine the appropriate allocation of resources between different levels of government 
and between the provinces. The poverty of a province, as determined by the number of poor 
households measured through the PSLSD, was a crucial element of the formula. 
52 Pundy Pillay, Interview 29/07/04. 
53 Dudley Homer, Interview 22/07/04. 
54 The PSLSD has been recognised as particularly innovative in its definition of 'household'. The 
eventual definition of 'household' that was adopted in the PSLSD has enabled new information to 
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point out that the Carnegie Inquiry's innovations and promise of tracing 
processes of impoverishment and enrichment across national boundaries were 
lessened in dominant South Mrican Poverty Studies. This is arguably of 
importance for poor people in southern Africa, given the increasing dominance 
and integration of the South African economy in the sub-region. 
In conclusion, the fact that there was no obvious, immediate definition of poverty 
in the PSLSD does not mean that a definition of poverty was absent and that the 
effects of the PSLSD were neutral. Poverty came to be seen as something to be 
defined in terms of income, dealt with in terms of government policy and 
understood in terms compatible with the economy. The state was authorised as 
the most important institution to act on this view of poverty in this process. 
2.2.3 The South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-
PPA) 
The participatory methodology of the SA-PP A has more in common with an 
understanding of the 'lived experience of poverty' and in this sense suggests more 
direct continuity with the Carnegie Inquiry than the PSLSD. However, this 
suggestion is misleading because the SA-PPA marks a continuity with the 
quantitative PS LSD, rather than with the Carnegie Inquiry. As I will show, the 
intention to allow the voices of poor people to define poverty is ultimately framed 
(and confined) in terms of the continuities with the PSLSD. 
The stated definition of poverty in the SA-PPA is that it is characterised as: " ... the 
inability of individuals, households, or entire communities, to command 
sufficient resources to satisfy their basic needs" (May 1998a, 2). The SA-PPA 
emerge on migrancy patterns that subsequent large scale surveys in South Africa have been not 
been able to provide (PoseI2oo3). 
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faced different contextual uncertainties and the definition that emerges is 
contingent on the political environment, agendas of international agencies, local 
development goals and institutional practices. Julian May, the lead researcher, 
considers the SA-PPA not to have been as politically successful as originally 
hoped.55 However, this lack of political success at the level of state policies 
throws light onto the argument that I have been making here. The apparent lack 
of success of the poverty study in the realm of formal politics does not mean that 
the definition of poverty it developed did not have any effects. 
The motivation 
The SA-PPA was undertaken because of a growing realisation, primarily at the 
level of international development agencies,56 that the quantitative poverty 
surveys that they had supported and facilitated did not provide a 'complete' 
understanding of poverty, for policy purposes. At this stage, the international 
development agencies were shifting their support from the anti-Apartheid 
organisations toward assisting the state with policy implementation. To gain a 
more complete understanding of poverty it was necessary to engage with poor 
people and allow them to explain how they 'experienced' poverty (cf. Brock 
2002). In this respect, the PSLSD is the reference point for the SA-PPA. To 
understand why, we need to return to another World Bank programme. 
Julian May draws attention to a curious similarity between the World Bank's 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) for highly indebted countries and 
three ofthe studies under review in this chapter - the PSLSD, SA-PPA and PIR.57 
The PRSP framework consists of a Living Standards survey, a participatory 
55 Interview 22/04/04. 
56 The SA-PPA was funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development 
and technical support was provided by the World Bank. 
57 Interview 22/04/04. 
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assessment and a policy review. The similarity is that the PSLSD corresponds to 
the Living Standards Measurement Survey (Budlender 1999). The SA-PPA is a 
participatory assessment and the Poverty and Inequality Report is a review of 
government policies. Whereas in other countries the components of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Process were undertaken more or less simultaneously, in 
South Africa it seems a similar framework was adopted with the studies being 
completed sequentially rather than simultaneously. 58 
Thus within this 'PRSP-inspired framework', and the collective intellectual 
weight of the recently completed PSLSD, it would have been extremely difficult 
not to have had the PSLSD as the reference point for the SA-PPA. Certainly, the 
PSLSD was used to decide on which provinces to focus the SA-PP A (May 1998a, 
15). It is worth recalling that the defining features of the PSLSD were the focus on 
contributing to policy and defining poverty in terms that made it easier to relate 
poverty to the economy. Any definition of poverty would be more successful if it 
enhanced the authority of the state to act in terms of poverty and could frame 
poverty within economic terms. To be able to make authoritative claims about 
poverty, the SA-PPA had to both be centrally linked to key government 
institutions and offer concrete recommendations for enhancing the delivery of 
services in a specific economic framework. 
sS I am inclined to agree with Pundy Pill ay's ascription of this similarity to the internal dynamics 
and motivations of the World Bank in seeking new business even though South Africa did not 
qualify for debt relief. Bearing in mind that the World Bank was prevented from operating in 
South Africa prior to 1994 and that it is always seeking to expand its market, the support 
provided to the research projects (notwithstanding the diverse personal commitments of the 
people involved) can ultimately be regarded as an important component of prospecting for new 
business within a standard mode of operation on the World Bank's behalf. Descriptions of 
poverty that could be internationally compared because of similar research methodologies offered 
a compelling argument for motivating for developments that may have required World Bank 
loans in South Africa (Interview 29/07/04) (see also Tomlinson 2002, 381). 
43 
The political context 
The eventual (more or less peaceful) transition to a fully democratic society 
overtook the PSLSD.59 In April 1994, South Mrica became a non-racial 
democracy with a government that inherited the negotiated settlement. The 
frenetic policy formulation of the transitional period had largely been determined 
by the ANC in its tri-partite alliance and other political interests.60 The new 
political priorities were the dismantling of South Mrica's intrinsically racist 
bureaucracy and geography, while simultaneously delivering the fruits of 
democracy to those disenfranchised and excluded by Apartheid. Moreover, in 
this early post-Apartheid period South Africa's first democratic state had 
consolidated its power. This made a difference because the SA-PPA was 
undertaken in a period of excitement and change and with little interest in policy 
fine-tuning. In this context, the institutional location of the SA-PPA is important 
in understanding its ultimate effectiveness on its intended policy target. As we 
have seen, both the Camegie Inquiry and PSLSD had been implemented from the 
institutional base of a university, which lent these research initiatives a certain 
amount of intellectual weight and 'scientific credibility'. The SA-PPA however, 
was led by a small but respected, quasi-private consultancy company.61 
59 Pundy Pillay left to participate in the process of educational policy formulation and other 
project team members were involved in the election process. The management had wisely 
decided to release the data as it became ready rather than waiting for the entire data set to be 
approved. Even so, some of the data was only publicly released after the inauguration of the 
democratic government. 
60 The Tripartite Alliance consists of a formal alliance between the ANC, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
61 The SA-PPA was led by Data Research Africa that counted Julian May as a director of the 
company. DfID selected Data Research Africa to undertake the research on the basis of Data 
Research Africa's record and experience of undertaking qualitative social surveys and Julian 
May's expertise on poverty issues. 
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Francis Wilson had spent two years enrolling key anti-Apartheid intellectuals 
and activists in what was to become the Carnegie Inquiry and the original 
motivation for the PSLSD came from the highest level of anti-Apartheid political 
leadership and the PSLSD then spent a considerable amount of effort in 
embracing the entire party political spectrum. By comparison, the SA-PPA 
appears as a creation of the international development agencies and, however 
powerful it might be thought that these agencies are, the SA-PPA had neither the 
institutional weight nor the political connectedness of the Carnegie Inquiry and 
PSLSD. The solution to this problem was for the SA-PPA to incorporate a senior 
government official from the RDP Office in the management team to ensure that 
the results of the research would immediately filter into government.62 In this 
way, the SA-PPA adopted a similar assumption to the PSLSD, which was that the 
state was now part of the solution to poverty. However, the immediate link to 
government and formal politics was lost when the RDP office was unexpectedly 
closed down in June 1996. This caused serious problems for the SA-PPA and 
raised the question of how the results could be channelled into policy-making 
and politics. The problems were only resolved later through the PIR. 
The institutional context 
While the motivation for the SA-PPA draws attention to broader international 
circuits of knowledge and development aid and attempts to inform South African 
policies, the SA-PPA had to include a range of very local charitable and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to implement the participatory methodology 
it was committed to. The alignment with organisations already based in, and 
committed to, poor communities facilitated participatory poverty research within 
poor communities. It also had the progressive political effect of widening the 
62 The RDP Office was located within the executive Office of the Deputy President and was widely 
regarded as a 'super-ministry' responsible for co-ordinating the post-Apartheid development 
effort across all the government's ministries. 
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range of voices participating in poverty eradication policy making. But this 
process of inclusion raised its own set of problems that had to be overcome if the 
research was to be considered at all successful. 
.As Morag Bell (2000; 2002) shows in the case of the Carnegie Inquiry, the 
Carnegie Corporation certainly pursued its own interests in particular forms of 
'knowledge', and as I argue in the case of the PSLSD, the World Bank's LSMS 
format was influential in shaping the parameters of the knowledge generated. 
Arguably however, the World Bank - as a profit-making business with an explicit 
commitment to a specific economic agenda - had a more tangible and pointed 
stake in the process and results of the poverty research it was then promoting 
than the Carnegie Corporation had had in the Carnegie Inquiry. It was precisely 
the more tangible interest of the World Bank that raised the ire and suspicions of 
the NGO networks that the SA-PPA sought to mobilise and include in conducting 
the participatory research.63 The impact of Robert Chambers' ideas on 
participatory forms of research and development had already filtered through to 
South Mrica's NGO sector and had found a ready audience seeking ways to make 
the voices of the marginalised and poor heard in the far more conducive political 
environment of the transitional and post-Apartheid period. Thus, by the time the 
SA-PPA was being formulated, participatory appraisal methodologies had been 
extensively claimed, developed and utilised by a well-established 'sector' of non-
governmental organisations. Thus Julian May anticipated and encountered: 
" ... a real ownership question, that this was a methodology that NGOs ought to do ... 
There was a vision ... [that we could not go and]. .. simply extract information. It would be 
politically impossible in South Africa. I think we recognised that ... ". 64 
The politics to which Julian May refers in this instance was a vibrant local civic 
or community politics that could 'make or break' any initiatives in the 
63 Julian May Interview 22/04/04. 
64 Julian May Interview 22/04/04. 
'community'. The non-governmental organisations were already part of this 
circuit of community politics and their 'gate-keeping' of external processes was 
an important factor in determining the possibilities for any new initiatives in 
poor communities. Whereas the Carnegie Inquiry and PSLSD had overcome the 
barrier of community politics through securing political legitimacy at the level of 
the political leadership, the SA-PPA resolved the issue through securing the 
legitimacy of the non-governmental organisations. To secure the legitimacy of 
the process amongst NGOs, the SA-PPA established a committee of respected 
academics and practitioners65 to oversee an innovative process of linking NGOs 
and poor communities to policy-making processes.66 The SA-PPA was very 
strategic in this way because the success of the methodology depended on having 
access and trust within local communities. There was probably no other way that 
the SA-PPA could have proceeded within the "extremely tight time limit" set by 
the international development agencies funding the research (May 1998, 15) 
because to have built up the trust that was required for significant levels of 
participation would have exceeded the project's duration. The partnering with 
NGOs, who would continue to address local issues raised by the research process, 
also allowed the final report of the SA-PP A to shift the emphasis of the results to 
policy issues rather than focus on concrete activities for change in the local 
communities participating in the research. This is evident in the "intended 
audience" listed in the final report as including "policy makers", "development 
managers" and "development practitioners" (May 1998a, 17-18), and not 
community organisations or poor people. 
Thus, through the SA-PPA a far broader definition of poverty is made 'visible' 
and 'sayable'. Poverty includes "shocks which do not have a direct political root, 
such as domestic violence or criminal violence, drought and ill health" (May 
65 The committee comprised Julian May, Francie Lund, Peter Ewang, Heidi Atwood, Andy Norton 
and Wilfred Wentzel (May 1998a, 10). 
66 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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1998a, 20), and overlaps with a sense of vulnerability. Vulnerability, especially 
arising from seasonal changes, in turn introduces "dynamic aspects of well-being 
... and speaks to the prevailing insecurity of livelihoods" (May 1998a, 73). The 
effect is that poor people's voices are heard and in new ways in relation to 
'poverty traps' from which they cannot escape over time (cf. Carter and May 
2001). However, the definition of poverty also had to be made 'visible' and 
'sayable' in policy terms. For example, the researchers note: "poverty is not 
experienced 'by sector' ... [but that] information is presented in this form largely 
in order to group certain issues in a form which will speak to policy debates in 
South Africa" (May 1998a, 56). This policy-focus appears to sit uneasily alongside 
a commitment to validate the voices of the poor and overcome a "bias to what is 
measurable, comparable and conforms to the concepts and realities of the 
professionals" (May 1998a, 38). Thus, these voices were enrolled in supporting a 
predetermined definition of poverty that would have some purchase at a policy 
level. This predetermined definition of poverty, inclining towards policy 
relevance, remained dominant despite the observation that the poor: 
..... perceived [poverty] to encompass a number of key dimensions with income not 
mentioned ... Thus poverty is manifested by too little food, large numbers of children, 
inadequate and crowded shelter, and finally, exclusion from community self-help 
structures ... [and] ... frequently, concepts used in ranking exercises coincided more 
closely with an idea of 'well-being/ill-being' than 'wealth/poverty"'(May 1998a, 39)· 
The definition of poverty made visible and sayable in the SA-PPA shows the 
difficulty of bridging what appears to be a vast gulf emerging between policy-
makers and poor people. This is a concern that contributes to the motivation for 
the Poverty Hearings, as I show later in the chapter. 
In conclusion the loss of the immediate policy link into government and 
consequent lack of impact of the research on policy, combined with Julian May's 
sense that the SA-PPA had not been taken seriously enough by policy-makers, 
was a source of considerable motivation for him to bid to undertake the Poverty 
and Inequality Report (PIR).67 In so doing, he was able to mobilise some of the 
SA-PPA conclusions in the PIR. 
2.2.4 Poverty and Inequality Report 
The Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR) declares the same definition of poverty 
as the SA-PPA. Poverty is characterised by: " ... the inability of individuals, 
households or entire communities to command sufficient resources to satisfy a 
socially acceptable minimum standard of living" (May 1998b, 2). This is not 
surprising given that Julian May was again the project leader but, as I show, the 
definition has different effects in a changed context. 
The policy context 
As the SA-PPA research drew to a close, the South Mrican government closed 
down the RDP Ministry and Office and, shortly thereafter, introduced a macro-
economic policy known as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
policy (Government of South Africa 1996). Despite GEAR having one of its aims 
as the "redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor" 
(Government of South Mrica 1996, 1), the vision of growth identified in the 
report is considered to be inspired by conservative, pro-market ideals (for 
example, Cheru 2001; Habib and Padayachee 2000; Peet 2002). Progressive 
intellectuals and activists within the ANC's tri-partite alliance working towards 
the realisation of a more just post-Apartheid society, greeted the introduction of 
GEAR with dismay and consternation (c.f. Marais 1998). Notwithstanding 
trenchant and sustained criticism, the government has continued to implement 
this policy. This macro-economic policy is important for this study because it 
shaped the understanding of poverty that developed in the PIR as well as the 
67 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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Poverty Hearings, and filtered down to local development policies in Durban, as I 
will show in Chapters Four and Five. 
Policy-making 
GEAR had effectively become the focal point in relation to which all other policy 
initiatives had to respond or frame responses. GEAR was a form of intervening in 
the economy to reduce poverty that the PSLSD had made possible, although not 
inevitable, by framing poverty in terms that made it easier to conceive of 
managing poverty through the economy and economic policies. I have noted how 
poverty was increasingly being framed as an economic issue in the studies prior 
to the PIR. Francis Wilson notes the 'big shift' to econometric studies in poverty 
research generated "all kinds of insights which we didn't have before".68 The 
most important insight in the context of this chapter is that the 'PRSP-inspired 
framework' had two effects. Firstly, it made the relationships between (poor) 
households and the production structure of the economy visible, and secondly, it 
also revealed new insights and depth to what had been known since the Carnegie 
Inquiry and before to be a highly skewed and unequal distribution of wealth in 
South Africa. As Julian May writes: 
" ... the majority of poor South Africans continue to face markets that are thin or 
missing ... [and] ... many markets remain strongly influenced by existing positions of power 
and influence through the institutions through which they operate ... " (May 2000,12). 
However, just at the time that the economy was emerging as a solution to poverty 
for the government, the researchers in the PIR were identifying the government's 
specifically neo-liberal understanding of the economy as itself part of the 
problem of poverty. However, the institutional location of the PIR meant that the 
government was able to declare the economy as 'off-limits' to the PIR process.6<) 
68 Francis Wilson, Interview 23/07/04. 
69 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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And, as I will show below, the contractual proximity of the PIR to the ultimate 
policy makers left little space for negotiation. The broader questions of the role of 
the state in poverty reduction processes in sub Saharan Africa was the subject of 
a major research exercise organised by the Comparative Research Programme on 
Poverty (CROP) that included SALDRU (cf. Wilson, Kanji, and Braathen 2001b). 
The editors note in their introduction that despite shifts towards more inclusive 
approaches to social policy "there is still a tendency both by governments in 
Africa and the international finance institutions to separate out economic and 
social policies and to underestimate the importance of the linkages" (Wilson, 
Kanji, and Braathen 2001a, 4). 
Institutional location 
On this occasion, although initially motivated by international agencies (May 
2000, 3), the research was commissioned and managed directly by the highest 
levels of the South African Government and technical support was again 
provided by the World Bank.70 The PIR was similar to the SA-PPA in being 
implemented by a consortium of consultants. The purpose of the research was to 
undertake a review of the effectiveness of the post-Apartheid government's 
policies on poverty. In terms of the similarities with the 'PRSP framework', the 
PIR can be regarded as the final element of poverty research. 
The institutional location appears to have had contradictory effects. On one 
hand, the researchers were guaranteed unmediated access to the top policy-
makers. Perhaps inevitably, this exposed the PIR more directly to the fickleness 
of national political processes, as I will show in relation to the Poverty Hearings. 
On the other hand, the research was more institutionally constrained than any of 
the previous studies I have considered in this chapter. The research was 
constrained because the parameters for the project were already set and the PIR 
70 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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was developed in response to a call for tenders by the RDP Office.71 Julian May's 
comments on the contractual beginning of the PIR are worth repeating at length 
because they draw attention to a number of organisational and institutional 
processes that created new uncertainties. Julian May comments: 
So the tender process started in the RDP office ... 1... put together quite a strong team ... 
the RDP Office informed us that we had won it, a contract was signed and then the RDP 
Office closed. So we had two loose ends now. SA-PPA finished with no one to give it to 
and the PIR ready to start with no one to manage it .... You will recall in about 1996, 
about July, that's when they released GEAR We were called to a meeting, which was 
attended, by ... about eight Ministers and the Deputy President, Mbeki at that point at 
which it was touch and go whether the PIR would continue. There was a very strong view 
that the PIR was not wanted at the same time as they released GEAR. That the last thing 
that they wanted was a document coming out of the Presidency that might be seen as a 
critique of GEAR. They were deeply unhappy about some of the people that we had on 
the team and insisted that some people be removed and replaced them with others. "72 
A focus on the role of the labour market and macro-economic policy in shaping 
poverty was removed from the terms of reference73 and changes were made to 
the project team.74 This makes an interesting comparison with the Carnegie 
Inquiry that sought to bring the structure of the economy into view to support 
the political struggle against Apartheid. The post-Apartheid government, on the 
other hand, used its political power to hide certain structural (economic) causes 
of poverty. 
Notwithstanding serious political concerns on the part of the researchers about 
whether the new terms of reference for the study had become too limiting, the 
PIR continued.75 The consequence of continuing was that the PIR: 
71 The study was planned to be managed by the RDP office and the major funder was the UK 
Government's Department for International Development (Julian May, Interview 22/04/04). 
72 Interview 22/04/04. 
73 These components were reinserted in the book Poverty and Inequality in South Africa. 
Meeting the Challenge (May 2000). 
74 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
75 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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" ... suddenly went from a study that was for the RDP Office, with international funders 
and international interests, to a study that was suddenly centre stage ... with very strong 
political involvement." (Julian May Interview 22/04/04) 
Indeed this substantiated Francis Wilson's claim in 1996 (but not in the way that 
he anticipated) that since 1990: 
" ... all research into poverty has occurred with the knowledge that any issues uncovered, 
or policy proposals made, would engage the immediate interest of the government of the 
country" (1996b, 227). 
A number of government committees were established to oversee the research at 
different levels. The PIR reported directly to an Inter-Ministerial Sub-
committee76 and a Reference Group of Directors General77 and finally a broader 
Ministerial Group including Deputy-President Mbeki. Thus while the Ministers 
were very amiable in Julian May's view, there was a sense that discussions: 
" ... could go so far and then there was an area that was off limits and [could] not 
be engaged with ... ".7B The area that was off limits was the "real economy".79 It is 
important to note that this was a selective view of the economy that was off-
limits to the research. Through the GEAR macro-economic policy the South 
African government was arguing that the solution to poverty lay in a particular 
type of (neo-liberal) economic growth. At the same time, the cause of poverty was 
being located by the PIR in the economy and in their view such neo-liberal 
economic prescriptions would only exacerbate poverty levels. 
We can grasp the definition of poverty established through the PIR, then, as 
76 This sub-committee was chaired by Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (Minister of Social Welfare) and 
included, amongst others, the Ministers of Health, Land Affairs, Finance, and Water Affairs and 
Forestry. 
77 The post of Director General is the highest appointed position in the Government bureaucracy. 
78 Interview 22/04/04. 
79 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
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partly the result of having to associate with what the PIR regarded as dominant 
neo-liberal economic discourses and practices and, because of their differences 
from this point of view, partly as an attempt to retrieve some 'progressive socio-
political intent' in the overall schema of poverty alleviation. In the 
implementation of the research, Julian May recalls that: 
" .. .it was a battle with the [World] Bank on the one hand and they had, you know, very 
strong ideas about what the market was, and education was the route ... they had some 
very clear pre-conceived ideas as to what policy recommendations ought to come out of 
the PIR".8o 
The researchers in the PIR tried therefore to weave together three somewhat 
divergent trajectories represented by different interests. The first was their own 
concerns for equitable social change. The second was the need to engage with 
specific understandings of human development promoted by the World Bank. 
The third was a need to speak to the dominant neo-liberal discourses and 
practices of economic growth presented by the government. The resulting 
position was that poor people could potentially benefit from the process of 
economic growth, based on the assumption that the wider people's options and 
the higher their quality of life, the greater potential there is for economic growth. 
Economic growth and human development were considered to mutually 
reinforce each other - the ability of the state to provide services required growth 
and growth requires human development. However, "while growth is a necessary 
condition for the alleviation of poverty, it is not a sufficient condition" (May 
2000, 8). In the view of the PIR researchers, there was a need to focus on the 
more embracing concept of 'human development'. 
But, despite the care with which this balance between the dominant discourses of 
economic growth and broader social concerns were crafted by the end of the PIR, 
agreement could not be reached on the conclusions between the research team 
80 Interview 22/04/04. 
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and government's Steering Committee. Si The compromise was that the PIR 
would be released as a report to Government rather than a report fo r 
Government.S2 Julian May is of the opinion that the report would then have been 
quietly shelved.s3 However, he reflects that because of the Poverty Hearings: 
" ... because of this road show of the NGO sector trawling around South Africa with the 
testimonies of the poor, at the big shindig that they then organised in Cape Town, 
government was challenged to say: "What is your response to poverty? Look civil society 
is doing so much, what are you doing about poverty?" And so they wheeled out the PIR. 
So rather than burying it, we suddenly shot up from our meeting with 20 Directors 
General. Within a month or two we had a meeting of, I don't know, 250 people, including 
the Archbishop, Chief Rabbi, Head Mullah, several premiers and god knows how many 
Ministers, Directors General all over the place - we actually had this huge shindig."14 
In sum, the PIR made poverty visible and sayable as a means of managing the 
"dynamic relationship" between human development and economic growth (May 
2000, 8). In this way, poverty was to be addressed through the processes of 
human development and economic growth. This is based on the view that 
poverty is a restriction of human development and thus of the overall potential 
for economic growth. The logic is that reducing poverty increases human 
development that in turn promotes economic growth. It is Julian May's view that 
this definition of poverty would never have achieved the profile it did unless the 
Poverty Hearings had taken place.8s 
2.2.5 NaHonal Speak Out on Poverty 
The impact of the GEAR macro-economic policy was also being felt amongst 
South Africa's substantial NGO sector and poverty researchers. For example, 
81 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
82 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
83 Interview, 22/04/04. 
14 Interview, 22/04/04. 
85 Julian May, Interview 22/04/04. 
55 
Wilson et al (2001a) had begun to question the role of the state in poverty 
reduction processes. It was becoming clearer that poverty was "inextricably and 
structurally entwined with dimensions of power at the national and international 
levels" and therefore, that it was no longer possible to gloss over the role of the 
state in any research that sought to analyse with poverty (Wilson, Kanji, and 
Braathen 2001a, 4). In addition to the general concern that GEAR had been 
formulated relatively exclusively and represented a departure from the aims of 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, J acqui Boulle from the South 
African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) - South Africa's umbrella 
organisation representing the NGO sector - observed two other trends. The first 
was that the debates about GEAR were tending to polarise NGOs within the 
sector and that the sector was losing a common focus (and hence effectiveness) 
in a post-Apartheid, democratic environment. The second sense was that policy 
and administrative gaps between goals and results that were emerging in the 
implementation of South Africa's new policies to meet basic needs were not being 
attended to. In addition there was no platform for poor people to make their 
experiences of the new policies heard. An issue or goal was needed to unite the 
force of the NGO sector and provide a platform for poor people's voices. Poverty 
was chosen as this issue from the range of social causes the NGO sector was 
pursuing.86 As Debbie Budlender - editor of the Speak out on Poverty summary 
report - noted: 
"As policy-makers reflect on strategies to eradicate poverty, Speak Out on Poverty aimed 
to provide a platform for the poor to influence the policy agenda, by talking about their 
experiences and solutions to poverty. The hearings are the beginning of a broader 
campaign to ensure that poverty eradication becomes the nation's priority" (1998, 8). 
The Poverty Hearings were considered necessary by important organizations in 
the NGO sector to both remind policy-makers in government about the claims of 
poor people to participate in the policy making process and to ensure that their 
substantive claims for assistance would continue to be prioritized. 
86 Jacqui Boulle, Interview, 07/09/05. 
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The motivation 
The motivation for the Poverty Hearings emerged from these NGO sector-wide 
factors and was contingent on the organisational abilities of the NGO sector at 
that time. The Poverty Hearings mobilized the same types of networks and 
circuits of organizations that the SA-PPA had sought to mobilize, but on a much 
bigger scale. The initiative drew on the format of South Mrica's high profile 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to give poor people "a chance to be heard" 
and consisted of a series of ten themed public Poverty Hearings convened around 
the country to gather the testimonies of poor people themselves (Budlender 
1998). Through a range of technologies such as simultaneous translation and 
toll-free telephone numbers, the submissions were heard, collected and 
acknowledged. The Poverty Hearings brought together "over 10,000 people" in a 
two and half month period and "nearly 600 people presented oral evidence" and 
there were "many hundreds of written records of the stories of those who arrived 
to make submissions on the day" (Budlender 1998, 8). 
The Poverty Hearings as an organizational form was itself the outcome of a set of 
processes between the Commission for Gender Equality, the South African 
Human Rights Commission,87 SANGOCO, and nine different international and 
national donor organizations.88 Apart from the ability to successfully organise 
this logistical feat, I draw attention to the themes of each Poverty Hearing. 
SANGOCO quickly realised that drawing on the 'lived experience' of poor people 
would result in a wide range of responses. Consequently, if the process was to 
87 The Commission for Gender Equality and the South African Human Rights Commission are 
both independent agencies provided for in the South African Constitution. 
88 Indeed one of the major funders of the Poverty Hearings - UNDP - simultaneously supported 
the PIR. Given the impact of the Poverty Hearings on the PIR, this raises interesting questions 
about the contested international terrain of poverty discourses on policy (Julian May, Interview 
22/04/0 4). 
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have any impact on the targeted audience of South Africa's Parliament, it would 
firstly be necessary to direct the process and secondly, focus it in a way that 
would be relevant to the government. Perceptively, SANGOCO created the 
possibilities for a more certain definition of poverty by tracing a policy lineage 
from the goals of the Reconstruction and Development Programme through the 
Bill of Rights expressed in the new Constitution to the obligations of the 
government to deliver social services and redistribute the country's wealth89 (see 
for example Pamell1998, 20). 
The definition of poverty that emerged in the Poverty Hearings drew explicitly on 
the certainty of the UNDP's Human Development Report that had broadened 
poverty to include reference to a lack of access to resources and also targeted the 
lack of effective delivery on basic needs by the government's new policies. This is 
encapsulated in the introductory quote chosen to illustrate the definition of 
poverty: 
"Poverty is lack of land and lack of resources to access land and basic facilities. It is the 
lack of capacity to purchase land, and for those of us with access to some land, poverty is 
the lack of resources to make productive use of that piece of land. If we get land and then 
we are assisted to secure inputs and services, such as fertilizers, good seed, farming 
equipment, credit and extension, we can beat poverty" (D Magadlela in Budlender 1998, 
7)· 
While the Poverty Hearings appear to have affected the PIR, the immediate 
impact of the process appears to have been limited. As in the PIR, the ANC was 
sensitive to critiques associated with GEAR and not a single local councillor 
attended the ten Hearings.9o Moreover, the sheer scale of managing the logistics 
diminished the immediate advocacy potential of the initiative. Both the 
Commission for Gender Equality and the South African Human Rights 
Commission reports annually to Parliament. SANGOCO handed over the final 
report to the Human Rights Commission to present to Parliament as part of its 
Se} Jacqui Boulle, Interview, 07/09/05. 
90 Jacqui Boulle, Interview 07/09/05. 
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annual report. However, the content of the report was downplayed for fear of 
political sensitivities and as a result, the effectiveness of the process was 
diminished.91 
Nonetheless, the outcome of the Poverty Hearings is that poverty was 'visible' 
and 'sayable' in terms of South Mrica's Bill of Rights and the government's 
service delivery programme. Strategically, this allowed poor voices to be heard 
and legitimated on terms and within the framework of the State and its 
development programme. A relationship was made visible between human rights 
and poverty. The Poverty Hearings go further than this and make visible poor 
people's ingenuity and innovation despite the lack of support from the State. This 
definition of poverty makes 'visible' and 'sayable' that aspects of the new macro-
economic policies of the State are responsible for the perpetuation, and even 
reinforcement, of poverty in South Africa. The effect of making poverty 'visible' 
and 'sayable' in this way and, it appears, coincidentally at this juncture, 
compelled the government to respond on poverty issues and paradoxically raised 
the profile of the PIR. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the extent to which definitions 
of poverty are 'obvious' in the sense of apparently accurately comprehending and 
conveying experiences and accounts of misery, impoverishment and deprivation 
in South Mrica since 1980. Through the example of five national studies of 
poverty, I have suggested that far from being obvious, definitions of poverty can 
always only be incomplete and partial and that this partiality has been 
'productive' of effects on policy making and for poor people. These effects include 
making only certain claims, actions and voices 'visible' and 'sayable'. 
91 Jacqui Boulle, Interview 07/09/05. 
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I pointed to the different ways in which the researchers all faced complex, 
uncertain environments in pursuing their respective research objectives, and 
how this was contingent on a diverse range of factors and social processes. I 
noted how both the process of defining poverty and definitions of poverty 
changed and reflected the researcher's different perceptions of political 
priorities. For example, I observed how the Carnegie Inquiry (de)defined poverty 
and how this allowed previously unheard and unseen Black voices and 
experiences of poverty to emerge and contribute to the case, and cause, against 
Apartheid. The PSLSD however, demanded very certain and commonly agreed 
upon definitions of poverty that would have some purchase on South Mrica's 
post-Apartheid policy making process and implicitly related to an understanding 
of the structure of the economy. The SA-PP A and its open definition of 'poverty 
as lived experience' can be considered a reaction to the extent to which 
definitions of poverty became dominated by quantitative understandings 
through the PSLSD. 
The PIR eventually provided a wider audience for the results of the SA-PP A 
although it had to strike a balance between competing views of the solution to 
poverty as residing in economic growth, human development, and more direct 
and tangible forms of the redistribution of wealth. But the high profile of the PIR 
itself was dependent on the challenge presented by the Poverty Hearings process 
and its attempt to link the definition of poverty to basic human rights. Contrary 
to the presentation of the development of poverty studies as linear, as described 
in the overview at the start of this chapter, this analysis of definitions of poverty 
shows that the process is more complex and convoluted. Instead, the definitions 
of poverty have always made some voices and actions relating to poverty 
reduction 'visible' and 'sayable' and not others. To be able to 'open up' the 
obviousness of definitions of poverty has been an important first step in 
interrupting the ways in which different aspects of the common understandings 
of poverty are routinely constructed and demonstrating how only certain aspects 
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are made 'visible' and 'sayable'. The insight is fundamentally important to clear 
the way for strategies to think creatively about poverty, and points to the forms of 
power that hold what is currently 'visible' and 'sayable' about poverty together 
(cf. Destremau 2001). 
There are two points that were implicit in this analysis and which it is necessary 
to state here before proceeding to the following chapters. The first is that the 
inevitably partial nature of definitions of poverty suggests that poverty 
researchers are thoroughly implicated in selecting specific definitions of poverty, 
even if it is accepted that they are not the only agents involved in this process. 
Indeed, the inclusion of such factors as the personal motivations of researchers, 
contextual contingencies and political changes in the analysis of the chapter 
points to the ways that definitions of poverty emerge from far more than 
straightforward research exercises that are presented as simply combining 
academic ideas and 'facts' together. This insight signals the importance of the 
role of the subject positions involved in poverty research. It is an issue that I wish 
to keep in mind throughout the thesis, as I return to it in different ways in so far 
as it suggests an important avenue for pursuing changes in thinking about how to 
address 'poverty'. 
The second point implicit in this chapter concerns assumptions made about the 
nature of the relationship of poor people to the state, to the economy and 
particularly to the nature of economic growth. This relationship has often, 
although not exclusively, been considered through the lens of policy making. 
Increasingly, I argue, the definitions of poverty in South Mrica have come to be 
framed in terms of economic policy making within an appreciation of both local 
and international economic processes (cf. Wilson, Kanji, and Braathen 2001b). 
However, an important source of both definitions of poverty and the way in 
which poverty is conceptualised in relation to economic growth are theories of 
poverty. Thus, in the next chapter, I consider how the three theories of poverty 
that have dominated the national studies analysed in this chapter conceptualise 
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economic growth. Within this focus, I examine how poor people's economic 
activities are considered by the three poverty theories to contribute to economic 
growth. As I will go on to show in subsequent chapters, the way in which poverty 
has been framed in economic terms appears to dis-empower poor people by 
perceiving their activities and needs to be subservient, and secondary, to broader 
goals of economic growth. 
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The (in)visibility of poor people's 
economic activities in relation to 
economic growth 
In the previous chapter, I pointed to the ways that poverty researchers were 
implicated in producing definitions of poverty that were contingent on their 
analyses and interpretations of complex and continually changing environments. 
Inevitably this resulted in definitions that were partial. I suggested that the 
effects of this partiality are typically neglected. Consequently, what often goes 
unacknowledged in poverty research is that definitions of poverty have already 
silenced some voices and legitimated others, and made certain aspects of poverty 
'visible' and 'sayable' and others not, and all this before they are deployed in any 
research exercise or built on during a process of policy formulation. 
This chapter aims to extend this analysis and explore how three prominent 
theories of poverty make poor people's economic activities 'visible' and 'sayable', 
specifically in relation to economic growth. This aim draws three issues through 
from the previous chapter. Firstly, from the five national studies of poverty I 
trace out three theories of poverty - income poverty, basic needs and sustainable 
livelihoods - that have been influential in shaping the different definitions that 
have emerged. Secondly, having noted the increasing importance of the role of 
economic growth in alleviating poverty, I draw through a focus on how the 
concept of economic growth is mobilised within poverty studies. Finally, I build 
on the argument that different representations of poverty make certain strategies 
to reduce poverty 'visible' and 'sayable'. Specifically, I focus on the understanding 
within Anglo poverty research that poor people's economic activities are unable 
to contribute to economic growth (Rakodi 2002a; Devas 2004). As JK Gibson-
Graham (2000, 102) observes, such "activities are rarely represented as resilient, 
ubiquitous, capable of generative growth, or driving economic change." I hope to 
respond to the recognition that this issue has been neglected in poverty research 
(BeaU 2002), by anchoring poor people's economic activities to the concept of 
economic growth in a different way, thus opening up the possibilities of 
imagining alternative strategies for addressing poverty. 
The importance of the role of economic growth in alleviating poverty is deeply 
inscribed in all three theories of poverty, albeit in different ways and despite 
many disagreements about the nature and measurement of the concept.89 In this 
view, economic growth is a necessary, if not always sufficient condition, to 
eradicate poverty. Martin Ravallion (1997) cautions that to assume that 
approaches to poverty take economic growth to be the sole indicator of change in 
poverty levels is to overstate the case. But it is fair to say that representations of 
the relationship between poverty and economic growth are discursively 
dominant in structuring theoretical understandings of what is to be done about 
poverty (Wood 2003). To my mind, the dominance of this understanding 
provides good reason to pay particular attention to its effects. 
The relevance of examining the relationship between poverty and economic 
growth in the three poverty theories is also underscored by their place as two of 
the top policy priorities in South Africa since the advent of the post-Apartheid 
period (Everatt 2003; Wilson 1996). Eradicating poverty and ensuring economic 
growth - almost always presented together as a package - have consistently 
remained the top priorities of the national government (African National 
Congress 1994; Department of Finance 1996; Mbeki 2003). As I consider in the 
89 These disagreements tend to centre on debates about the quantity, quality and form of 
economic growth (Thomas et al. 2000; Kanbur 2001; Thirlwall 2002; Ravallion 2001; Dollar and 
Kraay 2002). These debates also overlap with issues such as the level of dysfunctionality of 
poverty on the p~ospects for future growth (Carter and May 2001; Osmani 2000, 2004; Ranis, 
Stewart, and Rrumrez 2000). 
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next chapters, these twin policy priorities have increasingly centred on the post-
Apartheid development of South Africa's cities. Indeed, so prevalent and taken-
for-granted is this dominant view of the role of economic growth that it is 
difficult to extend the analysis from the previous chapter to recognise that 
poverty researchers (amongst others) are heavily implicated in (re)producing 
contingent representations of poverty. To disrupt this dominant view it is useful 
to ask a question that tends to go against the grain of the analysis that results 
from the three theories: namely, how are poor people's economic activities 
considered to contribute to economic growth in theories of poverty? 
The three theories of poverty all 'see' poor people as engaging in economic 
activities such as transacting, consuming, and to some extent producing goods 
and commodities. Therefore the reason that these theories are unable to 
represent poor people's economic activities as contributing to economic growth is 
not because the activities of poor people are not considered economic. To some 
extent, the way in which the inability to 'see' poor people's economic activities as 
contributing to economic growth has been avoided is to suggest that the problem 
lies in the lack of good data at the appropriate scale. Thus, the solution to the 
problem is perceived as lying somewhat outside the disciplinary realm of poverty 
studies. Carole Rakodi conveys a commonly held view that the problem lies in the 
lack of available statistical data to "quantify the size of the economy in most 
towns and cities" (2oo2a, 289), most especially those in which many poor 
people's activities are unrecorded, unregulated and informal.90 
The argument that I wish to develop here takes a different path and I look within 
poverty studies. I suggest that one of the reasons why poor people's economic 
activities are not 'visible' and 'sayable' as contributing to economic growth in the 
three theories of poverty is because these activities are (unintentionally) 
represented as, at least initially, divorced from processes of economic growth. I 
90 See also Devas (2004, 34). 
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will argue that this inability to consider poor people's economic activities as 
contributing to economic growth is folded into contemporary poverty politics. 
The chapter consists of three parts. Although the three theories bring economic 
growth into view in different ways, each of the theories makes reference to a 
generic concept of economic growth. In the first part, I provide an overview of 
this common understanding of economic growth. In the second part, I focus on 
the three theories of poverty in turn. I briefly describe some of the important 
features of the theory and then consider how poor people's economic activities 
are represented through the theory. These representations are then contrasted 
with the ways in which the generic concept of economic growth is brought into 
view. In the third and final part, I draw attention to the consequences of the way 
in which poor people's economic activities are made 'visible' and 'sayable' in 
relation to economic growth for poverty research. 
3.1 The concept of economic growth 
The vast literature on economIC growth reflects its importance and an 
acknowledgement that economic growth is the result of a complex interaction 
amongst a diverse range of factors. Consequently, there are many theories that 
seek to explain part or all of its causes (Ferreira 1999). My intention here is not to 
engage with this body of work but to tease out some of the important conceptual 
issues at the core of understanding economic growth from the perspective of 
theories of poverty. It appears that all theories of poverty take their lead from a 
concept of economic growth developed primarily in the discipline of Economics 
(Brady 2003)· However, while the different theories of poverty share the basic 
concepts of economic growth, I will show that each theory represents this 
phenomenon in a different way. Nevertheless, they all make it (more or less) 
difficult to think of the ways in which poor people's economic activities could 
contribute to economic growth. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of factors related to economic growth, at their core 
the theories of economic growth all assume that growth is a generative, 
propellant activity based on some form of innovation (Massey 1996).91 Various 
theoretical schools have emerged to explain the sources of 'innovation' and the 
relationship of innovation to levels of productivity and profitability. Exogenous 
theories were developed in the 1950S and 1960s and assumed that the dominant 
source of growth must come in the form of technological innovation from outside 
of an economy, because they made the assumption of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. In these theories, capital (investment) was always assumed to 
be more productive than investment in labour. Thus, as the capital to labour ratio 
in production increased, these theories suggested the incentive to invest would 
decrease because the marginal returns would diminish. The result would be 
decreasing income growth per capita, unless technological innovation altered the 
capital-labour ratio (Hagemann and Seiter 2003). More recently, theories have 
focused on endogenous explanations of economic growth by assuming constant 
returns to capital caused by externalities, principally through positive 
externalities that relate to human capital, knowledge spill-over and information 
technology (Sengupta 1998). 
If the first core concept is the notion of innovation, then a second is the 
importance of aggregate savings. Common to all theories of economic growth is 
the understanding that investments are related to the level of aggregate savings 
which provide the necessary financial resource that can be drawn upon for new 
(typically large-scale) investments. New investments, in turn, underpin 
innovation and hence, economic growth. What is of fundamental importance to 
note is that the primary responsibility for saving is identified as residing amongst 
the non-poor. This is because the poor are considered neither to have, nor engage 
91 I acknowledge the ecological critique that aggregate measures of economic growth include 
many activities that are neither generative nor sustainable (for example Douthwaite 1999) but 
here I am concerned with the activities associated with economic growth, rather tha~ its 
measurement. 
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in, forms of saving (Yunus 1998 ; Sandbrook 1982). The key assumption that 
supports this understanding is that poor people consume all their income, 
primarily on food, and thus their ability to save is zero (Lipton 1997).92 
Inevitably, this poses a dilemma for policy makers on how to allocate resources. 
Meeting the (apparently) endless consumption needs of poor people is 
contrasted with quantifiable investments in innovation that promise greater 
income (for all) (Jantti 1990). For now, I continue with a consideration of the 
core concepts of economic growth and will return to this 'trade-off in greater 
detail in Chapter Five. 
The last core concept, that I consider, is a concern with the geographical location 
of economic growth. There are two issues that stem from this concern. The first is 
that economic growth was observed to take "place in enclaves, surrounded by 
traditional activities" (Lewis 1976, 26). What is important to point out now is that 
within these 'enclaves', economic growth is considered to possess an inbuilt, 
organic logic that will inevitably increase the standard of living and welfare of the 
general population (AlIen and Thomas 2000; Jantti 1990). The differences and 
inequalities that emerge between the 'enclaves' and the surrounding areas raise a 
second issue. 
The second issue relates to how the results of economic growth are considered to 
be distributed because, by definition, economic growth cannot occur equally 
everywhere. This makes (at least temporary) inequality inevitable and raises 
questions about how the costs and benefits of growth are geographically 
distributed (Kuznets 1965). Various models have emerged such as the 'trickle 
down' processes identified by W.W Rostow or Fran~ois Perroux' 'spread effects' 
or Wallerstein's understanding of 'dependent development' that binds economic 
growth into spatial differences between the 'core' and 'periphery'. Despite this 
attention to the location of economic growth and the distribution of its costs and 
92 Although as Keynes pointed out, the ability of the poor to demand commodities will always be 
an important component of economic growth (Thirlwall 2002). 
benefits, the spatiality of these theories is remarkably abstract and universal. 
How economic growth actually happens or where is never made entirely clear. 
We are left to assume that economic growth is a harmonious process and can 
expand in any direction (Nugent and Yotopoulos 1979). 
Given the diversity of approaches and the complexity of the issues, this account is 
simply a sketch of the issues at stake in theories of economic growth. 
Nonetheless, I hope to have drawn attention to a number of core issues. To sum 
up, these are, firstly, that economic growth is commonly thought to be about the 
process of innovation and productivity. Secondly, the realisation of this 
innovation occurs through new investments that are supported by the savings of 
the non-poor within particular 'enclaves' distinguished by the perception of the 
presence or absence of specific economic rationalities. Thirdly, that the 
emergence of economic growth is related to spatial inequality. 
3.2 Theories of poverty 
This section forms the major part of the chapter and its purpose is to analyse how 
each of the three theories that have dominated South Mrican poverty research 
represents the relationship of poor people's economic activities to economic 
growth. I consider each theory in turn. I work through the theory by describing 
some of the general features and considering how poor people's economic 
activities are represented. The representations of poor people's economic 
activities are then compared to the ways in which the generic concept of 
economic growth is brought into view. I synthesise a wide range of literature to 
present an ideal description of the three theories that rarely appear in this way in 
practice. Although the theories have historically developed sequentially (Jones 
1999; AlIen and Thomas 2000), it is worth noting that these three theories have 
not replaced each other but rather co-exist and are often woven together by 
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researchers to explain the multi-dimensional nature ofpoverty.93 Here I provide 
two examples from the South African studies analysed in the previous chapter. 
The Carnegie Inquiry initially made use of income poverty statistics and to these 
statistics were added ideas of basic needs and assets and capabilities (Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989, passim). The PIR focused on income poverty represented by 
'money metric' measures of "poverty proper" (May 2000, 21) but also on 
sustainable livelihoods, as they note, the " ... the expansion of capabilities forms a 
cornerstone of the approach adopted by the PIR" (May 2000, 8). 
In each of the three theories, the inability of poor peoples' economic activities to 
contribute to economic growth emerges differently and different aspects of the 
generic view of economic growth are emphasised. As I will demonstrate, it is 
possible to imagine a spectrum of poverty theories in which it becomes 
progressively easier to consider poor peoples' economic activities as contributing 
to economic growth as the analysis proceeds from income poverty to sustainable 
livelihoods theories (See Figure 2). This is because as theories of poverty have 
developed, the view of poor people's economic activities has been broadened and 
enriched to include poor people's assets, claims on public resources, and means 
of managing or coping with diverse economic processes. Ultimately however, 
poor people's economic activities remain 'visible' and 'sayable' as 'survivalist', 
'residual', 'informal' or 'traditional' and as such are considered unable to 
contribute to economic growth (Jhabvala, Sudarshan, and Unni 2003). 
93 There are those that argue that it is neither advisable nor possible to combine different 
measurement methodologies to reach adequate understandings of poverty (for example 
Ravallion 1993) and those who argue that it is (see Olsen 2004; Streeten 1998). The debat~ 
appears far from over (Lipton 1997; Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, and Stewart 2003). 
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Figure 2. Spectrum of poverty theories 
Possibilities for considering poor peoples' economic activities 
as contributing to economic growth 
low 
• I 
income poverty basic needs 
3.2.1 Income poverty theory 
high 
I .. 
sustainable livelihoods 
The income theory of poverty has the longest history of the three theories of 
poverty described here. The origins of the theory can be traced back to processes 
and events in mid-nineteenth century England (Kanbur and Squire 1999). In 
developing countries, income theories of poverty are strongly associated with 
theories of modernisation and industrialisation that dominated the development 
debates of the 19505 and 1960s. In these theories, the goal of full, waged 
employment in a modern formal economy offered the best potential for 
alleviating poverty. In South Africa, this theory has historically been a structuring 
element of poverty studies (Wilson 1996, 233) and it still predominates in 
current research (Noble, Ratcliffe, and Wright 2004, 13). 
At the core of this theory is the belief that poverty is primarily a 'lack' or 
'deficiency' of income (Jones and Nelson 1999) and that poverty is best 
understood in terms of 'flows' (Chambers 1992, 302). The 'lack of flow' can be 
measured in a number of different ways such as expenditure, calorific 
requirements or the extent to which basic needs are met (Lipton 1997). The 
measurement relies on the isolation of discrete units such as households, across 
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the boundaries of which, the inputs and outputs can be traced (Yapa 1998). A 
typical contemporary definition of poverty in this view is described by Paul 
Shaffer (2002, 58) as "inadequate private consumption of basic goods and 
services". The calculations are based on assumptions of homogeneity across 
(typically household) units of "basic preferences ... represented as 'equivalent' 
consumption expenditure (money metric utility) after adjusting for price and 
household composition differences" (Shaffer 2002, 59). The level at which the 
consumption-equivalent-income is deemed to be adequate (either in absolute or 
relative terms) is calculated and represented as a poverty line. In this theory, 
poverty comes to be known through surveys of individual or household income 
and a 'head-count' of those individuals or households whose income is below the 
poverty line (Ravallion 2004). As noted in Chapter Two the assumption of 
homogeneity renders poverty to be 'visible' and 'sayable' in ways that tend to 
diminish the importance of individual experiences and contexts. But the 
assumption of homogeneity is also important to this view of poverty because it 
means that the relationship of all poor households to the state or the economy 
can be reduced and simplified to a single feature or characteristic (Mitche1l2002; 
Yapa 1996). The singular meaning of poverty tends to translate into a singular 
solution to income poverty. This solution is to increase incomes and hence the 
consumption of poor people. The theory assumes the universal existence of wage 
labour (Rakodi 1995) and that the most important asset of the poor is their 
labour. As I will show below, this is an important element of the poverty 
reduction strategies that follow from this theoretical vantage point. 
The pragmatic necessity of making (qualitative) assumptions about what is 
'adequate' and how poor households achieve 'adequate consumption' on 
corresponding levels of income and critiques of these, often implicit, 
assumptions have been well documented (Sen 1981; Chambers 1992; Noble, 
Ratcliffe, and Wright 2004)· Notwithstanding the qualitative assumptions that 
are necessarily made in income poverty theory, it is largely regarded as a 
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quantitative theory94 and, as such, a large amount of effort has been spent on 
improving the ways in which poverty is measured (Chambers 1992).95 Added to 
the notion of the poverty line is the concept of the 'poverty gap' which measures 
how much the income of those below the poverty line would need to be 
increased, assuming a perfectly targeted transfer is possible, to 'eradicate 
poverty'. The 'poverty gap' is also an indication of how severe the rate of poverty 
is since the poverty line provides no indication of how far below the line poor 
individual's or household's income/consumption actually is. While the rate of 
poverty is used to measure the percentage of people within a particular area that 
are classified as poor, the share of poverty is used to compare the distribution of 
all those counted as poor across areas such as urban and rural. 
A point that I would like to emphasise here is that the definition of poverty in 
income poverty theory is firmly focused on the consumption characteristics of 
the poor rather than their productive activities. As I will show below, this focus 
on consumption is an important aspect in the way poor peoples' economic 
activities are considered unable to contribute to economic growth. The focus on 
the consumption characteristics of the poor is reinforced in a key methodological 
debate that has relevance in South Africa. The debate is whether income or 
expenditure is a better measure of consumption and hence poverty (Shaffer 
2002). In support of an expenditure approach, Meyer and Sullivan (2003) note 
that, because there is less reliance on the formal labour market in developing 
countries, data on earnings is less reliable.96 Moreover, earnings in poor 
households could fluctuate rapidly while expenditure might remain more 
constant because credit could be used to smooth consumption (Blundell and 
Preston 1994). Expenditure also appears to be better reported in surveys than 
94 A notable exception is Michael Lipton's (1983) distinction between the poor and the ultra-poor 
which suggests a line below the poverty line that denotes qualitative changes in the poor's 
behaviour. 
95 See for example 0yen (1996) and AlIen and Thomas (2000) and Lok-Dessallian (2001) for a 
summaries of the different dimensions of the measurement debates. 
C}6 Although it is argued that consumption is equally relevant in developed countries (Blundell and 
Preston 1990 ) and that the distinction between income and consumption appears to relate more 
to the income level of the social group being measured (Blundell and Preston 1994). 
74 
income and therefore measuring people's actual expenditure is a more 
predictable indicator of poverty than an ability to consume (Chander, Grootaert, 
and Pyatt 1980). This debate emerged in the context of the PSLSD in South 
Africa. It is worth recalling how, despite starting off with the 'lived experience' 
definition of poverty developed in the Carnegie Inquiry,97 the researchers in the 
PS LSD came to focus on income and expenditure.98 It is now generally accepted 
that measuring both income and expenditure is preferable (Deaton 2003).99 
In income poverty theory the origins of poverty are acknowledged to be diverse. 
The origins can include a complex mix of factors relating to race, gender or age, 
as well as characteristics of livelihood strategies, spatial location, and lack of 
access to goods and services (Chambers 1992) and specifically in the case of 
South Mrica, in Apartheid (McCarthy and Hindson 1997; May 2001, 2000). 
Despite this recognition of a diversity of origins of poverty, income poverty 
theory tends ultimately to be reductionist, in the sense that poverty is reduced to 
what is measured (Guhan and Harriss 1992, 22). Echoing the concerns of 
Chapter Two, Carole Rakodi (1995, 411, emphasis in the original) notes "the 
definition used affects not only who is defined as poor but how their deprivation 
is understood and thus the methodologies used to quantify and understand it and 
the nature of the interventions designed to alleviate it". The reduction is also 
considered to oversimplify the nature of poverty (Chambers 1992). Diana Mitlin 
(1995, 3) even suggests that the concern with measuring poverty detracts from 
the "interest in understanding the underlying causes of urban poverty", a concern 
that has motivated Noble et al (2004) to pragmatically call for a 'consensual 
approach' in defining a workable poverty line in South Africa. 
97 Francis WiIson, Interview 23/07/04. 
9B Pundy Pillay, Interview 29/07/04. 
99 For convenience I will continue to refer to the income/expenditure poverty theory as the 
'income poverty theory'. 
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Representations of poor people's economic activities in income poverty 
theory 
Representations of poor people's economic activities figure in two ways. Firstly, a 
consideration of poor people's economic activities as inherently productive is 
noticeably absent in this approach to poverty. We are alerted to this absence 
through the perceived attributes that prevent poor people's economic activities 
from being productive. In early versions of this theory, these attributes are linked 
to backwardness, tradition and values that are antithetical to urbanisation, 
industrialisation and modernisation. Thus full development and eradication of 
poverty required attention to both economic issues and 'non-economic' values to 
be truly effective (Hoselitz 1952). That is, to the extent that poor peoples' 
economic activities were 'visible' it was to identify the need to transform them in 
the image of modern, productive activities. In this view, an activity can be 
defined as economic if it could be performed by a third party and sold on the 
market (Wood 2003). More recently, poor people are represented as not having 
the forms of education and knowledge appropriate to participate in growth 
processes (Zein-Elabdin 2004). As a consequence, poor people's economic 
activities are neither considered as informed by, nor exhibiting, the modern, 
rational values that the economic growth is assumed to depend upon. Instead, 
poor people's economic activities are represented as survivalist, small and 
unproductive by comparison. Lacking a 'growth' logic these survivalist activities 
are always framed as subservient to the coherent and organic logic associated 
with economic growth. The logic of economic growth is considered expansive, 
transformative and universal even though it is recognised that economic growth 
occurs unevenly across geographical space. While rural to urban migration is 
recognised as an important part of many representations of poor people's 
economic responses to improving their incomes, the logic of consumption is 
spatially confined - often to the household. 
Income poverty theory accepts that, by definition, poor people are assumed to 
consume whatever they earn. Therefore, there is little space for accounts of 
investments to increase the productivity of poor people. As Yunus (1998) and 
Sandbrook (1982) comment, the responsibility for saving is identified to depend 
on the non-poor because the poor are considered neither to have, nor engage in, 
savings. This introduces a second way in which poor people's economic activities 
figure in the income approach. 
Poor people's economic activities are presented as inherently consumptive. 
However, the fullness of this presence belies an ability of these consumption 
activities to contribute to economic growth. Indeed, the consumption activities of 
poor people are more typically seen as detracting from the possibilities for 
economic growth derived from long-term investments. The assumption that poor 
people's economic activities are predominantly consumption focused introduces 
a trade-off in distributing public resources between allocating the available 
resources between (short-term) consumption and (long-term) investment 
(Streeten 1977; King 1998; Hicks 1979; Goldstein 1985). This trade-off becomes 
critical in the context of the following chapters when the level of infrastructural 
investment in Durban is mapped against the assumptions about poor people's 
economic activities and the result is that poor areas qualify for the most 'basic' 
infrastructure, while traditionally 'productive' areas are enhanced with higher 
quality 'economic' infrastructure. 
Comparing activities associated with economic growth and poor 
people's economic activities: strategies of absorption 
I now bring the representations of poor people's economic activities and 
economic growth together to analyse how poor people's economic activities are 
made 'visible' and 'sayable' in relation to economic growth. The first point to 
draw attention to is that in this theory of poverty, economic growth is considered 
a necessary, if not sufficient condition, for addressing poverty. This ensures that 
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the lot of the poor is bound to the results of economic growth. However, while the 
economy and economic growth fully determine the possibilities of poor people's 
economic activities, it is clear that they are simultaneously represented as 
different in a number of ways. 
Firstly, by being consumption focused rather than production or investment 
focused, it is argued that poor people are engaged in the 'wrong' type of economic 
activity to contribute to economic growth. Where it might be admitted that poor 
people are engaged in some form of production or investment, this is seen as 
being on too small a scale to be relevant. Secondly, the 'logic' of poor people's 
economic activities is often located in the household and hence focused on 
'survival'. When this is compared to the logic of growth it means that poor 
people's economic activities do not contribute to economic growth. This leaves 
"the poorest groups outside the sphere of economic expansion and material 
improvements" (Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery 1979, 299). It is only through 
economic growth that poor people can be absorbed into the flow of the main 
stream of the economy. Thirdly, economic growth is considered to depend on 
very particular types of knowledge and skills and generally, the higher skilled and 
educated people are, the greater the productive potential. Since, almost by 
definition, poor people lack this level of education and skill, this is another way 
in which poor people's economic activities are considered divorced from 
economic growth. 
Since they are outside the processes of economic growth it is consequently not 
possible for them to contribute to economic growth. Indeed, in the most extreme 
cases, when economic growth is represented in approaches to poverty as growth 
in the aggregate output (GDP) or income (GNP) of a (formal) economy, a 
slippage often occurs between the measure of growth and what is understood to 
be the economy. In this way, the measure of economic growth comes to be 
understood to be the economy (Folbre 2001, 65). Thus when poor people's 
economic activities are not thought to be contributing to economic growth, the 
effect is to remove poor people's activities from the economy entirely and much 
of their output is not measured. Even in more nuanced accounts of income 
poverty theory, the focus on economic growth detracts attention from the 
economic nature of poor people's activities and how they may be within the 
economy, even if they are not thought to contribute to economic growth. The 
strategic response that emerges from this theory is how the poor can be absorbed 
through utilising their Oabour) asset (Amis 1995). 
Suresh Tendulkar (1992) provides a coherent summary of this poverty reduction 
strategy of 'absorption' of poor people into the formal economy. The process 
begins by characterising households in relation to the macro-economy. In this 
regard, it is important to distinguish between households that could be "drawn 
into the mainstream of economic activity and those which cannot" based on the 
distinction between the presence or absence of household labour endowments 
(Tendulkar 1992, 32). It is argued that where such endowments are absent, the 
household is the responsibility of the social security system of the state. 
Assuming the presence of household labour endowments, in this view the 
potential to absorb the households will vary, according to an assessment of the 
characteristics of the poverty such as its duration or the location of a household 
in a rural or urban area. The important parameters of the macro-environment to 
absorb households relates to the pattern and rate of the growth process 
(Tendulkar 1992, 33). On the basis of these assessments of the households and 
the macro-economy, "a household may be defined as economically viable in the 
production process when the interaction between the household-specific factors 
and relevant macro-environment enables the household to sustain an above 
poverty level of living" (Tendulkar 1992,33). 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this view of the relationship between 
poverty and economic growth is remarkably prevalent and enduring. Despite the 
methodological problems of reductionism and over-simplification being 
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identified with the approach (cf. Moser 1998; Rakodi 1995), income poverty 
theory continues to remain an important means of measuring poverty (Rakodi 
2002C). The subsequent theories that I will consider - that of basic needs and 
sustainable livelihoods - set out to make different aspects of poverty 'visible' and 
'sayable' and overcome some of the problems associated with income poverty 
theories. 
3.2.2 Basic needs theory 
The starting point for basic needs theory was that economic growth did not 
always translate into proportionate increases in remunerated employment that, 
in turn, reduced poverty (Rimmer 1981; Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 1983). 
This evidence emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970S and disturbed the 
sovereignty of aggregate economic growth as the solution to poverty. There was 
a recognition that the conventional development strategies that were focused 
around employment generation had not succeeded in reducing poverty (ILO 
1977). The work of the ILO had shown that "GNP growth generated by capital 
intensive production could not only worsen income distribution but, by 
increasing unemployment, actually produce growing poverty" (Moon 1991, 4). 
Despite worldwide economic growth at unprecedented levels, poverty levels had 
not changed significantly by the early 1970S. Since growth did not appear to be 
dependent on levels of income nor have a uniform effect, the concern moved 
from the "goal of output maximisation to poverty minimisation" (Hicks 1979, 
985). This view was informed by macro-economic research that has come to be 
termed the 'redistribution with growth' perspective and, as the term implies, was 
fundamentally concerned with the distribution of economic benefits that arose 
through growth (cf. Chenery et al. 1974). 
This led to the search for broader and deeper understandings of poverty and the 
concept of 'basic needs' emerged. Basic needs theory is distinguished from 
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income poverty theory by two characteristics. On the one hand, it was argued, 
"the basic needs of all should be satisfied before the less essential needs of a few 
are met ... " (Streeten et al. 1981, 8). On the other hand, there was a recognition 
that only improving the income of those in poverty was not sufficient and a wider 
conception of poverty was required - a conception that included access to public 
infrastructure and services, for example. For Richard Sandbrook (1982, 37), the 
"preoccupation with material needs [is] quite simple: these [are] the foundation 
of all other human needs because their satisfaction [is] essential to survival". The 
macro-economic 'redistribution with growth' research provided the justification 
for higher levels of redistribution through public investment in infrastructure 
and services that would benefit poor people and is therefore important for the 
argument that is being developed in this thesis. 
An emphasis on the redistributive element of the theory quickly came to 
differentiate a more politically radical version of basic needs approaches from 
liberal approaches that sought merely to cope with poverty (Sandbrook 1982; 
Seddon 1982). However, both radical and liberal versions of basic needs 
approaches recognised that some needs were dependent on prevailing societal 
norms, but suggested that a certain minimum was essential to a decent standard 
of living (Rimmer 1981). Thus, basic needs were defined in terms of "minimum 
levels of private consumption of food, clothing and shelter, and access to certain 
essential public services such as pure water, sanitation, public transport, and 
health and educational facilities" (Sandbrook 1982,10). 
The basic needs approach added another dimension to the conventional 
approaches of increasing income, consumption and employment by focusing on 
the "provision of the particular goods and services needed by deprived groups -
those who starve or are malnourished, those who are suffering from ill health, 
the homeless ... " (Streeten et al. 1981, 109) and in this way shifted the focus to 
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absolute poverty in 'developing countries'. 100 Thus, in addition to the poverty 
line, the theory set out to measure the needs considered 'basic' - those needs 
"minimally required to sustain life at a decent material level" (Moon 1991, 5). 
This in turn was defined in terms of adequate food, water, healthcare, shelter and 
minimum education (Streeten et al. 1981). Adequacy was therefore defined in a 
"minimum way and measured in terms of observable outcomes rather than in 
relation to income or consumption of such 'basic' goods" (Moon 1991, 5). Basic 
needs could thus be measured as outcomes such as life expectancy, infant 
mortality, and literacy (Moon 1991). The effect of this shift was to emphasise the 
survivalist characteristics of poor people that, in turn meant that poor people's 
economic activities were even less likely to be thought of as contributing to 
economic growth. IOI 
Representations of poor people's economic activities in basic needs 
theorY 
The basic needs theory represents poor people's economic activities in a similar 
fashion to income poverty theory. From scholars such as Paul Streeten (1977; 
1978; 1981) and Norman Hicks (1979) to Richard Sandbrook (1982) and Bruce 
Moon (1991), there is little attention to poor people's economic activities other 
than in the form of consumption. Instead, we are required to deduce broader 
views of activities from other statements. An example where Norman Hicks 
(1979, 985) suggests why income poverty theory failed to reduce poverty, is 
illustrative: 
"consumers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about health and nutrition, and will 
therefore not spend incremental incomes wisely or efficiently; there is known to be a 
serious maldistribution of incomes within households ... ; it is difficult to find policies, 
investments, etc. that will increase the productivity of all the poor in a uniform way ... " 
100 At more or less the same time, Peter Townsend's (1979) concept of relative poverty was 
gaining increasing purchase in policy debates in the 'developed countries'. 
101 However, this is not to deny the power of such forms of measuring changes in quality of life 
and the ffi.easurement of pove~ th~oug~ the 'outcom.es' of literacy, mortality and so on, 
powerfully mformed the poverty dlscusslOns m Durban. I Wlll return to this in the next chapter. 
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I argue that these statements are based on a view that poor people's consumption 
activities are seemingly ill-informed; the distribution of income within 
households is neither rational and optimal for economic growth nor equitable 
and that it is necessary to raise the productivity of poor people's economic 
activities. To my mind, these views are not far removed from the understandings 
of poor people's activities in income poverty theory. 
Paul Streeten notes the similarities with income poverty theory in this quote: 
" ... basic needs does not replace the more aggregate and abstract concepts, which remain 
central to measurement and analysis; it gives them content. Nor does it replace concepts 
that are means to broader ends, like productivity, production and growth, but it derives 
from the end of meeting basic human needs the need for changing the composition of 
output, the rates of growth of its different components, and the distribution of 
purchasing power" (1977, 9)· 
However, it is worth recalling that the influence of the 'redistribution with 
growth' macro-economic perspective was to encourage researchers and policy 
makers to focus on increasing the productivity of poor people. However, poverty 
work within this vein was historically applied in rural areas where the distinction 
between household consumption and production was very difficult to determine. 
Therefore retaining the insights of basic needs theory and the 'redistribution with 
growth' perspective on poor people's potential productivity justifies shifting the 
focus to urban poverty in this thesis. This is because the separation between 
production and consumption is easier to establish in urban areas and offers a 
theoretical justification to approach the insights from basic needs theory in 
considering the relationship between poor people's economic activities and 
processes of economic growth. 
It could be argued that basic needs theory makes it both more difficult and easier 
than income poverty theory to 'see' poor people's economic activities as able to 
contribute to economic growth. It is more difficult because the focus on the 
absolute poverty of poor people shifts attention from consumption activities to 
even more marginal activities associated with survival. The emphasis on survival 
is reinforced by the use of life expectancy, literacy and child mortality as key 
indicators of poverty. 
However, basic needs theory simultaneously makes it easier to 'see' poor people's 
economic activities as able to contribute to economic growth by drawing 
attention to the reproductive burden that households endure in the absence of 
full access to public infrastructure and services and their potential productivity. 
Implicit in this argument is the suggestion that the lack of access to 
infrastructure is a major reason for poor people's lack of productivity. An 
example of this reasoning is provided through the PIR that the "provision of 
infrastructure will make a crucial difference to the ability of the poor to overcome 
poverty, by addressing dimensions of poverty such as access, opportunities and 
workload" (May and Rogerson 2000, 215). The possibility that poor people could 
be productive was informed by a set of parallel debates about the 'informal 
sector'. Although it was clear that there was no simple correspondence between 
being poor and pursuing activities in the informal sector (as it was termed in the 
early 1970S (cf. Hart 1973)) (Cartaya 1994), the early debates around the informal 
sector strongly informed basic needs theory. For this reason it is therefore 
necessary to review these debates. The early debates around the informal sector 
are also important because they inform the discussion of sustainable livelihoods 
theory that is to follow in this chapter, and anticipate the form of some of the 
conclusions of my research. 
Cathy Rakowski (1994, 5) notes that debates around the informal sector 
"emerged from disagreement over how Third World economies should develop 
and at what pace, the role of state planning and investment or international 
funding and technical advising should play in economic development; and the 
relative importance and costs to the pace of economic development of addressing 
social problems such as poverty, rural-urban migration, rapid urbanisation, and 
so forth." It was precisely the massive urbanisation that had been spurred by 
processes of industrialisation and modernisation in the 1950S and 1960s that 
gave rise to new forms of informal employment and housing. Thus, the term 
'informal sector' "emerged in the 1970S to describe economic activities that are 
outside the purview of the state but nevertheless entirely 'modern', both in their 
origins and in their connections to other seemingly more advanced, better 
organised and more clearly regulated economic activities" (Benton 1994, 224). 
The earliest debates were not only about why the informal sector persisted, but 
also about its capacity to generate growth and employment (Moser 1994). Within 
studies of the informal economy, "dissatisfaction with a priori dualist models 
resulted in an alternative framework emphasising a continuum of productive 
activities" (Moser 1994,20). Within this continuum the vast majority of activities 
engaged in by poor people were considered to conform with descriptions of 'petty 
commodity production', "a form of production that exists at the margins of the 
capitalist mode of production but is integrated into it and subordinate to it" 
(Moser 1994,20). Thus, studies concluded that the "issue was not whether small 
enterprises have growth and employment potential, but under what conditions" 
(Schmitz, 1982a, 445 in Moser 1994, 22). However as Lauren Benton (1994, 224) 
observes, the debates about the informal economy have "borrowed, for the most 
part unconsciously" from a structural framework that subordinates the informal 
economy to the formal economy. A fundamental issue in the early debates about 
the informal sector was therefore the structure of the economy and relationship 
between the formal and informal sectors. These debates intersected strongly with 
insights from basic needs theory about the structure of the economy and it is to 
these issues that I now turn. 
Comparing activities associated with economic growth and poor 
people's economic activities: strategies of connecting 
If poor people's economic activities are represented in a similar fashion to 
income poverty approaches, differences emerge from the influences of informal 
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sector debates in how poor people's economic activities are compared to 
activities associated with economic growth. This is because economic growth is 
brought into view in a different way in basic needs theory. As the quote below 
shows, economic growth is still crucial for poverty alleviation. However, the 
cause of poverty is not only related to the aggregate output of the economic 
growth but also to the structure of the economy. The ILO (1977, 32) states that 
the: 
" ... fulfilment of basic needs in poorer countries cannot be achieved by a redistribution of 
goods currently produced. Not only must the structure of production change, but the 
total amount produced must also rise over time. For this reason a rapid rate of economic 
growth is an essential part of a basic needs strategy". 
It is worth recalling that basic needs theory questioned the assumed positive 
correlation between higher levels of aggregate economic growth and reductions 
in poverty levels in the light of evidence that growth did not always reduce 
poverty levels. The effect was to retain a focus on economic growth but shift 
attention away from the aggregate output of economic growth to the structure of 
the economy. As Bruce Moon (1991, 14) states, "the basic structure of the 
economy is the single largest determinant of basic needs provision and certainly 
the most immediate". This view is echoed by Ajit Singh (1979, 587) that "to meet 
basic needs it is necessary to transform the productive structures of Less 
Developed Country economies". In this way, basic needs theory again drew 
strongly on insights from debates about the informal sector and the benign or 
exploitative nature of the structural relationships between the sectors. 
The structure of the economy tended to be interpreted differently in the liberal or 
radical approaches that emerged within basic needs theory. The liberal 
approaches tended to focus on questions of whether fixed investments were 
capital or labour intensive and tended not to engage with questions of ownership. 
This led John Friedmann (1979, 607) to contend that, the liberal basic needs 
approaches were "mere adjuncts to main stream growth strategies ... [resulting 
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in] ... an emphasis on short term improvements in the consumption levels of 
target groups below the poverty line while the primary efforts [were] devoted to 
growth in GNP" .102 The more radical approaches of basic needs theory explicitly 
focused on the extent of the structural concentration and centralisation of 
ownership of assets in the economy. Within radical approaches, issues of land 
reform and class struggle were often prominent (c.f. Sandbrook 1982). Moreover, 
radical approaches drawing on both insights from the 'redistribution with 
growth' research/agenda and informal sector studies, began to disaggregate poor 
people's activities in terms of the relationship to the formal economy. This 
provided the basis for a political economy of poverty to be investigated where 
class alliances between different groups of poor people and forms of the state 
that underpinned poverty generating strategies of accumulation, could be 
analysed (Sandbrook 1982, 17). However, both liberal and radical approaches 
within basic needs theory started to give content to critiques that centred on the 
quality of growth, rather than just the quantity (Thomas et al. 2000) and this was 
an issue that would later be developed further by sustainable livelihoods theory. 
In basic needs theory, poor people's economic activities are considered 
disconnected from economic growth because, ultimately, the logic of survival is 
different from the logic of economic growth. This is particularly so, because the 
economic growth referred to is typically based on processes of urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Poor people are unable to be part of this industrialising 
economic growth because they are either undernourished and hence unable to 
work productively, illiterate and hence unskilled, or without access to water, 
homes, food and health care and hence often ill and unable to work consistently. 
In this view, they are considered to be either located in a subordinated 'informal 
sector' or poorly connected into the enclaves of (formal) economic growth. 
102 There are strong parallels with analyses of interventions related to the informal sector. The 
view that the informal sector could be a source of economic growth was criticised due to the fact 
that it "embodied policy implications which were convenient for international organisations and 
politically middle of the road governments. Support of the informal sector appeared to offer the 
possibility of 'helping the poor without any major threat to the rich'" (Bromley 1978a, 1036 in 
Moser 1994, 18). 
Arguably therefore, basic needs theory failed to develop the insights from parallel 
debates on the informal sector and the view that poor people's economic 
activities could be productive. Indeed the basic needs and income poverty 
theories pose a similar dilemma to policy-makers. For example, Hicks (1979, 
985) reflects on critics of the basic needs theory who "have argued that by 
emphasising activities which are essentially consumption oriented, the basic 
needs approach implies a reduction in the rate of growth". As in income poverty 
theory, the economic activities of people considered poor revolved primarily 
around consumption rather than investment and long-term production. 
Supporting poor people's economic activities essentially meant infinitely 
allocating resources to what were considered a limitless need and thereby quickly 
draining the country's resources without generating new wealth. 
Thus in basic needs theory poor people are part of the economy to the extent that 
they are absorbed as labour in the formal economy and to the extent to which 
they have access to public services that widen their opportunities and quality of 
life (as measured by life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy). The 
connections that infrastructure provides allow economic growth to be 
transmitted faster and for poor people to be absorbed quicker in processes of 
growth. In this way, basic needs theory is moving toward the centre of the 
spectrum (See Figure 2) that I outlined at the start of this section. 
3.2.3 Sustainable livelihoods theory 
Sustainable livelihoods theory makes a significant contribution to how poor 
people's economic activities might be considered to contribute to economic 
growth by breaking with many of the key assumptions of income poverty and 
basic needs theories. I suggest that to understand this contribution it is necessary 
to briefly review the historical development of the theory and its relationship to 
income poverty and basic needs theories. Sustainable livelihoods theory first 
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emerged in studies of rural poverty and was then developed in both urban and 
rural contexts (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002; Farrington, Ramasut, and Walker 
2002). In the analysis to follow I start to focus in on the application of this theory 
to urban areas in anticipation of the chapters to follow. 
Alongside income poverty theory, basic needs theOl)' grew in importance during 
the 1970S and early 1980s. However, by the mid-1980s the adverse impact of the 
macro-economic Structural Adjustment Policies, advanced by the Bretton-Woods 
institutions, began to be recognised. lo3 Structural Adjustment programmes made 
it more difficult for the urban poor to meet their basic needs (Tevera 1995), but 
basic needs theory did not seem adequate to the task of explaining how poor 
people were responding to these broader macro-economic changes. A new 
understanding of poverty was required. 
Thus the emergence of the 'asset vulnerability' or 'sustainable livelihoods' 
approach in the early 1990S was driven by a reassessment of the viability of 
current approaches (Moser 1998, 1). The sustainable livelihoods approach was 
focused not only on the impact of impoverishing macro-economic factors, but 
also the capability of poor households to respond. This focus on household's 
responses showed that more had to be done (that built on poor people's 
activities) to alleviate poverty rather than simply reworking macro-economic 
policies. Essentially, sustainable livelihoods theory acted as an "antidote to the 
view of poor people as 'passive' or 'deprived'" (Rakodi 2002b, 10) and dependent 
on the provision of infrastructure as basic needs theory implicitly suggested. The 
sustainable livelihoods approach therefore differentiated itself by starting off 
from a consideration of people's activities rather than their (basic) needs. 
Implicit in the view that poor people are adversely affected by changes in the 
economy and through the focus on their activities, is the recognition that people 
in poverty are economically active beyond waiting to be absorbed or connected 
103 It is worth recalling that it was in anticipation of these impacts that the World Bank's LSMS 
(that informed the PSLSD) had originally been formulated (Chander, Grootaert, and Pyatt 1980), 
into the mainstream economy (Jhabvala, Sudarshan, and Unni 2003; Devey, 
Skinner, and Valodia 2004). 
The work of Amartya Sen (1976; 1977) on 'assets and capabilities' was 
fundamental to this approach to poverty and was largely credited with shifting 
the debates about poverty away from economic efficiency to the broader 
realisation of human development (Callari 2004). However, it is difficult to 
summarise these contributions to understanding poverty, partly because the 
ideas of Sen himself have changed and developed over time (Fine 1997; 
Pressman and Summerfield 2000) and partly because his work has been taken 
up in a number of different ways (Corbridge 2002). I intend therefore to simply 
draw out a few key insights that have informed sustainable livelihoods theory. 
Sen shifted the analysis away from the overall availability or scarcity of resources 
to an individual or household's relationship to those resources and this led to a 
definition of poverty as people's 'ability or inability to command resources'.104 
He did not discard the notion of economic scarcity, but focused on people's 
capacity to convert assets and resources into 'well-being' (Sen 1999). Crucially, 
this capacity was not only dependent on the level of assets, it also depended on 
people's social entitlements, claims and relationships. Arguably this fore-
grounded the analysis of poor people's relationships to economic processes such 
as growth. Sustainable livelihoods theory began to emerge when these insights 
from Sen were combined with Robert Chambers' (1983) rural development work 
on deprivation and vulnerabilities (Norton and Foster 2001). Indeed, as will be 
shown later in this chapter, the rural origins of this approach continue to have 
important implications for its application in urban contexts (Satterthwaite and 
Tacoli 2002). These implications have perhaps been overlooked by the 
suggestion that many of the urban poor suffered more than the rural poor from 
104 As I noted in Chapter Two, this definition of poverty was operationalised in the SA-PPA and 
PIR. 
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the macro-economic changes of Structural Adjustment, precisely because they 
were caught up in a monetised economy (Moser 1998,1996). 
Added to this early work was the growing concern with green and brown 
environmental issues that emerged in the 1990s. The high dependence of poor 
households on what were already considered to be fragile urban environments 
was increasingly recognised by poverty researchers (cf. Hardoy and Satterthwaite 
1989). The emphasis on sustainability however, also spoke to the need to make 
'irreversible' improvements to household's livelihoods in the context of 
Structural Adjustment programmes. Thus, "stimulated by the adverse impact of 
recession and stabilisation and structural adjustment policies on many urban 
groups" (Rakodi 2002b, 3), sustainable livelihoods theory is particularly framed 
by broader economic concerns. Philip Amis (2001, 355) describes these adverse 
impacts as "increases in consumer prices, limits on wage increases and public 
sector employment and finally a limit on spending on urban infrastructure". This 
political agenda against Structural Adjustment policies has had a particular effect 
on how poor people's economic activities are understood in sustainable 
livelihoods theory. I will return to this point later in this chapter. 
Combining such a diverse set of concepts and concerns, it is not surprising that 
there are many different emphases in sustainable livelihoods theory (BeaU 
2002). As Sue Jones (2002, 10) adds, this is complicated by the interchangeable 
usage of the term, sustainable livelihoods, as "a tool, operational objective, set of 
principles, attitude, an approach or a framework". Nevertheless, the definition of 
a 'sustainable livelihood' is generally accepted in the literature105 as comprising: 
" ... the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities 
required for means of a living. A livelihood is considered to be sustainable when it can 
cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities 
and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base" 
(Rakodi 2002C, 3). 
105 For an overview of different approaches see Carney (1998). 
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This theory of poverty has proven difficult to measure.106 Perhaps because of this, 
the income poverty line remains a core component of sustainable livelihoods 
theory because "inadequate command over resources is the most important 
dimension of poverty and a key determinant of health, self-esteem and general 
welfare" (Rakodi 2002C, 4). Sustainable livelihoods theory is argued to be 
complementary to an income theory of poverty because, as (Rakodi 2002a, 297-
298) notes, "it does not deny the importance of increased incomes ... however ... 
it places more emphasis on addressing non-income aspects of deprivation and 
increasing security." Thus, in addition to measurements of poverty according to 
poverty lines, sustainable livelihoods is more interested in measuring "processes 
of impoverishment, increased welfare, exclusion or inclusion" than outcomes 
(Rakodi 2002C, 6). 
Notwithstanding these links back to income poverty theory and basic needs 
theories, sustainable livelihoods theory is also informed by informality studies 
and the debates around the 'informal sector' discussed earlier in this chapter 
(BeaU 2002). In the South Mrican context, Dave Dewar and Vanessa Watson 
(1991) suggest this is because the people involved in informal activities are 
generally, though not exclusively, in the poorest strata of society. Internationally, 
the informal economy is now also commonly regarded as the primary site for 
poor people's economic activities (Moser 1998). Understandings of the informal 
economy therefore acts as a backdrop to sustainable livelihoods theory and the 
possibility that poor people's economic activities could be productive acts as a 
key force in making it possible to consider how these activities could contribute 
to economic growth. 
106 Susan Parnell, Interview 23/07/04. 
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Representations of poor people's economic activities in sustainable 
livelihoods theory 
It is in sustainable livelihoods theory that poor people's economic activities are 
considered most broadly and diversely and thus move the debate about poor 
people's economic activities contribution to economic growth further along. 
Ultimately, however, the theory retains the inability to consider poor people's 
economic activities as contributing to economic growth, but in different ways 
from both income poverty and basic needs theories. 
Sustainable livelihoods theory has introduced many key insights that I will build 
on in Chapter Six to work towards making poor people's economic activities 
'visible' and 'sayable' as contributing to economic growth. Sustainable livelihoods 
theory seeks to restore agency to the poor, rather than regard them as passively 
defined by a poverty line arbitrarily set by external, non-poor experts (Rakodi 
1995, 411). The main assumption and belief underlying this theory is that 
households aim to secure their own livelihoods and that each household has a set 
of assets. This security is achieved through households making choices about 
how to use their "portfolio of assets" (Rakodi 2002b, 6). The strategies that are 
open to a household depend on their portfolio of assets and their capabilities to 
use them. I07 Thus, this approach to poverty has arguably broadened the concept 
so that "poverty is not only seen as a lack of assets and an inability to use them, 
but also as a lack of choice with respect to alternative coping strategies" (Rakodi 
2002b, 6). The lack of choice forces the poorest to adopt strategies that enable 
them to survive but not improve their welfare (Rogerson 2001). 
Sustainable livelihoods theory has been paralleled by the development of 
concepts of informality associated most commonly with Hernando de Soto (1989, 
2001 #545). There are points of commonality between sustainable livelihoods 
107 BeaU (2002, 72 emphasis in the original) cautions that it may be "helpful to move away from 
the notion of the poor as 'strategic managers of complex asset portfolios' to have a wider 
conception of the resources that people need to access in the process of composing a livelihood". 
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theory and de Soto's views that are important to note, even if de Soto's views are 
only just beginning to penetrate South Mrican development debates. Both 
sustainable livelihoods theory and de Soto's views are strongly informed by 
understandings of neo-liberalism. However, while sustainable livelihoods theory 
regards neo-liberal processes as problematic, de Soto (2001) generally regards 
these as a positive processes. Sustainable livelihoods theory and de Soto also 
focus on poor people's assets. But while, sustainable livelihoods theory tends to 
call for new forms of intervention to protect poor people's assets, de Soto (1989; 
2001) advises that poor people's assets can best be developed through processes 
of deregulation, debureaucratisation and privatisation of public resources 
(Bromley 1994). Thus, despite the commonalities and in general, de Soto's views 
have not been accommodated easily within the sustainable livelihoods theory of 
poverty and will not be considered further in this study. 
The theory points to a diversity of economic activities that also have cultural 
meaning for poor people engaged in them rather than just a focus on waged 
income (Bebbington 1999). While income poverty and basic needs theory focus 
primarily on poor people's labour as their only asset, sustainable livelihoods 
theory broadens out the range of economic assets that poor people potentially 
access in securing their livelihoods. This includes different forms of 'capital' such 
as natural, financial, social, human and physical as well as the claims and 
entitlements to these different forms. Sustainable livelihood theories attempt to 
locate these claims in a broader context although a criticism of the approaches 
drawing on this theory is that a balance between a focus on household livelihoods 
and the broader context is not always achieved (Rakodi 2002a). Sustainable 
livelihoods theory also does much to include poor people's economic activities, 
building on insights from informality and the working poor (BeaU 2002, 75). This 
leads Rakodi (2002b, 7) to note that: 
" ... economic activities form the basis of household strategy, but to them, and overlapping 
with them, may be added migration movements, maintenance of ties with rural areas, 
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urban food production, decisions about access to services such as education and housing, 
and participation in social networks." 
Sustainable livelihoods theory recognises that poverty has multi-dimensional 
facets and is not a static condition (Rakodi 1999). It also incorporates notions of 
deprivation and vulnerability. Yet, despite these advances in understanding poor 
people's economic activities as contributing to economic growth, the theory tends 
to rely on a very conventional understanding of economic growth. 
Comparing activities associated with economic growth and poor 
people's economic activities: strategies of inclusion 
In sustainable livelihoods theory, the state of the economy determines the 
economic opportunities available for livelihoods. Economic growth is understood 
to be 'transmitted directly through the labour market' (Rakodi 2002a, 288). By 
implication this assumes that, first, economic growth initially excludes poor 
people's economic activities and second, that it happens somewhere else and 
then moves, expands or contracts to, or from, poor people through the labour 
market - seemingly independently of poor people's abilities to affect or engage in 
altering such 'transmissions' (Amis 2002). 
It is also recognised that growth in manufacturing or services industries benefits 
poor people both directly and indirectly. These national growth processes are, in 
turn, shaped by processes of globalisation. The focus on globalisation as an 
economic process stems from the political critique that motivated much of 
sustainable livelihoods theory in the first place, as noted above. This tends to 
have the effect of narrowing the view of poor people's economic activities and 
returning to a view of poor people as passive in the face of processes of 
globalisation. The view of economic growth that emerges is therefore concerned 
as much with the quality of growth as the rate of growth (Osmani 2004). It is 
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recognised that economic growth can be as harmful as beneficial and a dominant 
concern is reflected in the notion of 'pro-poor' growth (Ravallion 2004). 
Notwithstanding the evidence that poor people's economic activities are often 
more than local (MacGaffey 1991; Peberdy 2000), in practice the view that 
generally prevails is conveyed by Sheila Meikle (2002, 37) that "the livelihoods of 
the poor are determined predominantly by the context in which they live and the 
constraints and opportunities this location presents". This has the effect of 
confining the activities of poor people to a particular location in comparison with 
forms of economic growth that stem from processes of globalisation. Although 
sustainable livelihoods theory recognises the existence and diversity of economic 
activities, they are generally too small and bound up with the fortunes of the 
informal economy to impact on global forces. 
illtimately, the livelihood strategies of people in poverty are "determined by 
household, intra-household and community factors" (Moser 1998, 2). Added to 
this is the concern with household security and self-sufficiency that is inherited 
with the development of the theory in a rural context and which serves to 
reinforce a view of households as discrete entities. Consequently, sustainable 
livelihoods theory tends to be consistent with income poverty and basic needs 
theories of poverty by locating poor people's economic activities in the household 
rather than the economyl08 and limiting the output of these activities. This 
assumption disconnects the logic of livelihood strategies from the homogenous 
space of the economy - whether it is an accurate assumption or not. There is no 
sense in which a secure livelihood contributes to economic growth except by 
means of not disrupting the prospects for economic growth. 
Drawing on studies of the informal economy, poor people's economic activities 
have been included in an understanding of the formal economy. However, the 
108 Despite an awareness of the problems of treating the 'household' as the appropriate unit of 
analysis, the household has remained the "site of poverty" in South Africa (May 1998): for more 
general critiques see Beall (2002) and Rakodi (1995). 
informal economy has been added on to the formal economy without questioning 
the expansive assumptions associated with the formal economy. Since the 
informal economy is thought of as not fully part of the formal economy 
(Sudarshan and Unni 2003), poor people's economic activities still remain at one 
remove from activities associated with economic growth. Cameron and Gibson-
Graham (2003, 151) highlight this fact by stressing that although poor people's 
economic activities are recognised and might be counted, they remain locked in a 
subordinate position in relation to the formal (capitalist) economy and it is 
difficult to extrapolate a positive politics of transformation. 
The separation of poor people's economic activities from economic growth, albeit 
in a different form, results in sustainable livelihoods focusing on similar themes 
of how to absorb and connect poor people's economic activities to economic 
growth. 
3.3 The consequences for poverty research 
I would like to draw attention to one very important consequence for poverty 
research that emerges when income poverty, basic needs and! or sustainable 
livelihoods theories are drawn upon. This is that these theories have to gloss over 
an assumption that poor people's economic activities are disconnected from 
processes of economic growth. I suggest that two effects follow from this. 
The first effect is that the ways in which poor people's economic activities are 
considered to be outside, disconnected and/or excluded from processes of 
economic growth is taken for granted by researchers. As a result, the underlying 
assumptions about poor people's economic activities, the concept of economic 
growth, and the relationship between the two entities are also taken for granted. 
As I have argued, the reason that poor people's economic activities are not 
considered to be able to contribute to economic growth is because they are 
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perceived as conceptually different from other kinds of activities despite the 
initiatives within basic needs and sustainable livelihoods theories to focus on the 
productivity of poor people. It follows that this conceptual difference must be 
based on an understanding of inherent differences between the categories of poor 
people's economic activities and activities which contribute to economic growth. 
The identification of the essential qualities of these two categories enables the 
activities to be considered both different and separate. As I will suggest in 
Chapter Six, such a view of economic activities is unhelpful and as Barbara 
Harriss (1992, 339) provocatively notes, "the attempt to explain the rationality of 
investment strategies of the poor does not require them to be attributed with a 
separate 'culture of poverty', but does require a reconceptualisation of 
productivity. " 
The second effect is that poor people are disabled from making immediate claims 
on the results of economic growth and divorced from participating directly in 
arenas that (re)distribute such results as may be produced. This is because the 
right to claims on the results of economic growth and to participate in 
distributing these results are considered to fall first and foremost to those who 
are perceived as having contributed directly to it. The line of reasoning that 
progress depends on those who 'work' is considered fundamental to the 
constitution of, and participation in, modem liberal democracies and the welfare 
state (Dean 1991; Miller and Rose 1990; WaIters 1994). The consequence for 
those not regarded as contributing to societal progress, is that the state, elites 
and indeed poverty researchers are introduced to adjudicate on which of the 
claims made by poor people are legitimate. As Green (2003) notes, the right to 
define which claims are legitimate also tends to generate the right to police these 
claims. The contestation around these claims is often clearest in the formulation 
of policies related to poverty reduction and in the following chapter I examine 
some of this contestation in the case of Durban. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has continued to focus on the partiality of representations of 
poverty. In particular, I focused on the relationship between poor people's 
economic activities and economic growth put forward in theories of poverty. I 
noted that theories of poverty do not consider poor people's economic activities 
as able to contribute to economic growth. I suggested that one of the reasons why 
theories of poverty represent poor people's economic activities as not 
contributing to economic growth is because these activities are represented as, at 
least initially, conceptually divorced from economic growth. This arises because 
poor people's economic activities are categorised differently from the activities 
associated with economic growth. The difference is based on assumptions about 
the respective logic or dynamics, types of activities, sizes and scales and locations 
of both sets of activities. 
Each of the theories of poverty made poor people's economic activities 'visible' 
and 'sayable' in different ways and emphasised different aspects of a generic 
understanding of economic growth. Consequently, the possibility of poor 
people's economic activities contributing to economic growth was different in 
each of the theories. I suggested that income poverty theory was least likely to see 
poor people's economic activities as contributing to economic growth because 
these activities were firmly located 'outside' processes of economic growth. The 
perceived problem here is that poor people's economic activities lie outside the 
formal economy; as a result the dominant solution is to investigate ways in which 
poor people's economic activities can be absorbed into the formal economy 
through formal employment. 
Basic needs theory tends to imply that poor people's economic activities could 
contribute to economic growth if these activities were not disconnected from the 
mainstream economy. However, the emphasis on basic needs and 'survival' also 
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tends to suggest that poor people have very little capacity to engage in productive 
activities that could contribute to economic growth. What is clear is that if basic 
needs are to be met, the structure of the economy requires change. In basic needs 
theory, a dominant solution of connection through the provision of infrastructure 
or recognition of citizenship is added to the theme of absorption. 
Sustainable livelihoods theory generally advances a pessimistic view of economic 
growth by identifying the impacts of new forms of neo-liberal economic growth 
on poor people. Simultaneously however, sustainable livelihoods theory suggests 
that poor people's economic activities are productive, strategic and involve 
managing a broad range of assets in securing livelihoods. Sustainable livelihoods 
theory advances the possibilities of considering how poor people's (informal) 
economic activities could contribute to economic growth by locating poor 
people's economic activities in the informal economy and suggesting ways in 
which their activities could be included in the formal economy. Despite the 
advances offered by sustainable livelihoods theory, however, a problem remains 
because the informal economy is considered subservient to the formal economy. 
Indeed, as Sudarshan and Unni (2003, 21) note in respect of the informal 
economy "the driving force of the economy is not to be located here." This begs 
the question: where is the driving force of the economy located? 
In this respect, I suggest that a shift to an urban case study is particularly useful 
in considering how poor people's economic activities are made 'visible' and 
'sayable' in relation to economic growth. It is important to return to the insights 
developed by basic needs theory and think these through the lens of urban 
poverty and, as I will argue in the next chapter, cities have increasingly become 
regarded by policy makers as the primary sites of economic growth. The focus on 
cities has also highlighted the modes of government best suited to promote 
economic growth as a means of alleviating poverty (Devas and Rakodi 1993). As 
Rogerson (2001, 343) has noted, the challenge of poverty in South Africa has 
been conceptualised as "mainstreaming ... policy interventions at all three tiers of 
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government." However, local government in South Africa is considered to have a 
particular responsibility in responding to the perceived needs for economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Mogale 2005; Scott 2002). Cities, then, bring 
together a policy emphasis on economic growth and a range of institutional 
practices relating to poverty reduction. Attending to poverty politics in cities, I 
want to suggest, has the potential to generate alternative perspectives of how 
poor people's economic activities might be made 'visible' and 'sayable' in relation 
to economic growth. The following chapters elaborate on these issues. 
four 
Institutional poverty practices in post-
Apartheid Durban 
The relationship between poverty (reduction) and economic growth is often 
presented and understood as self-evident in the context of cities, particularly 
those in 'developing countries'. However, over the course of this chapter and the 
next, I aim to explore how local poverty practices shape specific understandings 
of the relationship between poor people's economic activities and economic 
growth. This chapter sets out how understandings of poverty and the role of 
economic growth in alleviating poverty both informed, and were driven by, a 
range of local institutional activities in Durban. The period 1996-2001 represents 
an important historical moment in the sense that local government in South 
Mrica was undergoing profound transformations as to its purpose and objectives. 
Key to this transformation was the formulation of a vision for the future 
equitable development of the city in which poverty alleviation and economic 
growth were central. 
However, poverty and economic growth were not the only priorities that were 
central to the formulation of this new long-term development vision. Another 
important issue was addressing the vast disparities and inequalities in 
infrastructural provision and social services that remain at the core of local 
government responsibilities in post-Apartheid South Mrica. What was clear in 
1994 was that a post-Apartheid local government would face a situation where 
there were vast disparities and inequalities in income, access to infrastructure 
and services, and access to social facilities and amenities such as education , 
health and security and protection. What was not as clear was how to address 
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these disparities and inequalities most effectively and efficiently (Parne1l1997). 
In the words of a Durban senior city manager at the time, the future development 
of the city "could have gone in any direction".lo8 
There are two reasons why shifting the focus of this study from broader processes 
of defining and theorising poverty to the specificities of local politics in a city 
such as Durban is useful. On the one hand, an analysis of a city - as a site of 
institutional poverty practice - deepens our understanding of the construction of 
dominant accounts of poverty already considered at a national South African 
level. On the other, the city - as a primary site of economic growth - has to be 
central to any examination of the relationship between poor people's economic 
activities and economic growth. This is because the growing emphasis on the role 
of economic growth in alleviating poverty in South Africa, and at the 
international level, has occurred in tandem with an increasing tendency to 
represent cities as the primary sites of this growth (Grant 2004; Meikle 2002; 
DfID 2001). 
There is also good reason to focus on Durban as a site of institutional poverty 
practice. There is little doubt that poverty was an important issue for policy 
makers in the city during the 1996-2001 period (see for example eThekwini 
Municipality 2003, 2002; Monitor Group 2000; Nicholson 2000; eThekwini 
Municipality 2001; Khosa and Naidoo 1998; Freund and Padayachee 2002; 
Durban Metropolitan Council 1996). Indeed, policy researchers have made 
considerable inroads to incorporating poor people's activities into 
understandings of the local economy. In addition, Durban's local government has 
a long history of intervening in the economy to support particular forms of 
economic growth (Freund 2002a) and a strong public commitment to redressing 
the inequalities of the Apartheid era which coalesced into policies to address 
poverty (eThekwini Municipality 2001,2002). 
108 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
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Understandings of poverty in Durban emerged in the context of analyses of a 
series of problematic and overlapping historical racial, political, and economic 
processes. As such, the understandings of poverty came to serve as a reference 
point for a profound set of socio-political changes in local government and urban 
development activities in the immediate post-Apartheid period, and offered an 
important frame of reference for policy makers engaged in formulating a new 
development approach for Durban. Inevitably, however, the inscription of 
poverty at the centre of a series of overlapping problems meant that a range of 
(institutional) activities and actors contributed to the understanding of poverty 
as a policy priority. I will argue, therefore, that how poverty is understood by 
local policy makers is constituted and mediated by a series of activities that go 
beyond poverty research. Thus, these broader activities were involved in shaping, 
stretching and inflecting the ultimate approaches to poverty reduction that were 
cohered in the long-term development vision to address the legacies of Apartheid 
in the city. 
I use some of the key issues and concerns identified through interviews with 
senior officials, academics, and consultants, and close readings of texts, to draw 
through and highlight how understandings of poverty both informed, and were 
driven by, a series of institutional activities. From a diverse range of activities, I 
present four different ways in which poverty came to be understood as a policy 
priority. These are in relation to the activity of governing and managing the city, 
the economic growth of the city, the spatial form and urban development of the 
city, and the discourses and materialities of poverty itself. I suggest that each, in 
their own way, was perceived by policy-makers as in need of change during the 
period I am reviewing (1996-2001) and addressing poverty was an important 
dimension to these changes. 
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4.1 Poverty as a frame of reference for local 
government transformation 
In this section I examine how poverty came to be understood by Durban's 
municipal policy makers as an issue around which to anchor broader and 
comprehensive local government and urban development changes. I reflect on 
the understanding of the effect of Apartheid and how this meant that new local 
government needed to change the form of the city and the administration bound 
up with this form in order to reduce poverty. 
In Chapter Two, I drew attention to the wide acknowledgement of Apartheid as a 
major cause of South African poverty. By 1996, the Carnegie Inquiry and PSLSD, 
in particular, had contributed to a general view of the different ways in which 
Apartheid and poverty were linked. The Carnegie Inquiry had been particularly 
effective in demonstrating the involvement of the Apartheid government in 
creating South African poverty. The PSLSD in turn, had quantified how 
Apartheid had both racially and geographically distributed resources so 
unequally. In 1994, the process of dismantling the Apartheid state had begun at 
national and provincial levels and this chapter will chart the last stage of this 
transformation process as it unfolded at the local level in Durban. Despite the de 
jure removal of Apartheid and the transformation of the state, poverty remained 
as a tangible impress of Apartheid, embedded within the form of the city and 
systems of local government that produced and maintained the city. Given the 
importance of Apartheid, I begin by describing how it contributed to the extent of 
poverty locally and shaped the urban form and system of local government. In 
the conclusion to this section, I will show how the legacy of Apartheid provided 
an understanding amongst local policy-makers of the developmental challenges 
inherited by Durban's first democratic local government. 
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4.1.1 Apartheid 
The ways in which Apartheid contributed to urban impoverishment and 
immiseration in South Africa have been well documented. 109 Susan Parnell 
(1998) has summarised these processes in a background paper for the urban 
theme of the national Poverty Hearings.llo Rather than repeat these at a general 
level, I draw upon Parnell's key points and flesh out the details with examples 
generated through a participatory timeline exercise in Inanda Newtown Section 
C-Extension - the field site where the data for the analysis of Chapter Six was 
generated.m C-Extension will be introduced in detail in Chapter Six. For the 
moment I note that prior to 1996 the area was governed by the KwaZulu 
administration although it was socially and functionally part of Durban. 
In the timeline exercise, the participant's earliest memories reach back to 1967· 
From this period, the jurisdictional boundaries have shifted many times over 
what is now C-Extension.112 Until the redemarcation of local government 
boundaries in 2000, this was mainly because of the (ultimately) futile attempts of 
the Apartheid planners to make racial segregation 'work'. Jennifer Robinson 
(1998, 533) observes how the implementation of Apartheid was based on a 
"conception of space as homogenous, divisible, empty, able to be filled with social 
content, to be demarcated and subdivided". The Apartheid planners' lack of 
concern for Black people's lives and livelihoods shows how this view of space was 
mobilised in their utter disregard of the consequences of designating and re-
designating racially exclusive areas of the city. 
lC)9 See for example, Lemon (1976), Robinson (1996) and Swilling, Humphries, and Shubane 
(1991). 
110 See also Parnell and Mosdell (2003). 
III Details of this exercise are provided in the Methodological Appendix (Appendix 1). 
112 In 1967 the area was known ~s Ntuzuma and governed by the traditional leader Inkosi Ngcobo. 
As a result the land would ul~I~ately have been owned by the South African government but 
locally allocated through a tradItIOnal system of communal ownership overseen by the amakhosi. 
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In 1969, the South African government forced the residents of C-Extension to 
move to nearby areas of Mzinyathi and Machabeni. Such racist forced removals 
contributed to urban impoverishment because they "destroyed urban economic 
enterprises; increased costs because new housing was far from town; [and] 
disrupted established community structures" (Parne1l1998, 4).113 The area of C-
Extension was then re-allocated to Indians who began to farm the land and 
allowed the previous Mrican residents to return to 'their' land as 'caretakers'. 
This arrangement prevailed through the 1970S. An important year in this period 
was 1975 with the formation of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (lYY) - the 
organisation to become the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the post-Apartheid 
dispensation. 
In the arcane logic of the Apartheid city, there were restrictions on where Black 
people could seek employment. Resident's of C-Extension perceived that their 
chances of finding employment were better to the north of the Umgeni River 
rather than anywhere else. Thus unfair conditions of work contributed to 
impoverishment because Black people were geographically restricted, by law, to 
low wage, unskilled jobs which meant that their earning power was limited. 
Parnell (1998, 5) points out that even when job reservation legislation was 
removed, "Mricans struggled to compete because of poor educational levels 
associated with inferior segregated education". In addition, restrictions on 
trading and commercial activities meant that Black people found it difficult to 
create significant economic opportunities for advancement. 
In 1981, the government again tried to forcibly remove people from the land 
because Black people were considered to have re-settled on the land illegally. The 
government destroyed people's houses and if they complained, they were 
113 More generally in Durban the implementation of the Apartheid city meant the forced removal 
of African, Indian and Coloured households to locations on the periphery of the city such as 
Umlazi (African), Chatsworth (Indian) and MerebankfWentworth (Coloured) to the south of the 
city. While to the north, Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu (African), Phoenix (Indian) and 
Newlands (Coloured) served the same function (cf. Freund 1995; Maylam and Edwards 1996).' 
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arrested. The women and children moved away. In the process of the attempting 
to remove people, the government punitively destroyed the local communal 
water points that had been provided over time. Through spontaneous collective 
action by women residents of C-Extension, the authorities were compelled to 
restore the water supply. This experience still acts as a touchstone for 
community power and unity today. 
A year later, the government repeated its attempt to forcibly remove the Black 
residents from the land. Well-publicised community protests followed which led 
to arrests of some of the men and threats that, unless the community co-
operated, they would be ignored in infrastructural development terms and forfeit 
their right to the future provision of shelter and services. Through widespread 
community protests, the residents resisted this attempt of forcible relocation. 
Parnell (1998) records how, the lack of infrastructural services, peripheral 
location and racial fragmentation of urban areas contributed to high costs of 
Black household's expenditure. The peripheral location of areas such as C-
Extension and other townships increased household transportation costs for 
Black people. 
The Apartheid manipulation of urbanisation patterns and processes created 
inequalities within urban areas as well as between urban areas and forcibly 
disconnected Black people from economic activity in the cities. Influx control 
regulations restricted Black people's range of choice as to where they could live 
and work. These regulations also prevented Black people from taking advantage 
of the better opportunities that arise in urban areas and confined them to 
homeland areas or shuttling between urban and rural areas. In most cases, the 
Bantustans were located a considerable distance from the major cities. Durban 
was unique among South Mrican cities in that the Bantustan of Kwazulu abutted 
the city boundaries (See Figure 3 for the distribution of racial groups with the 
Durban area). Dan Smit (1997) observes that this allowed the formerly-white 
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Figure 3. Major suburbs by pre-democracy racial groups in Durban 
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Durban local government to neglect the poor, Black population growing on the 
city's doorstep through observance of the token administrative independence of 
Kwazulu. Moreover, the ring fencing of urban administration and financing 
within racial groups disabled the equalisation of infrastructural investments 
through systems of cross-subsidisation between richer and poorer parts of the 
city. The result was that there were vast differences between the high rates of 
expenditure on infrastructure and services in white areas and low expenditure in 
black areas (Abmad 1995; Beall, Crankshaw, and Parne1l2000). The effect was to 
exacerbate the skewed differentials in household expenditure over time such that 
residents of informal settlements and poorly serviced townships, who are almost 
100 per cent Black, often incur the highest costs for basic need such as water and 
energy (BESG 1999). 
Terrible conflict swept through the northern areas of Durban including C-
Extension in 1985 as Black residents fought Indian residents for rights to land 
(Hughes 1987; Hindson, Byerley, and Morris 1993; Sitas 1986). Indian 
landowners fled the area and were relocated in nearby Phoenix by the 
government. As the conflict subsided, C-Extension was declared a formal African 
township by the Kwazulu administration and the construction of roads began in 
1986. This was followed shortly thereafter by the construction of four room 
houses with dirt floors. As Parnell (1998) notes, restrictions on urban housing 
supply and the poor quality of the housing stock negatively affected the urban 
productivity and performance of Black people and their families. Furthermore, 
apartheid laws restricted Black households from investing in their urban 
property. 
In 1988, the wider area of Newtown C in Ntuzuma established a branch of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF)114 despite the area being 'governed' by an IYY 
114 The U?ited I?e.mocrati~ F~ont was an o~ganisation t?at bro~ght together student and youth 
organisa~ons, clV1~ ?~gamsatlOns, ~rade umons, ~omen s o.rgamsations and church groups. The 
organisatIOn was IDlhally formed m protest agamst the tncameral 'reforms' introduced by the 
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councillor linked to the KwaZulu administration. Tensions were building 
between the conservative IYY and the anti-Apartheid movements. The resident's 
ofe-Extension recalled that when fighting broke out on 4 April 1988 between the 
IYY and UDF many houses in the area were burnt. The small river between C-
Extension and neighbouring Section B emerged as a boundary between the UDF 
and IYY factions. Young men from C-Extension who attended school, were 
considered as belonging to the ANe and they were no longer safe in their homes 
from attack by IYY supporters. As a result, young men in particular had to move 
away from the area, or at least out of their homes, for fear of being killed. A 
ferocious and often indiscriminate war was waged between the supporters of the 
UDF and the IYY. With all the violence, all the residents had to leave their 
houses.1lS 
Tentatively, residents began to return to C-Extension in 1990 but violence and 
state repression continued to erupt and spill over into the area. The 'civil war' 
that Francis Wilson and Mamphele Ramphele referred to in the Carnegie Inquiry 
not only created political chaos but meant that Black people "literally, paid to get 
rid of Apartheid" (Parnell 1998, 5). The ANC established a local branch in 1990 
and in 1991 the local residents insisted on the UDF and IYY convening peace 
talks. However, the establishment of peace at a political level meant that a new 
form of violence emerged. During the fighting between the interests aligned with 
the UDF and IYY, the residents of C-Extension were protected by a 'defence 
group'. In return for protection and support against other political groups, the 
residents provided members of this 'defence group' with food and other 
resources for their sustenance. The resolution of political fighting meant that the 
'defence group' were no longer needed or supported by the residents. Without a 
means of surviving and little chance of employment, the members of the 'defence 
group' turned to crime and focused their attention on local communities. It took 
Apartheid state in 1983 but grew to become a key internal organisation co-ordinating the anti-
Apartheid struggle. 
115 The effects of this violence ~ont~nue to be i~ eviden~e today, as a significant proportion of the 
allocated plots and some dwelhngs mC-ExtensIOn remam unoccupied. 
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a bitter and violent struggle for the community to restore order. The prolonged 
cost of liberty and peace was sometimes death and often emotional scarring (cf. 
Jeffery 1997). Thus, while poor (Black) people may no longer be being displaced 
through Apartheid, the effects of years of systematised forms of racial 
discrimination cast a long shadow over the future of South Africa's cities (May 
and Rogerson 2000; Freund 2002b; Naude and Kruge1l2004). 
From 1992, the community history is more peaceful and records an impressive 
list of associational activities and provision of 'basic needs' and amenities. 116 This 
associational activity appears to have contributed to the stability of C-Extension 
and has meant that violence and uncertainty characteristic of neighbouring areas 
has been avoided.117 Despite these more peaceful times, the effects of Apartheid 
have literally been cast in the physical fabric of fragmented urban forms. In 
Durban, the geographic effects of Apartheid are often described as resulting in an 
inverted T-shape of urban privilege (See Figure 4). 
To give some indication of the extent of this legacy of impoverishment a 
'Development Profile' of Durban, drawing on data six years after the first 
democratic local government elections, showed the following service and 
infrastructural backlogs against 'basic' levels of service provision and not the 'full' 
level historically provided to White areas of the city (see Table 1). 
116 Liz Thomas (2002) has highlighted the importance of associational activity in development 
processes in a neighbouring informal settlement. 
117 For an in-depth account of unsettling micro-politics in a neighbouring area see Kaarsholm 
(2003)· 
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Figure 4. Spatial form of Durban 
Council Highly Resourced Areas 
Regional Poorly Resourced Areas 
......-...... Rail Informal Settlements 
(Source: eThekwini Municipality, 2 006) 
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Table 1. Extent of service delivery backlogs of basic needs 
Household Service Backlog1l8 % ofhouseholds1l9 
Sanitation 212 000 households 30 
Roads 165 000 households 23 
Stormwater 157 700 households 22 
Housing 175 000 households 25 
Water 144 600 households 20 
Energy 130 000 households 18 
Solid waste 46 604 households 6 
. . . . . Source: eThekwznz Munzczpalzty (2002, 17) 
Threaded through this history and the broader points Parnell draws attention to, 
are three important overlapping understandings that relate to poverty. The first 
is that although both race and poverty are powerful issues in their own way, the 
overlap in Durban is important in explaining the rise of poverty on the local 
government's political horizon in a post-Apartheid era. Poverty and racial 
discrimination coincided and later studies would confirm that 67 per cent of 
those who are poor in Durban are Black (eThekwini Municipality 2002,19). The 
second is that urban poverty is often thought of as spatialised and concentrated 
in informal settlements, townships or slums (BESG 1999; Makhathini, Pather, 
and Seedat 2002). Thirdly, that the peripheral townships such as C-Extension 
are perceived as 'dormitory areas' that have little potential for economic 
development (Harrison, Todes, and Watson 1997). One of the spatial solutions 
mooted in the face of this sprawling, segmented urban form was to 'compact' the 
city and develop it at higher densities in order to integrate poorer areas and 
populations. 
u8 The calculations of these backlogs are based on 'basic needs' rather than the full service levels 
historically provided to privileged (White) areas of the city. The following example illustrates the 
difference between 'basic needs' and full service provision: a basic level of sanitation equates to a 
Ventilated Pit Latrine and a 'full' level of service is waterborne flush toilets (see eThekwini 
Municipality 2002. 17). Thus, if the backlog calculations were based on 'full' levels of service 
provision they would be much higher. 
119 The percentages are calculated against an overall total of 707.350 households (eThekwini 
Municipality 2002. 14). 
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This all contributed to a local understanding that poverty in the city needed to be 
addressed, that the spatial form which contributed to and was part of this 
poverty needed to change, that certain parts of the city were more productive 
than others and that the racialised and fragmented form of governing and 
managing the city was bound up with this spatial form and needed to change as 
well. It should also be noted that policy makers' views of poor people also 
changed during this process. Beall et al. (2000, 833-834) have characterised 
these changes as policy makers initially seeing poor people as 'victims' of 
Apartheid, to 'villains' responsible for illegal practices that circumvented 
municipal regulations, and finally as 'fixers' capable of participating in 
community based projects in the post-Apartheid period. 
4.1.2 The lacl< of economic growth 
At the same time as policy makers recognised that the spatial form and system of 
governance needed to change there was a growing popular sense that Durban's 
economy was struggling (Freund and Padayachee 2002). The last year that the 
national statistical office collected economic growth statistics at city level was in 
1994. At this point the growth rate in 'output' had measured 1.8 per cent 
(Monitor Group 2000, 5).120 This was well below the estimated population 
growth rate and hence, intuitively contributed to a growing sense of alarm that 
the formal economy was not growing fast enough to generate enough wealth and 
opportunities for the expanding population.121 Local government departments 
researched a range of issues in an attempt to understand economic growth (or its 
absence) in Durban. An important department in co-ordinating and 
commissioning this research was the Metropolitan-level Economic Development 
Department (EDD) that I will discuss in detail below (cf. Hindson and 
120 South Africa's GDP growth rate was measured at 2·3 per cent for 1994 using 1990 as a base 
year and using market prices (Central Statistical Services 1995). 
121 Aman Maharaj, Interview 9/06/04. 
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Ngqulunga 2002). This research suggested that relative to other cities in South 
Africa, Durban appeared to be in decline. 
Reviews of retailing statistics revealed that while Durban's share of national 
retail spending had grown, relative to South Mrica's other cities it was 
decreasing. 122 The EDD undertook a survey of 100 firms in the southern 
Industrial basin in 1997 that indicated that local companies were shedding 
labour. EDD looked to property investment statistics that recorded that Durban 
was capturing less property investment relative to other cities. The Port is a 
central component of the Durban economy and an indecisive atmosphere around 
future investments and improvements exacerbated accounts of 
underperformance in terms of cargo volumes being delayed or decreasing (Jones 
2002). The national 1996 Census also revealed "Durban had some of the most 
impoverished clusters, not just in the Province, but in the country".123 And, 
perhaps most visibly, there was a growing sense that Durban was losing its status 
as a premier tourist destination. However, Robbins notes that there were some 
parts of Durban's economy that were growing albeit at very low rates that were 
"not significant enough to lift overall growth levels up".l24 
When this economic data was added to anecdotal evidence of new developments 
occurring in Johannesburg and Cape Town, "Durban looked like it was losing 
out".125 Indeed, Durban could show little progress on creating jobs and growth in 
the manufacturing sector, very few new tourists coming to the city and very few 
households were escaping the poverty that was attributed to the legacy of 
Apartheid. The result was that it was understood that "Durban was faced by these 
twin pressures. The one of decline of the economy and [the] problem of a 
122 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
123 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
124 The manufactur~ng sector remained significant, the financial sector was showing some growth. 
There was growth in the auto components and paper and pulp sectors. The chemical sector was 
boosted by the investments of companies such as Dow Chemicals and Bayer (Glen Robbins, 
Interview 14/06/ 04). The p~i?t ~bout this ~owth wa~ that it was stimulated by national policies 
rather than local (Durban) initiatives and POints to national level influences on local growth. 
125 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
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significant proportion of the population out of contact with the economy in any 
real way" (myemphasis).126 
In sum, poverty was understood to be a complex result of systematic deprivation 
and neglect concretised in the form of the city and expressed through 
management of the city. The perceived absence of economic growth posed a 
serious problem to the city leadership as to how to reduce poverty and develop 
the city. At the dawn of the post-Apartheid era there was little disagreement that 
poverty was an overwhelming problem for the city, that local government needed 
to change, that the city form needed to be integrated, and that the economy was 
not performing as well as needed. 
4.2 Activities to reduce poverty 
Poverty had emerged as an important political issue in post-Apartheid local 
government. But the ways in which it was to be addressed came to be understood 
through a series of institutional processes related to changes in Durban's local 
government. Some of the important activities linked to the restructuring of local 
government are analysed below along with some key trends in poverty research, 
approaches to development, and local politics. The aim of this section is to 
highlight a diverse range of activities that contributed to poverty coming to be 
understood as a policy priority in Durban. 
4.2.1 Restructuring local government 
Following the first national elections in April 1994, seven of South Africa's nine 
provinces held their first post-Apartheid and democratic local government 
126 Interview, 14/06/04. 
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elections on 1 November 1995. Due to provincial political dynamics about 
demarcating new political boundaries the Kwazulu-Natal and Western Cape 
Provinces convened their elections about six months later on 26 June 1996. In 
Durban, over forty separate government units were restructured into a two-tier 
system of metropolitan-level and six local-level governments. This established 
the Durban Metropolitan Council and six local councils. Each tier had their 
elected representatives. The new local government boundaries cut across the 
previous racial boundaries established under apartheid (see Figure 5).127 
A metropolitan level of government was established with limited metropolitan 
powers after the first local government elections in 1996. From this time until the 
Unicity elections in December 2000, Metropolitan councillors were elected on a 
proportional representation system based on political party lists. Councillors on 
the local councils were elected on a ward basis. This distinction is important 
because the newly elected (generally Black) councillors in the local councils 
tended to feel more accountability to their constituency's needs while the 
Metropolitan councillors arguably adopted more of a city-wide view. 
The co-existence of, and conflicts amongst, metropolitan level and sub-
metropolitan government elected representatives will emerge as a key dynamic 
later in the chapter. However, for now I merely point out that this 'transitional 
form' of local government pended the final transformation of the apartheid 
government system when a single metropolitan government was established in 
local government elections in December 2000.128 
127 Ultimately even this configuration was enlarged in the Redemarcation process (See Figure 6). 
128 The 'transitional' stage of local government transformation refers to the period 1996-2000 and 
is different from the transitional phase in South African politics identified in Chapter Two. 
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Figure 5. Changes to local government in Durban in 2000 
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Source: (Urban Strategy Department n.d.) 
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Bill Freund (2002a, 27) observes that this restructuring was the "product of 
several years of negotiation and tentative institutional change". This observation 
highlights the difficulties posed by engaging in institutional restructuring as well 
as the need to account for longer and more complex histories in examining 
institutional poverty practices in Durban. 
Nevertheless, during this 'transitional period' various forces came together in 
anticipation of the finalisation of the form of local government and 
transformation of the Apartheid state in general.129 A metropolitan-wide 
authority that transcended the racially fragmented government was generally 
considered to provide significant possibilities for social change and 
redistribution. It was these possibilities that motivated progressive scholars and 
activists to get involved in issues surrounding local government restructuring. 
One of the most important priorities for this newly elected leadership at both 
metropolitan and local levels was for it to replace the top management of the 
bureaucracy who were associated with implementing Apartheid. The new 
councillors wanted to give content to the nationally-defined developmental 
objectives of local government to redress Apartheid and reduce poverty (Nel and 
Binns 2003).130 The result was that the bureaucratic leadership of the 
Municipality tended to be replaced by people with a more developmental 
background - often forged in the NGO sector or anti-Apartheid campaigns - and 
with greater exposure to development experience and poverty debates.131 This 
meant that wider perspectives on poverty, economic growth, and the role of cities 
in development were imported, and imparted, at senior management levels. In 
some cases, this new leadership had experience of national debates about 
poverty, development, and the economy forged during the formulation and 
129 It was not clear what form local government in Durban would take until just before the 
elections in December 2000. This paralleled wider national debates about the form and function 
of local government in South Africa. 
130 See also (The White Paper on Local Government 1998). 
131 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
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negotiation of national policies in the period between 1990 and 1994 and then in 
the period of policy formulation after 1994. Good examples of this are Viv 
McMenamin132 who was involved in the ANC's national economic research and 
policy unit prior to 1994 and Dan Smit133 who had a long involvement in the 
formulation of national housing policy. These factors and wider perspectives 
contributed to the ways in which poverty and the role of cities in economic 
growth rose on the Council's agenda. 
However, the ability to change the strategic direction of the city's development 
was severely constrained because the bulk of the Municipality's budget was 
already committed to operating expenditure. Vidhu Vedalankar134 equated the 
difficulty of reorienting the bureaucracy with that of changing the form of the 
Apartheid city. She remarks that a large number of the 16,000 municipal staff 
and officials had a "fixed form" in the sense that their activities were bound to 
specific functions of regulation and maintenance. Of a total budget of 
approximately R8 billion, R7 billion was tied to operating expenditure and only 
R1 billion was available for new capital expenditure in 2001.135 While about 75 
per cent of the capital budget was directed towards the historically neglected 
townships it was clear that significant change rested on being able to refocus the 
municipality's operational programmes.136 Thus, the restructuring of the staff 
and organisation of the Municipality became critical to achieving the desired 
development direction. The reorganisation was itself difficult because of two 
problems. 
132 Viv McMenamin became the first director of the Economic Development Department in the 
Durban Metropolitan Council. 
133 Dan Smit became the Director of the Metro Housing Department of the Durban Metropolitan 
Counid. 
134 Vedalankar is a respected fonner activist in campaigns aligned with the UDF and became CEO 
of South and North Central Councils in 1999. The South and North Central Councils were 
managed together following the local government restructuring in 1996. 
135 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
136 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
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Firstly, the new leadership was diffused throughout the city. In Vedalankar's 
opinion this meant that while this leadership was not "blocking anything, they 
weren't taking [the city] anywhere".137 Nevertheless, a number of responsibilities 
were allocated to the new metropolitan level such as housing, water, electricity 
and economic development so that concerted metropolitan-wide action could be 
taken. A department that figures prominently in the way in which the poverty 
became important at this time is the metropolitan-level Economic Development 
Department (EDD).138 
Secondly, the new developmentally-oriented leadership were faced with a 
situation where the professionally competent and historically powerful 
infrastructure departments within the Municipality were continuing with 
business as usual and "weren't paying attention to the fact that people still didn't 
have access to water and nobody was making them pay attention".139 In 
Vedalankar's view, the only department that was paying attention to the 
development issues "might have been [Metro] Housing but they weren't strong 
enough" in comparison to the institutionally powerful Water, Electricity and 
Engineering departments. While Durban Metro Water and Durban Electricity 
pioneered the progressive provision of services through lifeline tariffs,140 in 
Vedalankar's opinion, these were primarily a "financing and system mechanism" 
rather than ensuring that poor people could access water and electricity.141 Thus 
Vedalankar concludes, the "only time we could debate the [broader 
developmental] issues was in the Unicity committee142 because they weren't 
137Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
138 The EDD was initially established within the Urban Strategy Department of the (local) Durban 
Municipality and later emerged as a department at the metropolitan level. 
139 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
140 This tariff structure ensures that each consumer obtains soKwh of electricity and 6 kilolitres of 
water per month free. If consumption exceeds this first free block, then the additional 
consumption is charged at a rate that cross-subsidises the first free tariff block. This tariff 
structure is an important component of eThekwini Municipality's poverty alleviation initiatives. 
141 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
142 The Unicity committee was a supra-local and metro-level forum established in anticipation of 
metropolitan-level government in Durban. 
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accountable to the local councils" and bound up with the existing organisation of 
the municipality.143 
In sum, the restructuring of local government and the possibility of a 
metropolitan view made it possible to conceptualise managing the city in a 
different way. A new layer of senior management was appointed to help realise 
these progressive possibilities. However, change was understood to be more 
difficult than originally anticipated because staff and budgets were allocated to 
specific functions and capital expenditure was restricted. These restrictions were 
consistent with the fiscally austere approach encouraged by GEAR. The ability to 
introduce a new vision came up against the financially and technically 
entrenched administrative systems. These systems were particularly difficult to 
challenge because they contributed to the image of Durban as a historically well-
managed municipality which was important in a broader political context 
(Freund 2oo2a). The combination of these factors thus made it more difficult 
than anticipated for post-Apartheid policy makers to address poverty and the 
effects of Apartheid. 
Redemarcation 
To facilitate the redistribution of resources from historically, wealthy white areas 
of the city to poorer Black areas and to reflect the functional dependence of 
urban areas and their hinterlands, national government passed legislation 
providing for the re-demarcation of local government areas. l44 The result was 
that a comprehensive system of racially integrated local government was 
established across the country in South Africa. 
143 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
144 The Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998. 
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In Durban the effect of demarcation was to increase the area of jurisdiction by 
about 67 per cent and the population by 9 per cent (Urban Strategy Department 
2000b). The difference between the increase in land area and population is to be 
explained by the low population density of the semi-urban peripheral areas that 
were incorporated (see Figure 6). 
These expanded boundaries ensured that many poorer parts of the city became 
incorporated within the city's boundaries. The net result was that the eThekwini 
Municipality inherited poorer areas that had historically been neglected in terms 
of infrastructure and amenities. Consequently this posed new development 
challenges for the city and raised the priority of responding to issues of poverty 
overall.145 The other effect of the re-demarcation and geographic expansion of the 
city boundaries was that the balance of representation within the council 
chamber shifted. Representatives of the relatively impoverished and additional 
wards were predominantly Black. These new representatives often brought their 
own personal experiences of poverty with them in the council chamber.146 But, 
more broadly, it required the Municipality to seriously engage with the 
development and redistribution of resources to the urban periphery, townships, 
denser informal areas and areas under the 'control' of traditional leaders (BeaU 
2006). The demarcation of expanded municipal boundaries coincided with the 
establishment of the eThekwini Municipality in the municipal elections of 
December 2000. 
145 It should be noted that although the eThekwini Municipality assumed spatial control over a 
previous city hinterlan? that had. always been part of the ~ocial and economic life of the city, 
significant powers to mtervene m these new areas rem am under the control of Provincial 
Government. 
146 Linda Mbonambi, Interview 10/06/04. 
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Figure 6. Redemarcation of Durban Metropolitan area 
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Many of the institutional changes in Durban were driven by national changes in 
the local government legislative framework. For example, the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution (1996) provided for three co-operative tiers of government and 
thereby established local government as an equal sphere of government with 
certain rights, powers and duties alongside national and provincial government. 
Of importance here, was the emphasis on the developmental purpose of local 
government rather than a purely regulatory role. The duty of local government 
was specified as to engage in "budgeting and planning processes to give priority 
to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community" (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996, Chapter 7, Section 153.a). The EDD was established in Durban, partly in 
response to this constitutional obligation147 and partly, as I will argue later, in 
response to a growing trend across South Africa to prioritise economic 
development at a local government level and suggest a far more active role for 
the local state in shaping the local economy (Binns and Nel 2002; Rogerson 
2003; Pieterse 1998). 
The key piece of legislation that gives content to the Constitutional obligations on 
local government is the White Paper on Local Government (1998). From this 
White Paper a raft of legislation was promulgated.148 In general, these changes in 
objectives reflect a desire for local government to be the State's first line response 
to the poverty and inequality characteristic of South Mrica's cities (Mogale 
2005). Possibly the most important of these responses is the requirement for 
each municipality to prepare an Integrated Development Plan (IDP). The IDP 
process was intended to integrate the spatial redevelopment of historically 
147 Eric Watkinson, Interview, 29/07/04. 
148 A brief overview is in order to provide a sense of the scale of changes experienced by local 
government in South Africa. As noted the Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 provides for the 
demarcation of municipal boundaries according to specified objectives and criteria. The 
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (The Municipal Structures Act) provides for the 
establishment of municipalities and aspects of their organisation, composition and internal 
affairs. Th.e Muni~i~al ~~stems Act 5 of 2000 (Municipal Systems Act) provides for systems 
within which mUnIcIpahtIes should operate and procedures they should follow in day-to-day 
operations. 
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neglected areas with the budgeting process of the municipality. The requirement 
to prepare an Integrated Development Plan was an important motivation for the 
Unicity Committee to engage in the long-term city visioning process (Moodley 
2004), which I will consider in the following chapter. The policy makers argued 
that the shorter-term IDP needed to be informed by a longer-term view of urban 
development. 149 
However, the legislation focused on transforming local government was not the 
only national-level legislation that was having an impact on the activities of local 
government. It is worth recalling from Chapter Two that the GEAR (Department 
of Finance 1996) macroeconomic strategy was having a profound effect on South 
African policy-making. This filtered through to the formulation of other national 
policies such as urban policy. The only national-level urban policy is the Urban 
Development Framework (Department of Housing 1997). In respect of this 
policy, Edgar Pieterse (2003, 124) observes, "the message is clear: prioritise 
economic growth while simultaneously gearing up municipal government to 
tackle the massive backlogs." It is perhaps not surprising, then, that there was a 
growing sense that Durban needed to focus more strongly on economic growth 
and be globally competitive to achieve this.lSo One of the first times that this view 
is explicitly stated is in Durban Metropolitan Council Green Paper on Economic 
development (Durban Metropolitan Council 1996). 
The emphasis on economic growth as a solution to poverty at the international 
level has occurred in tandem with broader representations of cities as the 
primary sites of economic growth. I drew attention to how the economy was 
increasingly coming to be seen as the most important solution to poverty in the 
presentation of the definitions of poverty in Chapter Two. Within this process the 
city rather than the nation has assumed greater importance in strategies for 
149 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
150 This ~s. in the conte.xt of linki~~ this economic gro~h to extend access to disadvantaged 
commumties to economlc opportumties (Durban Metropohtan Council 1996). 
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generating economic growth and cities have come to be regarded as the 'engines 
of economic growth' (Grant 2004; Meikle 2002). While the lines of causality are 
fuzzy, the concomitant rising policy importance of urban poverty, economic 
growth, and cities is suggestive of a complex interrelationship. But, here I want to 
draw attention to an effect of this concomitant rise in policy importance that has 
had consequences in Durban. Jennifer Robinson (2002) notes that generally the 
focus has shifted from developing poorer, peripheral parts of the city to 
considering how the city as a whole can benefit from fast-growing, globally 
integrated economic activities. This view, in turn, had consequences for the 
location of economic investments and their ability to 'trickle' or spread into the 
wider Durban metropolitan area (cf. Maharaj and Ramballi 1998). In sum 
therefore, 'cities', particularly in the global south, have come to be imbued with 
perspectives that suggest that they are sites of increasing poverty (cf. Mitlin 
2003; Devas 2004) but are simultaneously being recognised as critical 
components of poverty reduction strategies because they are primary sites of 
economic growth (cf. DflD 2001; Daniels 2004). An important effect to signal is 
that this has legitimated more ways of 'seeing' and 'talking' about urban poverty. 
The consequences for Durban were that eThekwini Municipality could 
legitimately pursue economic growth strategies as a general part of poverty 
alleviation initiatives. However, it was poverty research commissioned by local 
government that quantified the extent of this poverty in Durban. 
4.2.2 Poverty research 
The EDD commissioned the first post-Apartheid research into poverty in the 
emerging Durban metropolitan municipality in 1999.151 This research was based 
on the national Census of 1996 and conceptually draws upon, and is framed in 
terms of, the broad definitions of poverty in the national PIR (see Casale and 
151 Eric Watkinson, Interview 28/07/04. 
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Thurlow 1999). The research produces categories of 'poor' and 'ultra-poor' 
census enumerator areas. 152 These categories are mapped against different 
aspects of life in the city. Here I present a sample that relate to the prevalence of 
poverty, unemployment, and access to water services. The spatial prevalence of 
poverty, unemployment and Oack of) access to water on the periphery of the city 
are both important to the ways in which poverty came to be understood by 
Durban's policy-makers. Thus in Figure 7, Casale and Thurlow (1999) point to 
the concentration of the poor in the peripheral areas of Durban. Figure 8 shows 
the extent and distribution of unemployment and Casale and Thurlow (1999, 26) 
suggest that "while unemployment does, to a certain extent, concentrate in the 
outer areas, there is a general prevalence throughout the Durban Metropolitan 
Area". Figure 9 shows the percentage of households that had access to water 
from the local authority. On the basis of this sample spatial analysis of poverty 
and other maps included in the report, Casale and Thurlow (1999) conclude that 
poor people are primarily on the periphery of the city. 
Although the Casale and Thurlow (1999) study is framed broadly within the 
assets and capabilities/sustainable livelihoods approach of the PIR, these 
subtleties are generally lost or dissipated in subsequent references to this work. 
Consequently, poverty tends to be defined in terms of income. The calculations of 
poverty that are cited in later policy documents, for example that 23 per cent of 
Durban's population suffer from extreme poverty and 44 per cent suffer from 
poverty, are drawn directly from the conclusions of the 1999 study (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 3). As a result, the extent of poverty was quantified in the 
Municipality's general development agenda and the effect of this study was to 
152 This definition of 'poor' and 'ultra-poor' is based on May's (1998) definition in the PIR which is 
based on the RDP (1995) which is ultimately based on data from the PSLSD (SALDRU 1995). In 
this method, households are ranked in terms of their adult equivalent expenditure and divided 
into five q~i~tiles. The 'ultra-poor' are.the lowest quintile. This definition of a 'relative' poverty 
line was ongmally chosen by the RDP ID the absence of consensus on an 'absolute' poverty line. 
Coincidentally, the relative poverty line indicated an "extent of poverty in the same range as that 
produced by the minimum food lines" (RDP 1995, 8). This approach is to be distinguished from 
the definition of the 'ultra-poor' as those who are unable to meet their minimum needs despite 
spending more than 80 per cent of their income on food. 
129 
provide hard evidence of the extent of poverty and confirm the reframing of 
racial inequality as income inequality (cf. Nicholson 2000). This both allowed, 
and required, the Councillors to factor poverty into any new plans. 153 
The broader definitions and theories of poverty discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three respectively are complemented by international debates about urban 
poverty, development, and the role of government. In terms of the international 
debates, the prioritisation of poverty in the World Bank's 1990 World 
Development Report is a key moment in the broader processes of framing 
international development priorities (Mawdsley and Rigg 2002). It is recognised 
as having set in train a new focus on poverty for the international development 
agenda (Booth and Mosley 2003). As I suggested in Chapter Two, the motivation 
for the PSLSD, SA-PPA, and PIR, can in part, be ascribed to this new focus. Dan 
Smit (CEO of Durban Metro Council Housing and a senior consultant in the 
long-term city visioning process I will consider in the following chapter) suggests 
that these broader discourses are important here because as poverty became 
more fashionable within broader development discourses, it was possible to put 
it on the Durban Council's agenda more freely.l54 
But the international recognition and prioritisation of urban poverty lagged 
behind this broader trend (Satterthwaite 2005; Amis 1995). For example, ten 
years after the 1990 World Development Report, Philip Amis (2001, 354) 
suggests that the 2000 World Development Report neither understands, nor 
addresses, the position of the urban poor. Diana Mitlin (2004) argues that the 
international lack of recognition of urban poverty has been compounded by an 
underestimation of urban poverty. This is particularly so when poverty is defined 
more broadly than a lack of income and includes 'human needs not met' (Mitlin 
1995a). 
153 Brian O'Leary, Interview 29/03/04. 
154 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
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Figure 7. Poverty headcount in Durban (1996) 
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Figure 8. Unemployment in Durban (1996) 
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Figure 9. Water supply in Durban (1996) 
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In South Africa, there has only recently been a shift in policy emphasis and 
resource distribution that has paralleled the broader international shifts 
identified above. Firstly, this has been because the talismanic figure of the 
'poorest of the poor' as being a black, rural woman (that was given such impetus 
in the Carnegie Inquiry) has proven difficult to dislodge. Consequently, in the 
post-Apartheid period the challenge of reducing poverty has primarily focused on 
rural areas. It has only been in the late 1990S that urban poverty has become 
recognised as of equal importance to rural poverty in South Mrica.155 The 
growing policy emphasis on urban poverty has also to do with a recognition of a 
trend toward urbanisation bringing more people to the cities and an increasing 
share of overall poverty being found in urban areas (Rogerson 2001, 342).156 This 
has been underpinned by increasing amounts of resources being made available 
to generate research data which in turn is based on the perception amongst 
international development agencies that economic growth (to reduce poverty) 
increasingly occurs in cities (DflD 2001). This data is slowly filtering through to 
inform policy agendas.157 
More generally though the nuanced and thorough understanding of urban 
Apartheid's effects on poverty in South Africa has much to offer broader Anglo 
theories of urban poverty which tend to be more abstract and aspatial (cf. Parnell 
1997; Robinson 2006). Within the broader theories, urban poverty is considered 
as having the same underlying causes as 'general poverty' (Wratten 1995). 
Theorists have identified a range of effects of poverty that can combine uniquely 
in ways that "intensify the insecurity and life-threatening health risks 
experienced with poverty" (Wratten 1995, 25). These effects include the 
observation that urban poverty appears more embedded in the national and 
global capitalist economy. Thus urban poverty relates to the greater reliance of 
urban households on income and the monetary economy and relatively lesser 
155 Susan Parnell, Interview 22/07/04 and see also peAS (2003). 
156 These processes have their parallels in experiences internationally (cf. 0yen 2005; Wratten 
1995)· 
157 Susan Parnell, Interview 22/07/04. 
134 
reliance on the natural environment to produce food (Moser 1998). The means of 
accessing assets such as land, water and shelter are generally more commoditised 
and urban forms of governance tend to underscore these differences with rural 
poverty (Farrington, Ramasut, and Walker 2002). Ellen Wratten (1995, 25) also 
points to issues such as social fragmentation and crime, and negative contact 
with the state and police as important issues for poor people in urban areas. 
Together these effects of urban poverty exacerbate the exposure of people to the 
vicissitudes of the global (capitalist) economy and interventions such as 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (McMichael1998; Green 1998). The South 
African studies of poverty however offer rich insights that are based on the 
distinctively urban experiences and causes of poverty that arise from the 
Apartheid city and its racialised development. 
In Durban, growing attention to urban poverty led to efforts on the part of the 
EDD to restructure the finances of the Municipality to free up resources for 
capital spending and new innovative initiatives. As a result, resources were 
created to commission a Quality of Life survey.158 This survey is seen as critical in 
promoting the need to respond to urban poverty. Nonhlanhla Zondi159 comments 
"before the Quality of Life survey it was thought that most poverty was in the 
rural areas of the city, but [the survey] changed this and suggested that there was 
more poverty in the township areas".l60 It is generally accepted in the broader 
poverty literature and in Durban that urban poverty can be differentiated from 
rural poverty, even though the distinctions between urban and rural are often 
difficult to sustain and the general flows between the urban and rural suggest a 
complex interdependence (see for example, Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002; 
Cross, Mngadi, and Mbhele 1998). 
158 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
159 Non?lanhla Zond.i w~s interviewed in his ~apacity as ~el?uty Head of the department 
responsIble for co-ord1Oating responses to poverty m the eThekwim Municipality. 
160 Interview, 26/04/04. 
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I suggest that the acknowledgement of the distinctively urban nature of poverty 
in Durban has had two consequences for local policy. The first is that poverty is 
perceived as spatially confined to informal settlements.161 This in turn has the 
effect of providing a convenient spatial referent to the tendency within poverty 
studies to seek to isolate and target those in poverty (cf. Green 2003; Modarres 
2001; Yapa 1998; Shaffer 2002). The second effect is that a focus on the physical 
condition of settlements translates poverty reduction strategies into the 
provision and upgrading of public infrastructure. The link and eventual 
conflation between poverty alleviation and infrastructure provision is provided 
by basic needs theory. Diana Mitlin (1995b, 7) points out that when "urban 
poverty is understood as more than lack of income [and] includes all aspects of 
deprivation then a greater range of initiatives to improve housing, health, 
transport and basic services become part of poverty reduction". 
The intention of the basic needs approach is to guarantee access of all households 
to a minimum standard. This provided the basis for re-directing Durban's 
municipal budgets and programmes. However, as Edgar Pieterse (1998, 7) 
observes, precisely what constitutes the 'minimum standard' and how this is 
guaranteed is "highly dependent on the financial formulas that underpin them 
which determine the size of the subsidy, who gets access to the subsidy, the level 
of service, etc.". 
The conflation of basic needs and poverty in urban development policies is 
despite the insistence of other authors on poverty alleviation at a national level, 
that there is a distinction between meeting 'basic-needs' and eradicating poverty. 
May and Rogerson, for example, suggest that: 
" ... providing water, toilets or transport for the poor will not eradicate poverty. None the 
less, the more effective delivery of infrastructure services ... stands out as a particularly 
important set of policy interventions that government can use to directly meet the basic 
161 See Davis (2004), Gilbert (1982), Ravallion (2002) and United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (2003). 
needs of the poor and to redress apartheid-inherited inequalities in service provision " 
(2000, 217-218). 
In sum, broader poverty research had begun to make it easier to raise poverty as 
a policy priority within the municipality and Council although recognition of the 
severity of urban poverty lagged at the national and provincial levels of 
government. Within Durban, the racial segregration of the city made it possible 
to identify specific geographic concentrations of poverty because the levels of 
income, infrastructure and social services coincided with the racial geography of 
the city. Consequently, racial inequalities could be translated into urban 
inequalities and poverty became thought of as predominantly spatially confined 
to peripheral and 'dormitory' areas of the city. 
4.2.3 Development approaches 
Inevitably, with the need for change, a range of different views on approaches to 
reduce poverty emerged within Durban. There were two that I argue exemplified 
the extremes of the debates. The first is what was termed 'delivery-at-scale' of 
basic infrastructure and services and the second the 'big-project' approach. Both 
of these two approaches were a complex mix of contradictory factors and effects. 
However, both of these approaches were framed in terms of what local 
government was generally considered able to do. Constitutionally, local 
government in South Africa was required to pursue the objectives of the 'social' 
and 'economic' development of citizens. At the very least this involved the 
delivery of infrastructure and services on a financially sustainable basis and 
could be broadened out to include notions of citizenship. Most local authorities 
in South Mrica struggled to pursue a local economic agenda (Binns and Nel 
2002; Pieterse 1998). Durban was recognised as having more capacity than most 
local authorities (Khosa and Naidoo 1998). But even in Durban, the ability to 
pursue economic development appears confounded by the contradictory effects 
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of the national state having the power to intervene more adequately and having 
better instruments to promote economic growth, but being perceived as 
withdrawing from its local responsibilities, if unevenly (Rogerson 2001; Nel and 
Binns 2003; Freund and Lootvoet 2004). In terms of this understanding, the 
responsibility of local government was to ensure that when the local economy did 
start to grow the exclusionary impacts on the poor were minimised.162 
Notwithstanding these limitations, Vedalankar traces one source of the 
divergence between the 'delivery-at-scale' and 'big-project' approaches back to 
forms of engagement in the struggle against Apartheid. She notes that those 
involved internally in the struggle, through the mass UDF campaigns for 
example, tended to think "on scale" of a groundswell of change. In her view, 
those activists in exile tended to think more in terms of specific "projects" that 
would catalyse other changes.163 However, in the light of the analysis of Chapter 
Three, it is also possible to see the influence of different theories of poverty being 
played out and I suggest that the 'delivery-at-scale' approach resonates with the 
connective strategy of basic needs theories of poverty. 
The 'delivery-at-scale' approach centred on directly improving the material 
circumstances of those considered poor. In Dan Smit's view, sustainable poverty 
reduction required increasing the social wage through redistribution. In this 
conceptualisation, the role of economic growth was to contribute to the same 
goal of redistribution through creating employment.I64 But as Vedalankar notes 
"the fact that you have an unemployment rate of 40 per cent means that 
[Durban] cannot be driven by a formal economic agenda ... and if we have that 
many people who are not part of the formal economy, and they are being by-
passed, then we have to address [basic] needs".165 This approach favours direct 
infrastructural investment to meet the basic needs of poor areas of the city as 
pointed out in relation to the apportionment of the Municipality's 2001 capital 
162 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
163 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
164 Interview, 30/08/05. 
165 Interview, 29/07/04. 
expenditure budgeU66 However, the redistribution of this capital investment 
posed a problem because it tended to reinforce the form of the Apartheid city by 
literally, concretising, the existing fragmented urban form. Alison Todes (2003) 
notes, the debate about urban form in South Africa was driven more by questions 
of equity and social change than efficiency and diversity.167 This reinforcement of 
the Apartheid city was considered highly undesirable by progressive policy-
makers and it contributed to a growing sense that the best chance of 
restructuring Apartheid cities was to invest in areas that were not necessarily, 
historically poor. l68 Despite this, the 'delivery-at-scale' approach held 
considerable appeal to the Ward councillors representing poor, peripheral wards 
with poor services and high rates of unemployment. 
On the contrary, the 'big-project' approach relied on large, catalytic projects that 
would demonstrate tangible change and build confidence in the city as a 
favourable locale for other infrastructural investment and tourism development. 
In this way, the 'big-project' approach relied on a 'trickle-down' distribution 
system from the increased investment that would follow and in this way, spoke to 
an income theory of poverty in terms of which poor people would be absorbed 
into the formal economy and lifted out of poverty through earning higher 
incomes (Amis 2002). 
It was the Director of EDD, Viv McMenamin's view, that it was necessary to 
engage in single big urban projects to stimulate economic growth. l 6<) In addition, 
EDD did not have a very strong focus on the link between poverty and economic 
growth because McMenamin took a view that the 'delivery-at-scale approach' 
166 Adopting an international perspective Amis (2002, 109) notes that "despite the hype about city 
marketing and mega projects, traditional service delivery [by local government] may be more 
critical for [poverty reduction]". 
167 In many cases the opportunities and attempts to reintegrate Durban through implementing 
notions of the compact city foundered on micro-level antipathy from surrounding areas and the 
dictates of the land market (Charlton 2003; Todes 2000). 
168 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
169 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04; Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04; Vidhu Vedalankar, 
Interview 29/07/04. 
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was not the way to solve South Mrica's problems and that the economy should be 
viewed as having two connected but different problems - the absence of growth 
and severe poverty.170 It is worth noting that this view also structures the PIR.171 
In McMenamin's view, national government was seen as the best means of using 
basic services to address poverty in the most extreme form and local government 
should address the absence of growth (while not entirely ignoring the connection 
to poverty).l72 The lack of local economic growth was seen as a result of a lack of 
confidence and a disconnection between the political elites and economic elites 
and therefore the need for partnerships between the two. This was because the 
ability to realise catalytic big projects was understood to depend on 'coalitions' of 
local political and economic elite and such projects often require special 
arrangements or processes that require elite support and legitimacy (Robinson 
and Boldogh 1994). This is an issue I return to below when considering the 
perceived mismatch between the local political and economic elite in Durban as a 
source of tension in local politics. 
However, McMenamin and EDD were far from single-mindedly pursuing 
flagship, 'boosterist-type' urban projects and the department appreciated the 
need to work on many different dimensions of the economy. Indeed, the ability of 
the EDD to focus on large investments in economic infrastructure depended on 
their ability to secure continued support from Ward councillors in Council 
170 Glen Robbins, Interview 18/03/04. 
171 The PIR suggests that separate, but related policies are needed to intervene in the economy 
and to reduce poverty. The result is that economic growth policies and poverty policies have an 
independence from each other, even though it is expected that they will have an impact on each 
other. However, the economy comes to be seen as more fundamental because it is argued that 
when the past performance of the economy is considered, economic output and employment 
creation has been declining while the population growth rate has remained constant. 
Unemployment has therefore grown and because unemployment is strongly correlated with 
poverty, poverty has increased. Thus without employment to increase per capita output it is 
argued that little progress can be made on reducing poverty. The result is that economic growth 
(economic policies) is considered more fundamental than poverty reduction (poverty studies), 
with the result that economic growth as expressed in GEAR can be considered the most 
fundamental part of (and seems to be consistent with) the RDP. In effect, economic growth 
becomes decoupled from efforts to reduce poverty(May 1998, 6). 
172 Glen Robbins, Interview 18/03/04. 
140 
debates.173 One of the best ways of securing this support was to work within poor 
peripheral communities and deliver local economic results. Thus, Robbins 
reflects that EDD were involved in a set of contradictory processes which meant 
that "sometimes [EDD] worked with the market and at other times against".174 
To state the two development approaches in such stark terms is perhaps to 
overstate the differences. Nevertheless, these differences do appear to have been 
reinforced and played out through local politics and differences within the 
Council. 
4.2.4 Local politics 
There are three aspects of local politics that shaped the way in which poverty 
became important in Durban. These aspects shaped the process of arriving at a 
preferred development approach for Durban, and hence the understanding of 
poverty that would predominate. The first is tensions between the Metropolitan-
level and Ward-level councillors. The second is internal struggles over leadership 
within the ANC. The third is a perceived mismatch by policy-makers between 
political and economic elites. 
Tensions between Metropolitan and Local governments 
Earlier in this chapter, I noted when discussing the restructuring of local 
government that the two-tiered system of representation at metropolitan and 
local levels was important. I now return to this issue to explore in what ways it 
was important to how poverty became a priority. In this transitional period of 
local government, local councils often contested the metropolitan-level initiatives 
(Todes 2000). In Glen Robbins' view, the tension between the local and 
metropolitan level government was exacerbated by the perception of the centrally 
173 Glen Robbins, Interview, 14/06/04. 
174 Interview 14/06/04. 
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former-White local councils that they were more important than the 
Metropolitan level government in economic terms.175 To recall, in Figure 4 
showing the spatial form of the city, the central councils coincided with the 
historically highly resourced areas of the city where the formal economy was 
assumed to be located. 
The local Ward councillors felt that development in the historically 
disadvantaged areas, such as the townships and informal settlements so 
prominent in urban poverty discourses, should be prioritised. Mter all, as 
poverty research had shown, the greatest deprivation and neglect in terms of 
municipal service provision was to be found on the periphery of the city. Being 
more accountable to their local constituency than the Metropolitan councillors 
elected proportionally from party lists, the Ward councillors were eager to deliver 
resources to ameliorate deplorable conditions in their wards and match the 
hopes and expectations of the electorate. In this context, it was difficult for a 
Ward councillor to explain to a household, in an under-serviced township, how 
investments in an International Convention Centre in the centre of the city, and 
aimed at international visitors, for example, would improve their living 
conditions.1i'6 Robbins feels that there was a sense that the Metropolitan level 
councillors were not very sympathetic to what they saw as parochialism on the 
part of local Ward councillors. m Thus, the apportionment of the budgets and 
development priorities of the Municipality became highly contested. 
To some extent the EDD became identified with the Metropolitan level 
councillors, particularly with a small, but highly influential group of executive 
Metropolitan councillors (including the Mayor). This group came to form a 
strong team with a commitment to implementing investments with a 
metropolitan-wide impact. This chimed well with McMenamin's views on 'big-
175 Glen Robbins, Interview 18/03/04. 
176 Dan Smit, Interview, 30/08/05. 
177 Interview, 18/03/04. 
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project' economic development and it is not surprising that she performed an 
important role in providing the technical justification and backup for the 
executive committee and thereby improved its capabilities.178 McMenamin is an 
economist with historically strong links to the national ANC leadership and 
economic policy making processes. These relationships with national politicians 
and processes were important for unlocking development processes and securing 
higher levels of support for economic initiatives. Vedalankar notes the "[local] 
councillors weren't necessarily happy with this Metro approach of big projects 
because that didn't ... result in things for them in the townships".l79 
Mismatches between the political and economic elite 
The tension between Metropolitan and Ward councillors and differences over 
approaches to development was refracted by the perception of a disjuncture 
between the newly elected (mostly Black) political elite and historically 
entrenched (mostly White) economic elite. Robbins feels that the new 
"councillors felt threatened and didn't trust White business".180 However, the 
relationship between officials and White business was complex and Robbins 
notes "there were lots of bruising battles between the private sector and 
officials".181 The perception of a disjuncture was given added weight after the 
2000 local government elections when the political elite of the ANC did not 
generally represent the areas of the city perceived to be responsible for economic 
growth. In the broadest terms, the Democratic Alliance represented established 
White interests while the ANC and IFP represented poor Black interests. As 
Figure 10 shows, the Democratic Alliance (DA) represented the historically well-
developed and industrial (economic) parts of the city while the ANC tended to 
represent the (poor) peripheral areas ofthe city. 
178 Glen Robbins, Interview, 14/06/04. 
179 Interview 29/07/04. 
180 Interview 14/06/04. 
181 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04. 
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Figure 10. Political representation at ward level after the local 
government elections in Durban in 2000 
Political Party 
D ANC 
IFP 
D DA 
INO 
• MF 
Durban Metro Unicity Area 
Wards 
December 2000 
Source: (Urban Strategy Department 2000a) 
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Khosa and Naidoo (1998, 2) estimate that 80 per cent of formal economic 
activities were located within the well-developed and industrial parts of the city. 
The reason it was so important to resolve the perceived disjuncture between the 
political and economic elites was because the 'big-project' approach relied on a 
consensus amongst political and economic elites to legitimately circumvent 
'normal' development procedures and practices. This was complicated in 
Durban by the fact that the two sets of elites represented different racial and 
social groups in the city. 
Consequently, the perceived mismatch between political and economic elites that 
stifled the prospects for formal economic growth in the city meant that the 
priority for economic growth "was not on capital investment, it was on 
relationship building because that was missing" .182 Kiepiela goes on to explain 
that in relation to promoting economic growth in Durban, the "first problem was 
confidence, and the second problem was the right policies, and then the third 
was, where do we get the money from?"183 Thus, Robbins notes that if there was a 
perception of a Council "swing to Capital in this period, then it would not be 
unfounded because we were trying to forge a partnership between Black and 
White business and the Municipality in some form. This was not sufficient for 
everything in the economy, but it was necessary".lB4 In this context, a Durban 
Growth Coalition was forged.185 The perceived need to build bridges between the 
economic and political elites overlapped with internal contestations over 
leadership and who should be forming the alliances with business elites within 
theANC. 
182 Andrzej Kiepiela, Interview 22/06/04. 
183 Interview 22/06/04. 
184 Interview 14/06/04. 
185 Durban Growth Coalition consists of the Premier of the Province, Provincial Minister of 
Finance and Economic Development, Durban's Municipal Manager, the head of the Durban 
Chamber of Business, and a secretary - Andrzej Kiepiela. 
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Leadership 
There was a clash of personal leadership styles between local council leadership 
and metropolitan council leadership which tended to exacerbate metro-local 
relations. l86 The Metropolitan Council mayor was, correctly or incorrectly, 
perceived by local council leadership to be representative of an older faction in 
the ANC that was more accountable to business and national interests than to the 
interests of rank and file party members. Perhaps in the light of the perceived 
disjuncture between the political and economic elites, this was necessary. Freund 
and Lootvoet (2004) draw attention to how ANC politicians and big business 
came together to define common goals during this period.IS7 This perhaps 
provides grist to the mill of the local council leaders who presented themselves as 
more representative of the ordinary members of the electorate and ANC 
membership. However, the power of the Mayor to pursue and realise large 
catalytic projects appears relatively immune from these local councillor concerns 
during this period. This is partly because the spatial reorganisation of the ANC's 
branch structure lagged behind the spatial restructuring of the local councils. 
Thus opposition to his leadership could not be co-ordinated or mobilised at the 
relevant geographic scales within the local party structures. In addition the 
Mayor had mobilised the support of provincial and national leadership within 
the ANC to secure his position. Thus, as a result of contestation over priorities, a 
clash of leadership styles, and an apparent lack of accountability to the poorest 
areas of the city, the Metropolitan council appeared to be more in favour of 
generating economic growth through large catalytic projects. The local councils 
appeared to favour more direct forms of investment in basic needs infrastructure 
that would immediately improve the living conditions of their constituents. 
186 Glen Robbins, Interview 14/06/04; Kisa Dlamini, Interview, 06/04/04. 
187 See also Moffett and Freund (2002). 
When the party branch structure was synchronised with the new local 
government boundaries the interests expressed through the local Ward 
councillors were able to organise more effectively and curtail the power of the 
metropolitan mayor. Although, as I will suggest in the next chapter, this did not 
necessarily displace the dominant view of economic growth and its role in 
alleviating poverty that was emerging. Despite the dominance of this view of 
economic growth there remained very strong investment in infrastructure and an 
enlightened informal settlement policy was implemented. Consequently, it 
proved difficult to realise the more ambitious 'big-projects'. 
In sum, this section has considered four different institutional activities that 
contributed to the understanding of poverty as a policy priority in Durban 
between 1996 and 2001. I have explored how these four different activities to 
reduce poverty - restructuring local government, poverty research, development 
approaches and local politics - reinforced, stretched and inflected the 
understanding of poverty reduction as a priority. This points to the ways in which 
understandings of poverty inform and are driven by institutional activities. 
4.3 Conclusion 
I suggested that understandings of poverty were inscribed at the centre of a 
series of problematic historical and contemporaneous processes. By way of 
example, the activity of governing and managing the city, the spatial form of the 
city, and the existence of poverty could all, in their different ways, be traced back 
to Apartheid and hence for the new ANC-Ied government, required drastic 
change. Economic growth (or rather its absence) was also understood to be a 
complex function of the racially divided management of the city, the inefficient 
apartheid urban form, and was thought of as a fundamental cause of high rates of 
poverty (as suggested in the broader theories of poverty in the previous chapter). 
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It follows from this view that how poverty emerged as a priority was partly 
related to the ways in which poverty was defined and partly how political 
interests that were invested in different definitions played out in local processes. 
Firstly, this central inscription made poverty a reference point in a period of 
uncertainty and profound transformation of local government in Durban and 
contributed to poverty being considered as a priority policy issue by policy 
makers in Durban. Secondly, this understanding informed, and was given 
content by, different local activities. I argued that the understandings of poverty 
(that take at least some inspiration from broader international accounts of 
poverty) as a policy priority issue were entangled in local activities. 
Consequently, the activities engaged in to change the processes that were 
considered to result in poverty were integral to producing the understanding of 
poverty as a policy priority. Given the inscription of poverty at the centre of these 
problematic processes by policy makers, there were inevitably many activities 
and interpretations of how to address the processes that resulted in poverty. One 
way in which Durban's policy makers managed this diversity was to adopt a 
broad framework of development priorities with the ultimate aim of reducing 
poverty. Durban's long-term equitable development was understood as requiring 
local government to meet three (occasionally competing) priorities - service 
delivery, meeting social needs, and economic growth. 
Despite attempts to use the framework of development priorities to contain 
diverse understandings of poverty, the different priorities brought poverty into 
view in different ways. For example, the existence of a metropolitan authority 
revealed how unequally the city had developed, and how the Apartheid local 
government was entangled with this form of development which ushered in 
possibilities of redistributing the city's resources more equitably. The legacy of 
urban Apartheid could be measured more or less tangibly through the disparities 
in service provision, investments, fragmentation of the city, high costs imposed 
on Black households through the peripheral locations of many Black settlements, 
insecurity, exposure to environmental hazards and risks and economic exclusion. 
So the delivery of infrastructure and services to meet basic needs was also crucial 
to addressing poverty. Finally, economic growth emerged as a central element in 
poverty reduction strategies in Durban. 
In Chapter Two, I noted how definitions of poverty in South Africa were 
increasingly being framed in economic terms and economic growth policies were 
being considered as one of the, if not the, most important means of reducing 
poverty. In Chapter Three, I examined how theories of poverty incline poverty 
researchers to gloss over the ways in which poor people's economic activities 
contribute to economic growth and proffer strategies of absorption, connection, 
and inclusion in processes of economic growth as mechanisms to reduce poverty. 
In this chapter, I recorded how economic growth is considered an increasingly 
important goal for local governments to pursue and facilitate in the cities that 
they manage and govern. This is because of the view that poverty is urbanising 
and hence urban local governments face a greater challenge in providing for the 
well-being of their citizens. It is also in order to deal with the legacies of 
impoverishment resulting from years of urban Apartheid and because cities are 
increasingly coming to be seen as the primary sites of generating national 
economic growth and hence, responsible for the well-being of the nation. In 
addition to the imperatives on local government to act, resulting from direct 
encounters with the material deprivation and hardship faced by local citizens, 
this double layer of responsibility created pressure to accept conventional and 
well-researched understandings of the role of economic growth in alleviating 
poverty. In the following chapter, I will examine how one account of the 
relationship between poverty and economic growth emerged as dominant in the 
city of Durban. 
five 
Poverty politics in Durban 
Bill Freund remarks that in Durban: 
" ... the ANe dominated metropolitan government has moved effectively to try to 
distribute amenities more fairly throughout, but this is not, of course, the same as 
distributing economic activities or creating a more accessible field for accumulation 
available to much larger numbers of people" (2002b, 154). 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore why the distribution of economic 
activities has remained limited in Durban. In particular, I examine how policy 
makers understood the relationship between poor people's economic activities 
and economic growth in formulating the city of Durban's current long-term 
development policy. In so doing, I aim to point to some important consequences 
of this understanding for the future equitable development of the city. The 
analysis therefore remains with the local government of Durban as a site of 
institutional poverty practice and I again look back to the period of 1996-2001 
because this is when the process of developing the current long-term 
development policy framework gathered momentum. 
The formulation of Durban's current long-term development policy has tended to 
be held together by the perceived interdependence of three priorities, broadly 
defined as social development, service delivery, and economic development (cf. 
eThekwini Municipality 2001, 8).188 Although the complex interdependence of 
these three policy priorities is commonly acknowledged by local policy makers, 
we should not mistake this acknowledgement for meaning that the three 
priorities are always equally emphasised. The process of formulating a long-term 
188 The reasons for these priorities are undoubtedly diverse. However, it is possible to single out 
the importance of the understanding of the impoverishing legacy of urban Apartheid and South 
Africa's post-Apartheid Constitution. 
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development vision for the city of Durban is therefore useful for bringing the 
differences in emphasis of the priorities to light, which tend to be obscured in 
representations of the long-term vision as harmoniously developed and agreed 
upon. I will suggest that such representations are one of the means by which the 
assumption that poor people's economic activities cannot contribute to economic 
growth comes to be taken-for-granted in Durban. In addition, an examination of 
the long-term visioning process is useful because it culminates in widely agreed 
upon and accepted policy statements to guide the future of Durban's 
development. These statements cohered in the Long Term Development 
Framework (LTDF) (eThekwini Municipality 2001) and proclaim the basis for 
guiding the formulation of the Council's shorter-term Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP) process. The LTDF also sets out the Council's annual strategic budget 
priorities that will guide budgetary allocations between the three development 
priorities (eThekwini Municipality 2001,13). 
I will show that eThekwini Municipality's current long-term development policy 
- the LTDF - does not consider poor people's economic activities as being able 
to contribute to the economic growth of the city. Consequently, this suggests that 
institutional poverty practices around policy formulation in Durban can be 
regarded as complementary to the broader processes of defining and theorising 
poverty discussed in the previous chapters. This points to ways in which local 
government experiences in Durban are folded into wider national and 
international processes of defining and theorising poverty (cf. 0yen, Miller, and 
Samad 1996).189 As I will suggest later in this chapter, an assumption of the 
universal applicability of poverty theory by policy makers in Durban has 
contributed to their inability to see poor people's economic activities as 
contributing to economic growth. Local policy making therefore inherits the 
theoretical inability to make 'visible' and 'sayable' poor people's economic 
.89 There are many examples where experiences in Durban can be observed as being written into 
wider processes of formulating theories and practices around poverty reduction. By way of 
example, see Pieterse (1998) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2003). 
151 
activities in relation to economic growth. However, I suggest that to the extent 
that it is possible to isolate the development of 'abstract' definitions and theories 
of poverty from 'local' practices and discourses, they have both been important in 
shaping Durban's poverty politics. 
I therefore aim to explore why it seems 'natural' and obvious to Durban's policy 
makers that poor people's economic activities do not contribute to economic 
growth. I have anticipated this aim by already hinting that (inevitably) the LTDF 
must iron out disagreements and contradictions between the three development 
priorities and pointing to assumptions held by policy makers concerning the 
universal applicability of poverty theory. I will elaborate these points as the 
chapter proceeds. I argue that one of the reasons why poor people's economic 
activities are not considered by Durban's policy makers to contribute to 
economic growth is because of the way in which the concept of economic growth 
is understood by policy makers to be co-extensive with Durban's formal economy 
and bounded in particular locations. It has also been shaped by the perceived 
importance amongst politicians of an economic agenda for the city's 
development. Some of the reasons for this emerged in the analysis of the 
previous chapter. These include local political dynamics within the ANC, but can 
also be ascribed to the overall lack of an alternative vision of economic growth to 
the conventional and dominant view outlined at the start of Chapter Three. 
However, to suggest that eThekwini Municipality - as a site of institutional 
practices of poverty alleviation - is complementary to broader processes is not to 
see the eThekwini Municipality as subsumed by these processes. While the 
eThekwini Municipality (and Durban) is enrolled in, and invokes broader 
definitional and theoretical processes, it simultaneously exceeds these processes 
(cf. Parnell 1997). Local demands intersect with national priorities and 
competing discourses in diverse ways that Amin and Thrift (2002) suggest 
characterise any city. Alongside the processes of formulating the long-term 
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development vision, poor people's economic activities emerge in a number of 
different aspects of the economy such as the informal economy. These aspects of 
poor people's economic activities are referenced in the LTDF and in local poverty 
research. Although these other aspects to Durban's poverty policies confirm the 
dominance of the view that poor people's economic activities do not contribute to 
economic growth, their existence is important for thinking about Durban's 
economy in a different way. Thus, the refusal to see Durban and eThekwini 
Municipality as subordinate to broader definitions and theories of poverty is 
important because it opens up new possibilities for developing these other 
aspects and thinking anew about the relationship between poor people's 
economic activities and economic growth. It is worth recalling from the previous 
chapter that cities have come to be considered as central to the relationship 
between poverty and economic growth and are a key site of institutional poverty 
practices. A focus on the city of Durban is therefore an important 'site' through 
which it is possible to begin to shift the dominant understanding of the economy 
and economic growth. 
The chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, I focus on the three 
(competing) development priorities to trace the evolution of a long-term city 
visioning process. This city visioning process proceeds through the preparation 
of a Long Term Development Strategy (LTDS) to the formal acceptance of a set 
of policy statements expressed as the Long Term Development Framework 
(LTDF). As part of the LTDS, I consider the Monitor Group's (2000) research 
report as one of the clearest attempts to represent Durban's economy and its 
prospects for economic growth. In the second part, I consider a range of other 
aspects of Durban's economy and concentrate specifically on policy and scholarly 
work undertaken in relation to the informal economy as this offers an important 
basis for the analysis that is to follow in Chapter Seven. In the third part, I reflect 
on the consequences of the view that poor people's economic activities do not 
contribute to economic growth for the future equitable development of Durban. 
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5.1 Durban's long-term city visioning process 
I begin this section by providing a brief overview of the long-term visioning 
process before considering it in detail to explore why policy makers regarded 
poor people's economic activities as being unable to contribute to economic 
growth. Throughout this section I trace the evolution of the relationship between 
the three interdependent yet competing development priorities that I have 
suggested informed Durban's long-term development vision. The different ways 
in which policy makers represent the relationships between these three priorities 
provides a mechanism for tracing the continuities and discontinuities of thought 
during the process. These continuities and discontinuities are important to 
consider because they are used by policy makers to frame the visioning process at 
different stages in the formulation of policies. The ability to present policy 
processes as continuous or discontinuous in certain ways is a function of power 
that secures the taken-for-granted (Hastings 1998; Mitchell 2002). Thus, the 
acceptance of continuities and discontinuities, in turn, signal one of the ways in 
which poor people's economic activities are understood by policy makers to be 
unable to contribute to economic growth in Durban. 
The long-term city visioning process began in 1999 and in preparation for a 
metropolitan authority. In anticipation of a metropolitan authority, the Durban 
Metropolitan Council had established a Unicity Committee.t90 One of the 
primary purposes of the Unicity Committee was to develop a holistic and 
integrated view of the future development of the metropolitan area over a 20-
year period. The Unicity Committee began a long-term city visioning process 
known as the Long Term Development Strategy (LTDS). At this point there are 
two points to note about the LTDS. The first is that it was structured in terms of 
the three development priorities of social development, service delivery and 
190 The Unicity Committee consisted of the Metropolitan Mayor and 15 metropolitan-level 
councillors and was supported by a project team of senior local government officials. 
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economic development. The second point is that as part of the preparation of the 
LTDS, the international consultancy Monitor Group were appointed to analyse 
the prospects for economic growth in Durban. I return to this report and its 
effects later in the chapter for they are important to the argument I am 
developing and require detailed analysis. For now, I continue with this 
introductory overview locating the long-term visioning process against the 
backdrop of the dynamics and issues of the previous chapter. 
In the lead up to the local government elections in December 2000, the LTDS 
project team recognised that the "the timing for this project [was] not ideal for 
the development of strategy ... [since the] ... emergence of the new Unicity 
structures, and the political process under which this structuring [would] take 
place, [would] render some of the necessary debate either premature or 
incomplete" (Unicity Committee 2001, 2). This recognition portended the eclipse 
of its proposals (although not in the manner in which the Unicity Committee 
expected). Indeed, eventually the LTDS was short-circuited by a range of local 
processes and never came to fruition in the form originally anticipated.191 
Nonetheless as I will show, many of the key issues structuring the relationship 
between poor people's economic activities and economic growth that were set out 
in the LTDS process flowed into Durban's current development framework. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the completion of the transformation of local 
government in South Africa was marked by the elections in December 2000. 
These elections established the eThekwini Municipality and 200 councillors were 
elected across the 100 re-demarcated wards. 192 It is worth recalling from the 
previous chapter, that the demarcation of the ANC's local branches coincided 
with the re-demarcation of the city and meant that interests within the ANC 
could mobilise more effectively and ostensibly curtail the power of the 
Metropolitan Mayor and the development approach he favoured. The 
191 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
192 Representation is based on one Ward councillor per ward and 100 additional councillors 
elected on a proportional system from political party lists. 
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Metropolitan Mayor had presided over the LTDS process and at the point at 
which it was expected that the LTDS would inform decisions about the future 
direction of development, a significant group of interests amongst the new 
councillors were able to generate enough unease as to encourage the 
Metropolitan Mayor to defer this decision making process into the preparation of 
a relatively more flexible long-term development framework. This process 
resulted in the formulation of the current Long Term Development Framework, 
which was later accepted and agreed upon by a wide range of stakeholders in the 
city's development (Moodley 2004). With this introductory overview, I turn now 
to examine the policy debates and how these were structured in terms of 
balancing competing development priorities within the long-term visioning 
process. I analyse how these competing development priorities consistently 
informed the overall visioning process and eventual vision of Durban's 
development that was agreed upon. 
5.1.1 Long Term Development Strategy 
In this section I introduce the LTDS, its aims and how debates about the three 
competing development priorities led towards the appointment of the 
international consultancy company, Monitor Group. As suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter, it is important to consider the LTDS process because 
there are both continuities and discontinuities with the final policy statements in 
the LTDF. 
Vidhu Vedalankar was appointed to manage the process of formulating a long-
term view of Durban's equitable development. The team assembled by 
Vedalankar were of the view that a holistic and integrated development process 
required a long-term view of Durban's developmeni.193 The understanding of 
193 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
poverty as inscribed at the centre of series of complex political and historical 
processes generated an acknowledgement that it would be difficult to reduce 
poverty in Durban. Nevertheless, the possibilities that it is possible to change 
cities was informed by local research on cities as diverse as "Singapore, Curitiba, 
Cleveland, Baltimore and Pittsburgh" (Unicity Committee 2001, 1). However, it 
was clear that significant change was not achievable overnight and hence, the 
importance of adopting a long-term perspective.l94 Moreover, Vedalankar and 
her team also recognised that it was difficult to coordinate urban change because 
"different processes unfold at different rates".195 By 'different processes' she 
meant how to integrate local politics, 'socio-economic development', and 
'sustainable economic growth' (Unicity Committee 2001, 1). In her view, the only 
solution was to "see things in their totality ... [and] ... see the city as a whole" and 
within a long-term framework.196 The difficulties of transforming the 
development direction and staff programmes of the municipality were also 
becoming apparent and it was recognised that time was needed for this process. 
To this end, the Unicity Committee accepted the proposal to prepare a Long 
Term Development Strategy (LTDS) for Durban. 
The LTDS was informed by the view of poverty that drew primarily on basic 
needs theory and thus, that "there are always too few resources for the needs. It 
is therefore necessary to grow and use resources wisely and to direct them 
efficiently towards the actions required to reach the vision (Unicity Committee 
2001, 40). It is worth recalling that basic needs theory creates a dilemma for 
policy makers by introducing a trade-off between investment in poor people's 
consumption and long-term productive investments. A central objective of the 
LTDS was therefore to make outcomes and choices explicit so that local 
politicians could be clear about the potential implications of particular decisions. 
194 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
195 Interview, 29/07/04. 
196 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
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The LTDS was structured in terms of three working groups that were organised 
around the three priorities of economic development, infrastructural 
development, and social needs groups.197 The issue of poverty was included 
within the terms of reference of the social needs group. Vedalankar recalls that 
they tried "to do a new take on poverty ... trying to take a broader perspective ... 
that moved away from handouts to broadening access to opportunities" .198 As 
part of this process, the LTDS drew on an initiative of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to 'mainstream' issues such as poverty, 
gender, and HIV and AIDS into the main development agenda. In this way, 
poverty was expressed as an issue that cut across all of the three Unicity 
groups.l99 This means of integrating the understanding of poverty across 
development issues gave content to the need to deal with poverty reduction as a 
priority and could perhaps be argued as the main achievement with respect to 
addressing poverty of the LTDS. Although the LTDS attempted to incorporate a 
broader broader notion of social upliftment embraced through the participatory 
development experiences of Bheki Nene20o, Vedalankar argues that "we didn't 
take it very far".201 In fact, a poverty framework was never finalised because the 
LTDS was never adopted although the analysis of poverty persisted as the long-
term visioning process evolved.202 The view of poverty that prevailed, of income 
poverty, was a relatively narrow interpretation of work done by Casale and 
Thurlow (1999). 
The LTDS project team were of the view that the three competing development 
priorities could not be pursued in isolation and policy makers recognised a 
complex interdependence.203 But within this interdependence, there was plenty 
of scope for debates about the sequencing and relative resourcing of the different 
197 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
198 Interview 29/07/04. 
199 Linda Mbonambi, Interview 10/06/04. 
200 Bheki Nene was deputy-CEO of the Inner West local council and was co-opted into the process 
of the LTDS to manage the 'social needs' working group. 
201 Interview 29/07/04. 
202 Linda Mbonambi, Interview 10/06/04. 
203 Linda Mbonambi, Interview 10/06/04. 
priorities. Indeed, throughout the long-term visioning process there is constant 
disagreement about the relative weighting of the three priorities. 
The LTDS refracts the local political dynamics between those favouring a 
'delivery-at-scale' approach (placing more emphasis on social development and 
service delivery) and others preferring a 'big-project' approach (with more 
emphasis on economic development) by attempting to establish a clear basis for 
one or the other approach to reduce poverty. I noted how an important tension in 
the transitional period was over the development approach considered most 
likely to reduce poverty. There has been a history of catalytic 'big projects' in 
Durban and this throws the importance of the perceived disjuncture between the 
political and economic elite into stark contrast. The origins of these large projects 
is often traced back to local 'coalition' frameworks for business interactions (cf. 
Robinson and Boldogh 1994; Freund 2002a; Moffett and Freund 2002).204 
Kiepiela recalls that during the period of Operation Jumpstart205 
"we met at 7am at least every two weeks for about a year and a half and we planned. It 
was virtually an unofficial [Executive Committee] of the city. Not all political parties were 
involved ... we looked at how to use the assets of the city for the new developments ... 
[and] we restructured the finances of the city without any officials and when they were 
ready, they put it through the official channels and ... that's how the ICC206 was financed. 
It was all informal, it had no legal binding on each side and that was the beauty of the 
whole thing ... it was done on a consensus basis among those people who had the 
majority". 207 
It was perhaps the continuation of these historical practices that concerned 
Vedalankar when she commented that the problem with the 'big-project' 
204 Interview, 22/06/04. 
205 Operation Jumpstart was a 'coalition' that emerged in the late 1980s that brought together 
local business leaders, progressive planners, and respected activists in the struggle against 
Apartheid. The coalition was formed as a means of catalysing much needed infrastructural 
development in a forum that was not associated with the local Apartheid state. The coalition 
closed in 1995 when legitimate local government was established. 
206 International Convention Centre 
207 Interview 22/06/04. 
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approach is that "approval happens outside of formal processes and so may not 
link to any other plan that the city has"208 (see also Benjamin 2000). 
In order to assess the validity of the different economic development approaches 
for poverty reduction, the Unicity Committee appointed the international 
consultancy Monitor Group to undertake research on the best means of achieving 
economic growth.209 Vedalankar notes that the reason for appointing Monitor 
Group was that " ... what had happened in Durban is that we were very much 
driven by a 'big-project' agenda in terms of the economy".21O Hence, Vedalankar 
was "keen to get a more scientific understanding [of economic development] to 
the extent that it is possible, because with economic growth, one can never 
say".211 Vedalankar's recollections of Monitor Group's appointment are evocative 
of the debates and discussions of the time. She argued that there was 
" ... a need to look at the Durban economy as a whole and test what we are saying. If we 
are right, we are right. And I remember having these arguments and debates with Viv 
McMenamin because we disagreed on a lot of this stuff because she was quite happy that 
they were on the right track. Obviously, because she was heading the economic stuff and I 
said no, lets test it. Lets bring in [Monitor Group]. They've done this in other places and 
one thing they can do is do that type of analysis of sectors and how they've grown and 
compare them to other places ... and bring in that perspective also of how things have 
worked in other cities, and even internationally. That's why we brought Monitor in".212 
Vedalankar comments that 
"although we did bring [Monitor Group] in to do the assessment of the economy, as far as 
I was concerned I was quite clear, that the economic section wasn't going to drive it and 
be the answer to everything, whereas it was important ... I think that the work they did 
was invaluable. I liked the work they did, it was just on the economic stuff not on the rest. 
I told them ... I said they didn't have a city development perspective" (my emphasis). 
208 Interview 29/07/04. 
209 In discussions of urban economic development, this consultancy is typically associated with 
Michael Porter (1990; 1995) even though he is only one of a number of highly-recognised scholars 
that are part of Monitor Group. 
210 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
211 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
212 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
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The Monitor Group was initially requested to prepare a city development plan.213 
Vedalankar had seen the work that Monitor Group had undertaken for the 
Johannesburg council and wanted a similar study for Durban.214 However, the 
preparation of a city development plan proved unaffordable to the Unicity 
Committee and the terms of reference were then scaled down to an economic 
analysis of how to achieve economic growth to create employment.215 The focus 
in the terms of reference on economic growth to create employment was an 
important element of the process. It shaped the recommendations that emerged 
from Monitor Group's research report entitled Durban at the cross-roads 
(2000). I turn to consider the research and recommendations, and effects of this 
research that emerged. 
5.1.2 "Durban at the cross-roads" 
Glen Robbins observes that in his experience of promoting economic 
development in Durban, "analysis and policy don't always emerge from the same 
place".216 It is worth keeping this distinction in mind throughout this section as I 
will suggest that the Monitor Group report had two different, if ultimately, 
complementary effects in Durban. Their analysis tends toward a very particular 
view of economic growth that relates to an interconnected set of factors such as 
competitiveness, sustainable job creation, productivity, and market accessibility 
in a global sense. However, the effect of the report on policy was to consolidate 
the dominance of an economic agenda in the city's plans. 
The Monitor Group report is framed within the growing sense (noted in the 
previous chapter) that Durban's 'platform for economic growth' is eroding. 
Monitor Group (2000, 5-8) summarise a number of economic challenges faced 
213 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
214 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
215 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
216 Interview, 14/06/04. 
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by the city. These include, declining average per capita incomes, low economic 
growth rates, rising unemployment, a skills deficit, high inequality and the 
historical racial concentration of economic power among White elites. To some 
extent Glen Robbins feels that this sense of decline was hyped up by the Monitor 
Group's report because their approach is to "bring you to a precipice, and show 
you what the worst scenario would be, and get you to jump and make some quick 
decisions".217 However, the perceived need to make quick, bold decisions was 
given added weight. At the time the report was released, protracted negotiations 
and hopes to redevelop an inner-city waterfront area (The Point) failed and were 
seen as another example of Durban falling behind.218 Robbins recollects, "all this 
did was to up the pressure [on the Municipality] to come up with solutions".219 
In the Durban report, the Monitor Group draw on Michael Porter (1990; 1995) 
and Fairbanks and Lindsay (1997) to argue that the global economic map has 
changed. This is based on an economic assumption that the engine of growth is 
no longer the nation but the firm (Fairbanks and Lindsay 1997). Monitor Group 
point out that the structure of Durban's economy which had developed behind 
protectionist tariffs (during the years of Apartheid) is no longer in-tune with 
global developments where tariffs are being lowered. They argue that with 
increasing globalisation, the most important resource for economic growth is for 
firms in cities to become accessible in global economic networks. The assumption 
is that "once such enhanced accessibility is achieved ... the latent comparative 
advantage of a locality will come to the fore, largely through more pronounced 
exposure to global market signals" (McCarthy 2002,313). Underlying this view is 
the assumption that open, competitive and unregulated markets represent the 
optimal mechanism for economic development (Brenner and Theodore 2002). 
The report also reflects a wider reversal in thinking in that "the present is no 
longer the logical development of the past; rather it is increasingly the hostage to 
217 Interview, 14/06/04. 
218 Andrzej Kiepiela, Interview 22/06/04. 
219 Interview, 14/06/04. 
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the future in the double sense of the spectre of riches and of deterioration 
accompanying the globalisation project" (McMichaeI1998, 96). The key role for 
eThekwini Municipality to secure future economic growth was, then, to enhance 
accessibility through investing in the 'economic platform' of the city (Thurlow 
2002). 
The concept of an 'economic platform' is key to Monitor Group's analysis and the 
argument I am developing because it represents their understanding of the basis 
for economic growth. The platform for growth describes the "type of 
environment that will enable and inspire firms to build advantages" (Monitor 
Group 2000, 9). It includes: the skills base, infrastructure, demand conditions, 
firm strategy and rivalry, and related and supporting businesses (Monitor Group 
2000). The interaction of the different platform elements implicitly creates an 
internally coherent 'economic system'. In Monitor Group's view, government is 
not a platform element, but along with 'chance', can influence the platform 
elements and their interactions. A growing economic system exists when the 
different platform elements are positively reinforcing each other. The implication 
of this view is that the logic of competitiveness is essentially aspatial and beyond 
the control of local government. While local government can influence the level 
of competitiveness of the city it is essentially driven from elsewhere. It is also 
important to note that implicit in this view of the 'economic system' is that local 
residents only fulfil a consumptive role as a "sophisticated local customer base 
expecting the latest innovations and the highest quality standards" (Monitor 
Group 2000, 9). Working from within this perspective, economic growth in 
Durban is identified in the report as only occurring in "advanced sectors of the 
economy - sectors which have the potential to produce high income and to have 
multiplier effects" (Monitor Group 2000, 10). The 'struggling informal economy', 
where it is recognised by Monitor Group that the most employment creation is 
recorded, is accorded some attention, but in their view (where economic growth 
is measured in terms of output) these informal economic activities "lack skills", 
"finance" and are "fragmented" and are therefore unable to compete and "take 
growth opportunities" (Monitor Group 2000, 13). By definition therefore, these 
informal economic activities and the areas where they take place are not part of 
the economic growth plan for the city. Thus, to the extent that Monitor Group's 
analysis is adopted by the policy makers, this is one of the ways in which 
Durban's 'economic map' is configured in a way that excludes the activities of 
many poor people from consideration as a source of growth. I turn to consider 
another that emerges through Monitor Group's conceptualisation of the 
relationship between infrastructure and space. 
The 'economic system', as Monitor Group defines it, represents a particular and 
homogenous sphere of rationality which (local) government should support and 
encourage through the spatial provision and maintenance of infrastructure for 
globally competitive industries, through building entrepreneurial and 
technological skills, helping firms network, and supporting geographical 
clustering. It should be noted that this understanding of an 'economic system' is 
not far off the concept of 'enclaves of economic growth' identified by Lewis (1976) 
and analysed in Chapter Three. The emphasis in the Unicity Committee's brief to 
Monitor Group to focus on economic growth as a means of creating 
employment22o is arguably part of the reason that Monitor Group distinguish 
between creating jobs and creating sustainable jobs and leads to the 
recommendation to focus on the formal economy as the source of this new 
sustainable employment. What is striking about the analysis that follows is that it 
directs local government to focus on existing infrastructure first and only then 
extend from this base. Indeed, Monitor Group (2000, 59) go on to explain that 
infrastructure spending must be differentiated because spending "must build the 
economic platform" (because) ... if not, it does not regenerate the growth 
machine". In a context of limited resources, there are therefore trade-offs to be 
~o In t~e c~ntext of the PSLSD. results and feedback from local communities the political 
lmperative m terms of addressmg poverty, was understood at the time to be to create 
employment. 
made between infrastructure spending that enhances the prospects for growth 
and spending that meets basic needs and services. 
This is justified in the report because it is the development of the formal 
economy that will lead to the formation of a "virtuous circle" through creating 
sustainable, innovating jobs. Monitor Group argues that if the city seeks to 
support the economic activities of the poor it will generate a "vicious circle" 
(2000, 48). This is because seeking growth for the poor by helping people enter 
the economy at points where the barriers to entry are low, only props up 
"marginal informal businesses". This in turn, "negatively affects the supply-
demand balance and causes prices and industry attractiveness to decline" 
because the local authority is subsidising these activities. This causes "incomes to 
decline and informal businesses to fail, increasing the need for job creation and 
help for the poor" (Monitor Group 2000, 49). 
However, job creation aimed at building the economy requires the "city to 
analyse industries and look for ways to help build strong small businesses" 
(Monitor Group 2000, 49). These interventions result in "fewer high quality jobs, 
innovation and stable or rising prices - this produces increasing sales, profits, 
employment and per capita incomes" (Monitor Group 2000,49). This, in turn, 
leads to "more equitable distribution of wealth and provides the city with more 
resources to put into interventions, thereby completing the virtuous circle" 
(Monitor Group 2000, 49). In effect, this amounts to channelling resources for 
job creation to the formal economy rather than the 'informal economy'. 
According to Monitor Group it is only through a form of economic growth that 
will absorb and provide revenue to sustain new infrastructural connections to 
poor people that the gap between the rich and poor will be closed. This leads to 
the view, most commonly expressed amongst big business interests in Durban 
that, it is necessary to first grow the economy before it is possible to engage in 
165 
redistribution.221 This trade-off between productive and basic needs 
infrastructure is based on the assumption in income poverty theory that the poor 
consume all that they earn and that it is therefore dependent on the non-poor to 
save and provide the resources for investment. To support the short-term 
consumption needs of the poor is to detract from long-term investments in 
greater productivity and economic growth and adds to the trade-off introduced in 
relation to meeting basic needs, noted earlier in the chapter. 
I noted earlier that a key continuity between the long-term visioning process, 
LTDS, Monitor Group (2000) report, and LTDF were the three key (competing) 
development priorities of social development, service delivery, and economic 
development. I will trace these through from the LTDS to LTDF but it is 
important to consider how they were represented in the Monitor Group (2000) 
report. To my mind, the emphasis among the (competing) priorities falls 
relatively more on economic development in the LTDF and the inflection of these 
competing development priorities with an economic twist is important for 
securing the dominance of an economic agenda for the city. The three 
development priorities of 'people development/social development', 'service 
delivery/quality of life', and 'economic development' are narrowed down to 
"platform challenges" by Monitor Group (2000, 23). Thus, addressing the legacy 
of apartheid translates into strategies to 'rise to the challenge of trade 
liberalisation', stimulate the growth of smaller and medium size enterprises, and 
develop the skills base of the city's residents (Monitor Group 2000, 24). The 
'quality of life' criterion is reflected as making Durban a 'quality of life 
destination' for highly skilled residents, upgrading existing infrastructure and, 
particularly in relation to the port, supporting economic clustering. 'Economic 
development' is given content as the areas of the economy that Durban will be 
able to compete in, at a global scale. For Monitor Group this involves building 
Durban's logistic hub capabilities and focusing on specific areas of economic 
221 Andrzej Kiepiela, Interview 22/06/04 and Amman Maharaj, Interview 9/06/04. 
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"strength which will differentiate Durban's platform for global growth" (2000, 
25). 
In sum, the relationship between poor people's economic activities and economic 
growth, in Monitor Group's view, is one where these activities are generally 
thought to be unable to contribute to economic growth although they do see 
them as essential to poor people's economic survival. The (internally coherent) 
system that emerges through the interaction of the platform elements 
circumscribes a bounded and homogenous sphere of 'competitive' rationality. 
This sphere of rationality is mapped against the spaces created by 'productive 
infrastructure'. Poor people cannot be part of this sphere of rationality because 
they lack skills and knowledge and their activities are too fragmented to take 
advantage of large, productive infrastructure and thus, growth opportunities. To 
the extent that poor people's economic activities contribute to this economic 
system it is as consumers. The apparent disconnection between poor people's 
economic activities and economic growth is to be reduced through absorbing 
poor people into sustainable, formal employment. Consequently, this line of 
Monitor Group's reasoning secured the importance of the concept of a 'platform 
for economic growth' in the future development thinking of Durban's policy 
makers. 
However, opinions are divided on the ultimate impact of Monitor Group's final 
report (2000).222 Linda Mbonambi does not "think that [Monitor Group] went 
far enough in trying to understand poverty".223 Indeed Monitor Group 
themselves state that although there is a "clear political desire and imperative" to 
engage in redistribution, it was not a focus of their research (2000,66). Andrzej 
Kiepiela of Durban's Growth Coalition described the Monitor Group report as 
their 'bible' and that until the publication of the report, formal business "did not 
222 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04; Glen Robbins, Interview, 14/06/04. 
223 Interview, 10/06/04. 
know what the real position of the City was" on economic development.224 It is 
worth recalling from the previous chapter, that both municipal officials and big 
business in Durban were fairly cautious of each other in this period. However 
following its publication, this report became formal business' "frame of 
reference".225 Jeff McCarthy (2002) remarks that the appointment of Monitor 
retlects less about the recommendations of the ultimate report than the growing 
power of this type of analysis. Indeed, the effect of the report was to consolidate 
the importance of the City having an economic development strategy (Hall and 
Robbins 2002) and is consistent with the assumption that cities have an 
increasing role to play as the primary sites of economic growth. Thus, Robbins 
points out that the Monitor Group report "pushed the strategy into a new era. By 
giving that stamp of Michael Porter to this process ... made it, to some degree 
unassailable".226 Robbins comments: 
"What the Monitor process did was assert once and for all the dominance of an economic 
agenda in the city plan. Everyone was exposed to it, they all bought into some bits of it at 
least. What had been quite consistent contestation about whether a city should even 
bother about economic development issues, prior to that, was sort of brushed aside" (my 
emphasis).227 
This points to the ways in which the report had two different, but complementary 
effects. On the one hand, economic growth is understood to be co-extensive with 
the formal economy, and both the formal economy and economic growth, in 
turn, are regarded as co-extensive with specific bounded spaces in the city. On 
the other hand, effects of Monitor Group report are to assert dominance of an 
economic agenda amongst the three development priorities. This appears to have 
contributed towards the politicians and policy makers involved in the LTDF 
effectively contlating an overall city development vision with a city vision with an 
economic growth agenda. It is therefore to the LTDF that I now turn. 
224 Interview 22/06/04. 
22S Andrzej Kiepiela, Interview 22/06/04. 
226 Interview 14/06/04. 
2271nterview, 14/06/04. 
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In the previous chapter I drew attention to the jostling for local power, 
differences over development approaches, and the differences between (at this 
stage historical) metropolitan and local interests, shaped the ways in which 
poverty became important. Inevitably, given the issues and horizon of 
transformation that the LTDS set itself, it became caught up in the politics 
between the Metropolitan councillors and the local councillors that in turn 
tended to coincide with the divisions between the big-projects/scale-up 
approaches and politics internal to the ANC. Vedalankar recalls that with the 
Unicity on the horizon, the two different development approaches of 
Metropolitan and Ward councillors came together and ''both sides weren't letting 
go at a politicallevel".228 
5.1.3 Long Term Development Framework 
Sogen Moodle~29 (2004, 7) describes how in the initial months after the 
municipal elections in December 2000, the new councillors were anxious to 
"respond to emerging national legislation ... [and] ... pressure from within to take 
an inward-looking bureaucracy and transform it so that it would make a real 
difference in the lives of all its citizens". The LTDS had produced a document 
that set out a number of choices about infrastructure standards and institutional 
arrangements for service delivery that the Unicity Committee believed to be 
relevant and appropriate. The LTDS had been explained at a caucus meeting of 
ANC councillors. The Monitor Group (2000) report had been circulated amongst 
the councillors and officials. As suggested in the previous section, the Monitor 
Group report consolidated the dominance of an economic agenda in the city's 
long-term plans. But what the politicians also took from this report was a belief 
228 Vidhu Vedalankar, Interview 29/07/04. 
229 Sogen Moodley is municipal town planner and long-standing participant in the long-term city 
visioning process. 
"that the most important thing is for the city to move rapidly to deliver on some 
key projects that would have a catalytic effect", although Robbins opines that this 
was a secondary aspect of what the Monitor Group were proposing.230 
The local political differences all came to a head, as the need for one clear 
programme of transformation and service delivery was demanded of the 
eThekwini Municipality. A three-day workshop of all 200 councillors and 50 
senior municipal officials was convened at the Alpine Heath Resort to agree on a 
programme for transformation and service delivery that would underpin the 
future development of the city. Moodley (2004) records the general sense of 
unease among the participants at the start of the workshop. A sense of unease 
that was perhaps not surprising given the disparate interests and political 
agendas that convened. Astutely, the Mayor picked up on the unease and tension 
in his opening address (Moodley 2004).231 In my view, he effectively deflected 
these tensions by deferring the decision-making process and downgrading the 
LTDS with clear choices and outcomes and decisions to be taken, to a 'reference 
document'. The result of the workshop was an agreement that a 'framework' 
would replace the 'strategy'. Despite the 'downgrading', many of the key ideas 
were carried through to the LTDF, which was agreed, but amongst a different set 
of political interests than those that had contested the L TDS. 
There are various interpretations of why the politicians opted for the flexibility of 
a framework as opposed to the specificities of the way the strategy had been 
formulated. In Dan Smit's analysis, the rejection of the LTDS at the three-day 
workshop of all the councillors, shortly after the December 2000 elections "was 
not so much a turning point as the factionalism within the ANC becoming more 
230 Interview, 14/06/04. 
231 A major point of unease was the perception of a significant set of councillors, that the LTDS 
was not prepared in a participative enough fashion. This was despite the LTDS involving various 
forms of participation. This included an 'External Stakeholder Forum' comprising a select group 
of 27 representative~ from different .gro?pings, .an. 'External Stakeholders' Plenary' comprising 
developmentally orIentated orgamsatlOns wlthm Durban, and community and sectoral 
workshops to brief groupings and receive feedback (Unicity Committee 2001, 7). 
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overt".232 Thus this represents one of the first instances that a certain set of local 
political interests at the Ward level were able to challenge the power of the 
Metropolitan Mayor. From Kisa Dlamini's233 perspective the challenge to the 
LTDS marked a major change in political control of the process with the 
councillors taking much greater control from the officials.234 In his opinion, the 
LTDS foreclosed political decision-making by being too technical too soon. 
Despite Vedalankar's preference for a 'delivery-at-scale' approach to 
development she was perceived by the certain interests within the ANC 
councillors as being aligned with the a metropolitan view of development rather 
than a local view. This may have been exacerbated by the fact that the 
Metropolitan mayor chaired the Unicity Committee and his preference for 'big-
projects'.235 It is ironic that by 'downgrading' the LTDS, the Ward councillors 
representing poorer wards lost an important vehicle for policies for tackling 
poverty directly and the 'big-project' /trickle-down relationship between the 
economy and poverty alleviation won out in practice. Thus the end result was 
that poverty reduction was expressed as being reduced primarily through the 
Municipality engaging in big, catalytic urban projects to restore confidence in the 
local economy with a commitment to providing a level of 'basic' services to those 
considered poor. 
In my view, the shift from a 'strategy' to a 'framework' meant that the councillors 
effectively avoided the process of committing themselves to a clear strategy for 
transformation and service delivery by arguing for a more flexible framework and 
embroiling the process in more thorough participatory mechanisms. As I will 
show later, the result was that the dominant approach to poverty reduction 
remained centred on a 'big-projects' development approach to stimulate 
232 Interview, 13/08/05. 
233 Kisa Dlamini is a respected former activist, who after working in the NGO sector was 
appointed as a manager in the Transformation Office of the eThekwini Municipality and had the 
responsibility of producing the LTDF. 
234 Interview, 5/04/04· 
235 The LTDS set out a range of options for service delivery standards, institutional mechanisms 
for service delivery that included public-private partnerships (that were particularly unpopular 
with councillors with a trade union background). 
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economic growth. Part of the reason for this must lie in the fact that there were 
no other coherent options for economic growth. In the previous chapter, I noted 
the (inconsistent) differences in development approaches. The understanding of 
city development expressed by Vedalankar was that the city required an overall 
development vision which had to address basic needs. This was because when the 
unemployment rate was so high the possibilities for using the formal economy to 
achieve significant change were regarded as limited. Whereas, the position 
expressed by McMenamin was that basic needs should be taken care of through 
national government social programmes and that the city should concentrate on 
promoting economic growth. At a very simple level the point of view expressed 
by Vedalankar has little purchase on the perceived need to promote economic 
growth to reduce poverty. Thus, the only option that speaks to the need for 
economic growth, is that put forward by McMenamin focusing on 'big-projects'. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, the view of economic growth expressed by 
McMenamin and enacted by the EDD was far more nuanced and complex than a 
simple juxtaposition with a 'delivery-at-scale' approach suggests. 
Irrespective of these nuances, the 'big-projects' approach fitted the politician's 
perceived need for an economic development agenda consisting of big flagship 
projects in the formal economy to inspire confidence and investment. The 
possibility of exploring other development approaches was forestalled because 
the politicians had effectively conflated a more comprehensive and balanced 
vision of city development with an economic development agenda. Thus, despite 
a more participatory process, it was effectively the only model of economic 
growth available and nobody questioned the basis on which economic growth 
was being calculated, least of all those focused on formulating Durban's poverty 
reduction policies. 
An important discontinuity was that the staff that prepared the LTDS were 
replaced or eventually left. For example, a political challenge from one set of 
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interests within the ANC weakened Vedalankar's authority and ability to shape 
the process to the extent that she resigned before the LTDF was finalised. While 
the LTDS project team had maintained a distinction between the need for a long-
term vision that could deal with processes unfolding at different rates and the 
shorter-term, more participatory requirements of the IDP process, the new staff 
conflated the processes.236 The advantage of this approach was that the Council 
could respond more quickly to short-term trends. The disadvantage was that it 
would be less likely to take a long-term view of development processes and iron 
out short-term anomalies. 
But there is also a strong continuity that links the overall visioning process, 
including LTDS, the Monitor Group report and LTDF. By way of example, I trace 
the evolution of the three (competing) development priorities through the draft 
vision in the LTDS and the final version of the vision in the LTDF. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, while retaining the sense of interdependence between the three 
priorities, the emphasis shifts in the LTDF to the importance of economic 
growth. 
One of the draft visions that circulated through the LTDS process is described in 
the box below and encompasses these three core concepts that inform the 
competing priorities: 
Durban is Africa's most well-networked city 
Where our fast growing economy is well-linked nationally and internationally and is providing 
rising per capita incomes and jobs for all our residents; 
Where our people have good access to high quality living and working environments; and 
Where our people are well educated and informed and share a common sense of identity and 
pride. 
Source: (Unicity Committee 2001,10) 
236 Dan Smit, Interview 30/08/05. 
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At the Alpine Heath Workshop this was amended to read that Durban would 
enjoy: 
" ... the reputation of being Africa's most caring and liveable city, where all citizens live in 
harmony. This vision will be achieved by growing its economy and meeting people's 
needs so that all citizens enjoy a high quality of life with equal opportunities, in a city that 
they are truly proud of' (eThekwini Municipality 2001,7). 
In the final version of the vision, the three competing priorities are again 
reflected. 'Caring and liveable city ... with equal opportunities' relates to social 
development, 'high quality of life' addresses the service delivery issues and 
'growing the economy' relates to economic development. 
In the LTDF this vision is underpinned by a 'new' purpose of eThekwini 
Municipality as being: 
" ... to facilitate and ensure the provision of infrastructure, services and support, thereby 
creating an enabling environment for all citizens to utilise their full potential and access 
opportunities, which enable them to contribute towards a vibrant and sustainable 
economy with full employment, and thus create a better quality of life for all" (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 6). 
As statements of vision and purpose, the final versions reflect the values of 
commitment, energy, care and duty that arguably characterised the dawning of 
Durban's first fully democratic local government. Such statements are in keeping 
with the spirit of 'developmental local government' and reflect the progressive 
ideals of the Municipality's post-Apartheid leadership (eThekwini Municipality 
2001, 7). There are two issues that I believe are important to point out in relation 
to the final vision of the LTDF. The first is that the emphasis on 'facilitating' and 
'enabling' is deliberately used to draw attention to a shift in ethos of Durban's 
local government.237 A distinction is often drawn in the literature and practice 
between different forms of governance. This distinction relies on an often over-
simplistic division between government as 'provider of services' and government 
237 Kisa Dlamini, Interview 06/04/04. 
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as 'facilitator'. Nonetheless, this division is important here because the shift to 
government as 'facilitator is typically associated with a broader neo-liberal shift 
that seeks to reduce the role of government and increase the role of 'the market' 
in the delivery of services (Devas and Rakodi 1993). A less-generous view of the 
'big project' development approach would see this as slotting into a government 
as 'facilitator' mode of governance because there is a lot of overlap between 
considering the Municipality as a catalytic and facilitative agency. While I do not 
believe that it was the intention of the LTDF project team to further neo-liberal 
agendas, there is the constant danger that rather than empowering citizens to 
achieve freedoms in Durban, within this policy framework the local state could 
step back from its current role and level of responsibilities to Durban's citizens. 
The second point to draw attention to is that the vision and purpose of the LTDF 
leave little doubt about the perceived importance of harnessing a growing 
economy to reduce poverty. It is very clear that a 'vibrant and sustainable 
economy with full employment' is considered as the means of achieving a 'better 
quality of life for all'. In, and of itself, there is nothing wrong with such a 
statement: a sustainable economy is important for securing a better quality of 
life. What is noticeable though is how these statements echo the arguments of the 
poverty theories I outlined in Chapter Three: economic growth and poverty 
reduction are folded into each other. Following from the conclusions of Chapter 
Three, this suggests that what is understood by 'the economy' in Durban and how 
it might be thought to be related to poverty alleviation deserves more rigorous 
scrutiny. 
However, as I suggested earlier, the continuity of concepts is combined in a 
different way to emphasise economic growth as a solution to poverty. Thus, while 
'social development', 'service delivery', and 'economic development' are still 
presented as integrally linked their success is dependent on building a "strategic 
platform" (eThekwini Municipality 2001, 8). Thus, unwinding the legacy of 
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Apartheid is equated more broadly with meeting basic and social development 
needs. Meeting basic needs relates to ensuring that "all citizens have access to 
free basic services and decent housing" and a coordinated approach to dealing 
with HIV and AIDs, and crime (eThekwini Municipality 2001,8). Strengthening 
the economy is mapped against economic development and revolves around 
generating income and jobs. The objective of strengthening the economy is to 
increase wealth through formal employment. Priority is given to those sectors of 
the economy with the most potential in terms of absorbing poor people through 
providing employment and generating income. These are identified as: tourism, 
export focus manufacturing and the port and related transport sector (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 10). It is clear that policy makers formulating the LTDF have 
the formal economy in mind when they refer to the strengthening of the 
economy. In my view, 'building skills and technology' is a relatively instrumental 
version of the necessity for 'people development' concept that was first stated in 
the LTDS process. It is explained as necessary for ensuring Durban becomes a 
"smart city, connecting with its neighbours and the world" (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 8). The implication is that these connections should occur 
through technology. 
The LTDF informs that council budgets will be prepared according to the three 
development priorities. The underlying concept of building a strategic platform is 
reflected in the principles guiding the Council's future budgetary allocations. The 
principles are stated as being "pro-growth", meeting "basic needs" and building 
"skills and technology" (eThekwini Municipality 2001, 13). Thus, even while 
there will be spending in the form of 'basic needs' infrastructure for poor people, 
a prior assumption has already subordinated this spending in importance and 
value, to spending on 'productive infrastructure' since all expenditure should 
ultimately contribute towards building the 'strategic platform'. 
What emerges in the LTDF is that poverty is an important concern and that 
economic growth provides the main means of reducing poverty (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 8). But only the formal economy is the possible source 
capable of generating economic growth. Moreover, just as poverty has been 
thought of as spatially confined, economic growth is considered to be spatially 
confined. Here I focus on the evidence that suggests that only the formal 
economy is a source of economic growth and that it is spatially confined to the 
centre of the city, industrial areas or areas of tourist interest, such as the 
beachfront. The notion that economic growth is bounded comes through in a 
commitment to "maintaining high quality core infrastructure that serves key 
economic nodes" (eThekwini Municipality 2001,10). This is reinforced through a 
"strong regeneration thrust within key [existing] economic areas" (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 10). These key economic areas are all sites of the existing 
formal economy such as the central business district, Port, southern Industrial 
Basin and beachfront (see Figure u). A commitment to big project or 'flagship' 
projects takes in projects that serve the formal economy such as the 
redevelopment of the Point Waterfront, a new airport and new industrial area. It 
should be noted that other 'mixed investment nodes', 'rural investment nodes' 
and sub-regional regeneration areas are planned. However, it remains that the 
major economic investment nodes are located as indicated in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Major invesbnent nodes in Durban in 2003 
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The result is that the activities of poor people are only to be supported when they 
are in the form of "small, medium and micro-enterprises that are linked to the 
city's mainstream economy in a synergistic way that supports the overall 
economic strategy" (eThekwini Municipality 2001,10). However, the council will 
"facilitate poor people's access to skills development that are customised to meet 
local needs" (eThekwini Municipality 2001, 11) and can therefore be easily 
connected to the economy. This is important for encouraging links between what 
are considered to be the formal and informal economies. However, the limit to 
this understanding is that it is predicated on the assumption that poor people's 
economic activities are outside, or disconnected from, the city's 'mainstream' 
(formal) economy. As poor people's economic activities are perceived in this way, 
they do not conform to, or display the rationalities of mainstream economic 
activities that contribute to economic growth. It is thus only when poor people's 
economic activities are connected to the mainstream economy and conform to 
particular economic rationalities that they will become 'visible' and 'sayable' in 
relation to economic growth in Durban. 
The acknowledgement of these different 'small, medium and micro-enterprises' 
in the LTDF is nevertheless important and prompts a recognition of a broader 
appreciation of poor people's economic activities in Durban. This might best be 
thought of as opening up a view of different aspects of the overall economy of 
Durban. Insights into these different aspects of Durban's economy developed 
(and continue to be developed) by departments within the Municipality -
principally, departments dealing with environmental issues, housing, and EDD 
itself. The work involved in analysing these diverse aspects of Durban's economy 
occurred in different departments. Thus despite representations of the LTDF as a 
coherent and holistic vision of Durban's future development, the final vision only 
approximates 'integration' and a holistic view. Nonetheless, these different 
aspects are all important for thinking about the economy in different ways. 
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5.2 Diverse aspects of Durban's economy 
As the conclusion to the last section hints, there are significant ways in which 
local government policy makers and researchers in Durban already make poor 
people's economic activities visible. In this section I aim to present three ways in 
which poor people's economic activities are visible, even if in the LTDF they are 
ultimately seen as subordinate to the formal economy. An important source of 
inspiration for this work is sustainable livelihoods theory and research on the 
informal economy. It is worth recalling from Chapter Three, that research on the 
informal economy provides an important backdrop for sustainable livelihoods 
theory. Sustainable livelihoods theory draws attention to the different 'capital' 
assets that are required to compose a livelihood. In Chapter Three these were 
identified as natural, financial, social, human and physical capital. These insights 
which broadened out the notion of 'assets' from income poverty and basic needs 
theories are important in firstly recognising the importance of the 'natural 
resource base' and self-help housing in Durban's economy. I will then proceed to 
consider work on Durban's informal economy. 
5.2. J Natural resource base 
Both basic needs and sustainable livelihoods theory offer insights into the 
relationship between the environment and poor people. There are significant 
continuities between basic needs theory and an environmental 'brown agenda' in 
South Africa (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2000b, 835). Sustainable livelihoods 
theory's emphasis on 'natural capital' offers a broad alignment between 
approaches to poverty and 'green' environmental agendas (cf. Twyman and 
Slater 2005). Although the concept and perception of the environment is 
historically entangled in many racial, political and development processes in 
Durban, the municipality in Durban is distinguished by its green environmental 
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agenda (Freund 2001).238 The implementation of a metropolitan open space 
system in 1982 and the city's participation in the Local Agenda 21 programme239 
has helped to cohere a broader environmental and developmental agenda (Patel 
2000). 
In Durban, one outcome has been that the city's natural resource base has come 
to be regarded as a means of subsidising municipal service provision to poor 
people. Poor people are considered economically dependent on, and productive 
because of, the city's natural resource base. The natural resource base includes 
land, water and vegetation and the LTDF states that this base "provides R2.24 
billion worth of free services to the residents of the city per annum" (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 4). To put this in perspective, this figure is almost half the 
amount of the Municipality's annual operating budget of approximately R4.5 
billion in 2001 (EDD 2001, 31). If the LTDF calculations are correct, the natural 
resource base represents a significant contribution to the economy in Durban. 
The environment is considered a 'service provider' meeting the "basic 
[consumption] needs of the many of the city's poorest communities" (eThekwini 
Municipality 2001, 4). Despite the financial size and importance of this aspect of 
the economy, poor people's economic activities are considered as essentially 
consumption based or utilising the natural resources for informal activities often 
on the urban periphery. As I have argued above, both a focus on consumption 
and the peripheral location of these activities tend to consign them to a category 
that is considered unable to contribute to economic growth in Durban. 
238 The environment is recognised by Durban's policy makers as important in itself and as a 
resource to industry. For example, the dependence of the broader economy on a sustainable 
resource is noted in the Metropolitan Green Paper on Economic Development (Durban 
Metropolitan Council 1996). 
239 This programme sought to pilot recommendations of the 1992 United Nations 'Earth Summit' 
held in Rio de Janeiro. 
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5.2.2 Self-help housing 
A further insight from sustainable livelihoods theory is to recognise that 
adequate housing is not only important for meeting the basic need of shelter but 
is also a key asset for urban poor people (Moser 1998; Rakodi 1999). In terms of 
this theory adequate housing provides both a space for household consumption 
and is increasingly the site of home-based work/production (cf. Cross et al. 2001; 
Skinner and Valodia 2002). Indeed this is widely acknowledged in Durban and 
the LTDF clearly states the importance of poor people having access to "decent, 
safe, and secure living environments" (eThekwini Municipality 2001, 7). One of 
the most important means of achieving this aim is through the national 
government's Housing Policy. This policy is regarded as one of the most 
successful (in quantitative terms) in the suite of reconstruction and development 
programmes implemented in the post-Apartheid period (Huchzermeyer 2003; 
Tomlinson 2002). 
The housing policy consists of a number of programmes but by far the most 
significant is the programme that subsidises the provision of basic infrastructure, 
ownership of land and provision of a 'starter house' against an income means test 
and other household criteria. The programme is built on a principle of 
incremental self-help on the part of the recipients of the houses and therefore is 
intended to mobilise the labour of the household (or its ability to mobilise other 
labour) to continually improve the dwelling. Between 1994 and 2001, just over 
120,000 housing subsidies had been approved in Durban (eThekwini 
Municipality 2002, 3), and by 2000 the Municipality was gearing up to deliver 
16,000 houses per year (Makhathini, Pather, and Seedat 2002). While the 
housing subsidy has been an important source of income for the formal 
construction sector, the ongoing incremental self-help component is an economy 
of poor people's labour. Again, notwithstanding the importance of these 
economic activities for poor people, they are considered too small and 
fragmented and moreover, located within the household economy, to be able to 
contribute to economic growth in the city. 
5.2.3 Informal economic activities 
At more or less the same time as the Unicity Committee commissioned Monitor 
Group to research (formal) economic growth, a process to prepare a municipal 
policy for the informal economy was initiated by EDD. The research and policy of 
the informal economy policy is important because I suggest that it represents the 
most sustained attempt to rethink the economy in Durban and makes it easier to 
see poor people's economic activities as contributing to economic growth. 
Informal economic activities have long been a feature of urban life for people 
disadvantaged by Apartheid (Maylam and Edwards 1996; Preston-Whyte and 
Rogerson 1991; Wellings and Sutcliffe 1984). During the 1980s a number of 
factors came together in South Mrica to result in a massive growth and higher 
visibility of what were termed informal economic activities. These factors 
included firstly, increasing urbanisation as Apartheid restrictions on movement 
became more difficult to sustain and hence, less extensively applied. Secondly, 
the gradual and disjointed easing of Apartheid restrictions on Black people's 
participation in the economy provided more scope for people to openly engage in 
different economic activities. Lastly, the general decline in the fortunes of the 
South African economy and its ability to generate formal employment meant that 
more people had to create their own opportunities. By 1999, Daniela Casale 
(2002, 292) calculated that about 27 per cent of employment in Durban was 
informal.240 One of the most visible forms of this informal economic activity in 
Durban has been informal street-trading (Popke and Ballard 2004). A survey 
240 This figure includes those counted in the informal sector and people engaged in domestic 
work and is based on the national Census of 1996. 
commissioned by EDD in 1997 calculated that nearly 20,000 individuals were 
involved in street-trading in the centre of Durban (EDD 2000).241 
In the process of local government restructuring in 1996, the responsibility for 
the informal economy had somehow become that of EDD rather than a 
'community development' focused department. In Francie Lund's view, this was 
critically important for rethinking the role of poor people's economic activities in 
the city because it meant that the informal economy could be linked to broader 
economic development issues associated with the formal economy.242 She notes 
that at the time that the policy process began, "there was still a [Council] 
committee where informal traders were dealt with along with dogs and 
prostitutes". Partly, because engaging with small business issues was important 
to EDD's politica1legitimation with representatives of poor people to engaging in 
partnerships with big business in Durban, and partly due to the motivations and 
interests of EDD's own staff, a process to prepare a policy for Durban's informal 
economy was initiated under the leadership of Francie Lund.243 
The initiation of the policy process occurred in an atmosphere of considerable 
ambivalence about the role of street trading and informal activities (Skinner 
1999). At one extreme were those who sought to integrate these activities into an 
understanding of the city's economic plans. At the other, were those who viewed 
informal activities as a nuisance detracting from the ability of formal enterprises 
to engage in their business (Popke and Ballard 2004). At the time the informal 
economy policy process was initiated there was already research and practical 
work on the informal economy in Durban and a number of pilot projects -
particularly in relation to the centrally located Warwick Avenue Junction - had 
241 Other research suggests that 300,000 people could be engaged in home based enterprises 
(Cross 2000) and 110,700 people are involved in craft production (Markewicz English, Mander, 
and Mbokodo 2000). 
242 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
243 Francie Lund and Caroline Skinner had completed a two year research project for SEWU on 
the conditions faced by informal workers in South Africa and were active members of the 
international Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and Organising (WIEGO) network 
(Lund and Skinner 2004). 
demonstrated the viability of alternative approaches. An important motivation 
for the policy was that the municipality's attempts to negotiate a relationship 
with the street-traders had broken down because the street-traders were not 
organised (Lund and Skinner 2004). Lund understood the sentiment in EDD 
being that the city would "make space for traders, but they [had] to behave in 
different ways ... [and that the municipality had to] ... help them behave in 
different ways".244 Consequently a task team was set up to prepare the policy that 
would support and regulate the informal economy. 
The policy process built on three key issues that are important in terms of 
rethinking the economy (Lund and Skinner 2004). The first was to consider the 
informal traders as 'workers' and was based on the assumption that all work 
should be valued (Skinner and Valodia 2003). The view that all work is 
productive sets up the possibility of introducing a spectrum of economic 
activities within a single economy along an informal/formal axis (Kirsten 1991). 
Following on from this, the insights offered by 'value chain' analysis provided a 
means of 'seeing' the connections across the assumed 'divide' of formal and 
informal activities and throughout the spectrum.245 The 'value chain' analysis 
also proved useful in recognising that informal economic activities have unique 
and dynamic linkages with the more formal economic activities that differ from 
sector to sector (Skinner 2005, 6). The final insight was to think of space 
differently. The street-trader's organisation SEWU246 had recognised that they 
had little bargaining power on the basis of their citizenship. Rather, they 
understood their strength to lie in being seen as "workers and users of municipal 
space".247 Thus the strategy to advance informal trader's interests revolved 
around identifying who controlled space in the city. The clearest agency was the 
Municipality and hence, from the perspective of SEWU, the city council was the 
244 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
245 Caroline Skinner, Interview 25/02/04. 
246 Self Employed Women's Union. 
247 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
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agency to be engaged with.248 Influenced by this View, Francie Lund's 
understanding was therefore that, "local economic development was not about a 
local economic policy, it was about the local spatial place where the whole 
economy worked itself out" .249 While I believe that this sense of spatiality offers 
an interesting perspective it is not very prominent in accounts of poor people's 
economic activities. I will return to in the following chapters. 
These three key issues informed three key statements in the Informal Economy 
Policy. Firstly, that the informal economic activities were an inevitable part of 
Durban's economy and were 'here to stay'. Secondly, that informal economic 
activities should be counted as work and informal traders as workers, and 
thirdly, that the support and regulation of the informal economy was not just an 
issue for the council in Durban but was a growing global phenomenon. 250 
Durban's Informal Economy Policy251 (EDD 2000) reflects these strategic 
changes in approach. It establishes that the economic activities of poor people 
are part of the city's overall economy (see also, Khosa and Naidoo 1998; Sithole 
2002). This is possible because the Policy identifies that the "economy does not 
divide neatly into a 'formal sector' and informal sector'" (EDD 2000, 2). Instead, 
there is one economy with "a more formal end and a more informal end" (EDD 
2000, 2). The move to a spectrum of formality was based on the recognition that 
the line between different formal and informal activities varied according to 
different sectors of the economy but more importantly, that by dividing at the 
point of informality/formality the result was a bifurcation exactly at the point at 
which the linkages were the most important.252 Thus, of growing importance is 
"the sectoral (or value chain) approach ... [which] ... offers possibilities for 
248 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
249 Interview 10/06/04. 
250 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
251 The policy was initially accepted by the North and South Local Councils in October 2000 and 
then later adopted for the metropolitan-wide eThekwini Council in November 2001 (Skinner 
2005)· 
252 Francie Lund, Interview 10/06/04. 
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understanding the dynamics of each sector more accurately, and thus of building 
more precisely focused support" (EDD 2000, 12). 
Despite the advances offered by studies on the informal economy, I point to two 
broad issues within this body of work which seem to reinforce the identity and 
location of economic growth as being bound up in the formal economy. My 
purpose is not really to take issue with the researchers with whom I agree on 
many counts but to point to some of the effects of current policy research. Firstly, 
what is striking about much of the research on the informal economy and the 
Informal Economy Policy, is that it is conceptualised in the image of formal 
sector activities and thus does not question the assumptions that constitute 
understandings of key concepts such as 'productivity', 'profitability' and 
'competitiveness'. A good example of this is a recent Local Economic 
Development (LED) study undertaken (in 2003) by the eThekwini Municipality 
with support from the World Bank and School of Development Studies at the 
University of Kwazulu-Natal. Constrained by a desire to generate comparative 
data, Durban implemented the study developed by the World Bank in 
Johannesburg. Collating this study, Caroline Skinner (2005, 4) reports that 
informal enterprises were evaluated in terms of their "time of operation, assets, 
employment generated and profit ... business environment and relationship to 
the state ... production and management issues ... [and] ... access to financial 
services and insurance and training." While these factors are all important 
components of economic activity, the result of evaluating informal economic 
activity in the image of the formal economy leads to conclusions that informal 
economic activities faced 'constraints to growth' in the dimensions of the 
research. Consequently, research in this vein logically concludes that these 
economic activities are a "second-best alternative" to formal employment and for 
generating income (Posel 2001, 2).253 This makes it more difficult to see how 
poor people's economic activities could contribute to economic growth. 
253 This is not to deny the importance of secure and safe forms of employment. 
Despite the suggestive insights into the relationship between the local economy 
and spatiality of Durban raised in the preparation of the Informal Economy 
Policy a different view of the spatiality of economic activity more commonly 
prevails. This view is a second way that signals how policy makers consider poor 
people's economic activities as being unable to contribute to economic growth. 
There have been a number of studies that relate either directly or indirectly to the 
spatiality of informal economic activities in Durban.254 It is worth recalling that 
in most of these poverty and economic growth are represented as spatially 
confined and bounded in contrasting and separate areas. Here I focus on 
Markewicz English et al's. (2000) attempts to address the spatiality of informal 
economic activities which developed out of a broader ILO-sponsored study into 
home-based work in selected informal settlements and Black townships (Cross 
2000). 
Markewicz English et al. (2000) start from an assumption that the social and 
economic relationships that characterise urban areas "are in the first instance 
aspatial ... and then manifested in various physical spatial patterns" (Markewicz 
English, Mander, and Mbokodo 2000, 36, emphasis in the original). This 
assumption has important implications. In particular it allows town planners to 
draw on abstract economic assumptions about the logic or competitive 
rationalities that guide or govern social interaction. This in turn allows for the 
application of 'spatial assessment criteria' that have no inherent spatiality but 
which are derived from an abstract understanding of economic rationality. The 
implication of this view is that to contribute to economic growth an activity must 
be well-located in relation to the overall location of economic activity. It must be 
easily accessible and have good transport links to other important activities and 
must contribute to the establishment of thresholds that constitute the efficient 
operation of economic markets. In this view, successful economic activity 
depends on physical concentration and proximity (Dewar and Watson 1991). The 
254 See for example, Hemson (2002), Sithole (2002), Khosa (1998), Maharaj (1998), Skinner 
(2000), Cross (2000) and Grest (2002). 
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result is that economic activities that fall outside of these 'spatial assessment 
criteria' are considered unlikely to be able to contribute to economic growth. By 
way of example, areas outside the 'spatial assessment criteria' include "lower 
income residential areas ... located on the periphery ... with fragmented linkages 
... to economic opportunities and social infrastructure" (Markewicz English, 
Mander, and Mbokodo 2000, 38). This means that the "inhabitants of the 
peripheral settlements are firstly, restricted in their efforts to access markets and 
opportunities ... and secondly, do not benefit from 'passing trade' ... [and] ... the 
thresholds for economic activity within the peripheral areas are both highly 
fragmented and low level" (Markewicz English, Mander, and Mbokodo 2000, 
38). I conclude therefore, that such activities are unlikely to be considered as 
contributing to economic growth in Durban. As a result, the "focus on 
competitive strengths and advantages has tended to concentrate attention on 
areas of existing economic activity, so marginalising predominantly residential 
low-income areas" (Harrison, Todes, and Watson 1997, 58). 
In conclusion, while the research and policies related to informal economic 
activities show the ways that poor people's economic activities are aspects of one 
economy, it has not considered that these activities could contribute to economic 
growth. I have suggested that two of the reasons for this are because poor 
people's economic activities remain understood in the image of formal 
(capitalist) activities and hence are always deficient and secondly, that poor 
people's economic activities are generally (although not exclusively), located in 
peripheral parts of the city which are thought to be marginal to processes of 
economic growth. 
5.3 Consequences for poverty reduction policies in 
Durban 
In drawing the analysis of this chapter to a close, I return to the inabilities of 
theories of poverty to consider poor people's economic activities as contributing 
to economic growth described in Chapter Three. Building on the insights from 
Chapter Three, I now consider the consequences of such a view for policies to 
reduce poverty in Durban. The first consequence is that the provision of support 
and assistance to poor people's economic activities tends to conform to an image 
of economic activities in the formal economy. The pressures to conform include 
providing support to small economic activities if they (re)locate in designated 
nodes or 'activity corridors', and the provision of credit and business training 
through specific agencies and according to formulaic criteria.255 While these 
factors are all important for the basis of economic activities the limitation is that 
the debate about their appropriateness is confined to a narrow range of what is 
thought to contribute to the economic growth of the city in a 'synergistic way' (c.f 
LTDF 2001) Poor people's economic activities that fall outside this narrow band 
are dealt with (often highly innovatively) by municipal departments focused on 
occupational health and safety, community development or crime and safety 
(Lund and Skinner 2004). 
The second consequence of this configuration of Durban's economic map is that 
it tends to confirm binary understandings of the economy. This issue will be 
developed in the following chapter and for now I merely draw attention to some 
of the key binary pairings that have been operationalised. Important binary 
pairings include: formal/informal, central/peripheral, economic/non-economic, 
and 'productive' /,basic needs' infrastructure. The effect of these binary logics is 
to lock poor people's economic activities into subordinate relationships in 
255 Caroline Skinner, Interview 25/02/04. 
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relation to economic growth. This reinforces the search for strategies of 
'absorbing', 'connecting', and/or 'including' poor people's economic activities in 
the (formal) economy or in processes of (formal) economic growth. As a 
consequence, the question of why there should be a separation, and the precise 
nature of the economy that poor people are being absorbed into, connected to, or 
included in, is glossed over. My argument is that, and as others have pointed out, 
this leaves the dominant understanding of 'the economy' intact and undisturbed 
as a category of social analysis (cf. Hart 2004; Miller 1998; Mitchell 2002). This 
is why, I suggest, even though sustainable livelihoods theory and informality 
studies have advanced poor people's interests by including them in the view of a 
single economy, they remain subordinated to the (unexamined) understanding of 
economic growth that is commonly regarded as co-extensive with the formal 
economy. 
The third consequence is that expenditure on infrastructure for the perceived 
consumption needs of poor people is likely to firstly remain 'basic' and secondly, 
to remain dependent on, or second in line to, expenditure on 'productive 
infrastructure'. Thus, even though a significant portion of the Council's capital 
expenditure may be allocated to the construction of 'basic needs' infrastructure, 
this is far outweighed by the combined capital expenditure on 'productive' 
infrastructure and the operational expenditure incurred in maintaining and 
regulating the use of historically higher levels of investment in White areas of the 
city.256 In this way, an important historical source of inequality in the city is 
replayed and reinforced by democratic local government. 
256 Soobs Moonsammy, Interview Jennifer Robinson and Debbie Bonnin, 23/07/04. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by noting that despite the importance of the policy goal of 
economic growth in Durban, the distribution of economic opportunities 
appeared to be limited. I highlighted the importance of the debates about three 
interdependent policy priorities understood by policy makers as necessary to 
reduce poverty in Durban. I drew on a long-term city visioning process in Durban 
to bring these debates into focus. My argument is that poverty reduction 
practices in Durban have been complementary to broader processes of defining 
and theorising poverty. This is because these local policy making practices replay 
the partiality of the dominant definitions of poverty (in Chapter Two) and the 
three theories of poverty (in Chapter Three), which I reviewed. Consequently, 
policy makers in Durban - facing urgent demands for redress - do not consider 
poor people's economic activities to be able to contribute to economic growth and 
yet consider economic growth essential for addressing poverty. 
I suggested that the Monitor Group analysis of economic growth and other 
approaches to the economy in Durban do not question assumptions about the 
nature of economic growth, and thus worked to secure the dominance of a 
conventional view of growth at an analytical level in policy circles in the city. 
Tracing the continuities and discontinuities in policy formulation and different 
attempts at presenting visions as holistic and integrated, I noted some of the 
ways in which policy makers secured the obviousness of the view that poor 
people's economic activities do not contribute to economic growth in Durban. I 
suggested that with the additional national policy emphasis on cities as the 
primary sites of economic growth and local political dynamics, the effect of the 
Monitor Group report on Durban was to assert the dominance of an economic 
agenda in the city's development plans. As a further result of these local political 
dynamics, politicians conflated the processes of developing a city development 
plan with an economic development plan. Thus, despite a more participatory 
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process, the LTDF confirmed a very narrow view of economic growth that 
reduces poverty through 'trickle down' mechanisms and supporting local 
business confidence. 
However, although poverty reduction policy making in Durban can be considered 
as broadly complementary to wider processes, such practices should not be 
considered subsumed by these same wider processes. In this respect, I noted that 
a number of other aspects of the economy came into view through policy making 
processes in Durban. I identified three other aspects of the economy that are 
acknowledged in the LTDF (the natural resource base, self-help housing, and the 
informal economy) which point to a more diverse understanding of Durban's 
economy, but which nonetheless continue to confirm the dominant view of 
economic growth. 
Thus, the inability to see poor people's economic activities as contributing to the 
dominant goals of economic growth and poverty reduction is reinforced as ideas, 
problems and the realpolitik of metropolitan development merge in random, 
unpredictable and accidental ways. In the next chapter, I start to examine how 
the economic diversity which the case study of Durban has brought into view 
might shift our understanding of the economy, economic growth and poor 
people's relationships to these processes. 
· SIX 
Opening the economy to difference? 
I have been arguing that theories of poverty invest in a very specific 
understanding of economic growth and 'the economy'. In broad terms, the 
dominant approaches appear focused on a small set of activities considered to 
relate to the 'real' economy in assessing the prospects for economic growth. In 
this Chapter, I propose a theoretical outline for a different and wider 
apprehension of the economy. The purpose of this theoretical outline is to open 
our understanding of the economy to difference. But this is not all that needs to 
be done, for it may be possible to see difference across/within the economy and 
still remain with one element or part of the economy considered to be inherently 
dominant or more significant than others. Therefore the additional challenge is 
to simultaneously acknowledge the economy to be constituted by a wider set of 
activities than the dominant approaches allow, while not automatically 
presupposing that any particular activity or set of activities are inherently or 
necessarily dominant. 
I aim to build on the ways in which sustainable livelihoods theory recognises and 
validates poor people's economic activities. 257 Sustainable livelihoods theory 
focuses attention on poor people's economic activities and broadens the 
appreciation of economic assets that poor households utilise in securing a 
livelihood. Drawing on these insights, I intend to start to open up alternative 
ways of thinking about how poor people's economic activities contribute to 
economic growth. In other words, to allow for poor people's economic activities 
257 As I noted in Chapter Two, Informal Economy Studies are another Source upon which to build 
our understanding of p~or people's economic activities. Here I plan to draw on the insights of 
Informal Economy StudIes as they have been filtered through sustainable livelihoods theories of 
poverty since it is particularly theories of poverty that are of interest. 
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to be 'visible' and 'sayable' (The Community Economies Collective 2001) in more 
active ways than is currently understood within theories of poverty. In the 
previous chapters, I noted that key Anglo theorists of (urban) poverty had 
commented on their own inability to consider how poor people's economic 
activities might contribute to economic growth (cf. Amis 2004; Beall 2002; 
Devas 2004; Rakodi 2002a). I elaborated on some of the reasons why it has 
proven difficult to consider these issues in developing theories and formulating 
(local) policies for poverty reduction. Thus, at best, sustainable livelihoods 
theories of poverty make provision for poor peoples' economic activities to be 
considered as part of the informal economy that, in turn, is increasingly 
considered as articulated with the formal economy. As noted, however, the 
informal economy remains theorised as occupying a subservient role to the 
formal 'real' economy, within the formal/informal binary continuum of the 
economy (Jhabvala, Sudarshan, and Unni 2003). The Anglo poverty literature 
bypasses this issue by suggesting the solution lies outside of theories of poverty -
such as in the collection of more appropriate statistics. While the generation of 
better quality statistics will undoubtedly be beneficial in social policy terms, I 
sought to look for ways to resolve some of the problems within the discourses 
and practices that constitute poverty theory. 
The progression from the previous chapter to this chapter represents a fulcrum 
in my analysis. The previous four chapters have explored how existing 
understandings of the economy might be unhelpful in thinking about creative 
responses to misery and deprivation. In Chapter Two, I suggested that there is 
another 'realm' of politics that determines what is 'sayable' and 'visible' about 
poverty in poverty research and that, as poverty researchers, we are implicated in 
constructing these understandings. The intention was to highlight what I think is 
a neglected agency on the part of researchers of poverty. In Chapter Three, I 
noted that one of the elements that is not 'visible' or 'sayable' is how poor 
people's economic activities contribute to economic growth in theories of 
poverty, and I explored some of the reasons why this might be the case. Chapters 
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Four and Five considered how the institutional practices at the city level of 
Durban bring together a particular commitment to poverty reduction, to 
processes of organisational transformation and to urban development. I argued 
that, despite the progressive intentions of the post-apartheid local government, 
the result has been a relatively narrow approach to poverty reduction258 and 
economic growth because of the politics producing certain approaches to poverty 
as dominant and on singular ways in which theories of poverty bring the concept 
of economic growth into view. 
This balance tips in the current chapter. I begin by identifying the theoretical 
possibilities for such an alternative understanding of the economy and economic 
growth by exploring the notion of 'diverse economies' associated primarily with 
the work of JK Gibson-Graham (1996). The concept of 'diverse economies' 
appears useful because it aims to open up our view of the economy to difference. 
By opening our understanding of the economy to difference, I mean to make 
'visible' different aspects of the economy and the ways in which they are 
constituted by different activities and registers, and to see the relationships 
between these diverse activities and registers as contingent and relational. As a 
device, then, it offers the potential to open up our understanding of the economy 
to a wider set of activities, which include the economic activities of poor people 
that sustainable livelihoods theory has brought into clearer focus (cf. Bebbington 
1999b). But while the notion of diverse economies offers a way of opening our 
view of the economy to difference and widening the scope of activities considered 
to be economic, it raises new questions about how we might think about the 
dynamics that both constitute relationships between and differentiate activities 
from one another. I therefore turn to consider other work that seeks to revise our 
understanding of an economy (for example AlIen et al. 1998; Massey 1996) and 
work that builds on Gibson-Graham's initial analysis (for example Samers 2005; 
Smith 2004)· This sets up the possibility in the final chapter of considering how 
258 This is not to deny the tremendous improvements in service delivery and infra structural 
development achieved by Durban's post-Apartheid local government in areas that were 
historically disadvantaged. 
poor people's activities can be thought of as part of interdependent networks of 
economic growth in the diverse economy of Durban. 
The three parts to this Chapter provide the structure to the argument. In the first 
part, I examine how the notion of 'diverse economies' opens our understanding 
of the economy to difference. In the second part, I identify new questions that the 
notion of 'diverse economies' raises. In the third and final part of the chapter, I 
start to explore how we might address some of these new questions and extend 
the current conceptions of 'diverse economies' as a means of thinking about how 
poor people's economic activities contribute to economic growth. 
Before I begin, a caveat is in order. When used in a general way there is always 
the danger of misrepresenting a body of work and a diverse range of scholars 
associated with the notion of 'diverse economies'. It is very difficult to do justice 
to all the insights, developments and contradictions that are inevitable in this 
body of work and which includes many different theorists and practitioners in 
different contexts (see for example, the list of participants in The Community 
Economies Collective 2001). A focus merely on the work of JK Gibson-Graham 
offers no respite from this problem either, since JK Gibson-Graham's work is 
complex and evolving and they do not represent the whole of this field. Despite 
this diversity, I feel that there are key issues that have remained consistently in 
focus and it is these key issues that I hope to have captured and conveyed in the 
argument. 
6.1 Diverse economies: concept, theory, strategies and 
framework 
This section presents the concept of 'diverse economies' and goes on to build an 
understanding of what this entails by describing the theoretical basis and 
strategic actions that follow. It then explores Gibson-Graham's 'diverse economy 
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framework' which they use to bring together many of their insights and 
strategies. 
6.1.1 The concept of 'diverse economies' 
The concept of the diverse economy is simply an acknowledgement that the 
economy is more than what is observed and measured, as capitalist or as 
formal. 259 Gibson-Graham declare that the problem in orthodox/hegemonic 
accounts of the economy - such as those invested in, in different ways, by 
theories of poverty - is that capitalism is fully co-extensive with 'the economy'. 
Thus, what is useful about the 'diverse economy' concept is that it suggests that 
the representations of the 'real' economy, promoted by theorists, policy-makers 
and activists alike, are fundamentally representations only of a capitalist 
economy. By way of example, let me return to the understanding of the economy 
in Durban outlined earlier. This will serve to illustrate the point and allow me to 
point to the new and different meaning of the term 'diverse' implied in the 
concept of 'diverse economies'. 
As I noted in Chapter Five, there is already recognition amongst officials in local 
government of the existence of a wide range of economic activities in Durban. 
The recognition of this diversity can be seen in the ways in which the natural 
resource base is considered an input to the survivalist activities of poor 
households, the sweat-equity contributions inherent in the post-Apartheid 
government's massive low-income housing delivery programme, and the 
officially acknowledged presence of the informal economy. All of which takes 
place alongside the formal, capitalist economy. While recognition of all these 
different economic activities flesh out various Durban policy documents and 
259 The primary binary Gibs~n-Grah~m focus on is be~een capitalism and noncapitalism. I argue 
we could ~qually ex:tend theIr analYSIS ~o t~e f?rmaljmfo~mal. economy binary pair that currently 
characterIses theOrIes of poverty and mshtutlOnal practIces m Durban. This is partly why their 
insights are so useful for the general purposes of the argument I am developing. For the moment 
though, I continue to develop their position in their terms of capitalism/noncapitalism. 
development discourses, there is no real sense that they are all equally, if at all, 
seen as part of one metropolitan economy. The (capitalist) formal - that is, 
registered and regularised by the state - economy is regarded by Durban's policy 
makers as the 'real' metropolitan economy and exists in its own register. All the 
other elements of the economy (public, non-profit, informal etc.) are deemed 
subservient to/deviations from/beholden to/weakly developed examples of, the 
capitalist logic. Thus, the visible 'real economy' refers to the realm of formal 
capitalist activities and the term 'diverse' has been used to describe only the 
different sectors, enterprises and activities that can be observed and measured 
within this 'visible' economy (Monitor Group 2000). 
Now, through the notion of 'diverse economies', I want to differentiate and 
extend the usage of the term 'diverse' and think 'difference' beyond the narrow 
range of formal, capitalist enterprises, and across a far wider and richer variety of 
economic activities - but importantly, to consider these to exist within networks 
of interdependence. To anticipate some of the ways in which Gibson-Graham 
seek to proliferate difference later in the chapter, we can think of diversity as 
referring to infinitely different forms of transactions, ways in which labour is 
practised, and production and surplus appropriation organised. Thus, the first 
point made by Gibson-Graham is that the concept of 'diverse economies' suggests 
that there are many more economic activities than frequently acknowledged by 
theorists, the state representations, media or indeed activists or, indeed, 
commonly represented in long-term city visioning documents. Gibson-Graham 
have drawn on the metaphor of an iceberg to illustrate their argument that the 
'visible' activities only represent a small percentage of the economy (see Figure 
12). The representation of the economy as an iceberg suggests that there are 
many other activities through which we engage in production, exchange and 
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distribution and that these activities out-number and out-weigh what is 
visible.260 
Figure 12. The economic iceberg 
wage labor 
roduce for a market 
in a capitalist fi rm 
on the street 
in neighborhoods 
within families unpaid 
in church/temple 
the retired between friends 
volunteer 
barter moonlighting children 
il legal informnllending not for market 
not monetized 
under-tlH~table 
self-provisionlng 
proaucer cooperatives 
consumer cooperatives non·capitalist firms 
Source: (Drawing by Ken Byrne in Gibson-Graham n.d., 1) 
Gibson-Graham insist that what is conventionally visible as 'the economy' only 
occupies a small part of diverse economic relations. They also insist that the 
activities that are currently 'visible' and 'sayable' only represent a small 
percentage of 'the economy'. Finally, they focus squarely upon how activities 
260 Another represent~tion that .is oft.en ?r~wn on, and which suggests a similar image, is the 
concept of the layered Iced cake 10 whIch It IS only the top layer of icing that is visible and counts 
as 'the economy' (cf. Henderson 1991). 
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make up economies. To substantiate their claim, Gibson-Graham draw on 
feminist critiques of the representation of the economy to argue that as "much as 
50% of all economic activity in both rich and poor countries is undertaken by 
unpaid labor in households and neighbourhoods" (Gibson-Graham 2004, 411).261 
In addition, once nonmarket and market-oriented noncapitalist activities are 
included, the proportion of capitalist activities are likely to account for less than 
half of all economic activities and economic relations. 
It is important to note that this claim about the relative size of the 'visible' 
(capitalist) economy and 'invisible' economy rests on calculations based on 
activities and not for example, productivity or output. This is both a novel way of 
seeing the economy and provides a useful overlap with sustainable livelihoods 
theory's emphasis on poor people's economic activities. The admission of a far 
wider range of activities as part of the economy starts to question the prevalence 
and extent of capitalist activities and, by implication, the view that capitalist 
activities can be solely responsible for a process such as economic growth. The 
political scope for considering the activities of poor people as 'economic' is 
therefore enlarged and justified. 
However, the term 'activities' also needs to be scrutinised for the definition of an 
economic activity is not neutral. Earlier (in Chapter Three) I pointed out that an 
activity was defined as economic if it could be performed by a third party and 
sold on the market (Wood 2003, 308). But, Wood (1997; 2003) concludes that 
this commonly accepted 'third-party criterion' definition leads to two problems. 
The first is a theoretical problem. By utilising the market as the standard for 
economic activity, the criterion privileges and affirms the capitalist sector of the 
economy and simultaneously marginalises all other forms of non-commodity 
production. The necessity of disrupting the market as the standard for economic 
activity is underscored by Humphrey and Mandel's (2002, 4) observation that 
"engagement in the market is not a moral free activity, but instead is given value 
261 See also (2001), (1989) and (1991). 
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through the political-economic context in which it operates." The second is a 
practical problem because, as Wood points out, the third-party criterion is not 
applied consistently. She cites the example of unpaid domestic labour that is 
excluded from definitions of economic activity even when it is marketable (Wood 
2003). This leads Wood to the conclusion that "some non-monetary definition of 
economic activity must be constructed to distinguish the large (if inferior) non-
market economy from those activities considered non-economic" (Wood 2003, 
307). I return to this issue in the Conclusion. 
The iceberg representation of the economy is also useful for drawing attention to 
the arbitrariness of how much of the economy is 'below the waterline' or what is 
conventionally considered to be visible. The arbitrariness points to the ways in 
which our representations of the economy are socially constructed and 
researchers and theorists are implicated in (re)producing such representations. 
To anticipate a fuller consideration later, how we come to know the economy 
shifts as a result of the notion of 'diverse economies'. Until this point in the 
argument of this thesis, the term 'economy' has reflected its general usage in 
theories of poverty. That is to say, the term economy has referred to a mirroring 
of a 'reality' that is assumed to naturally pre-exist our observations, 
quantifications and measurements of 'the economy'. However, the concept of 
'diverse economies' introduces, and relies on, an understanding of the economy 
as a representation rather than directly mirroring any immutable 'reality'. 
Thus through Gibson-Graham's 'iceberg economy' representation of 'diverse 
economies' four new claims have been introduced. The first is that activities 
constitute economies The second is that the economy consists of many more 
activities than conventionally considered 'visible' in the formal, capitalist 
economy and provides a basis for thinking about different activities as related. 
The third is that activities associated with the capitalist economy typically 
represent a much smaller proportion of economic activities than is generally 
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assumed. The fourth is that the many activities acknowledged as part of the 
economy is ultimately arbitrarily defined. 
It is necessary, however, to put the 'iceberg economy' representation aside for the 
moment. As with all representations, it obscures as well as illuminates. It raises 
fresh questions such as how to analyse some of the ways in which the exclusions, 
boundaries, equivalences and relations consequent upon viewing the economy as 
only capitalist are established and draws attention to how the dynamics between 
activities are played out. Later, once I have presented Gibson-Graham's 'diverse 
economy framework', I will return to these questions. I now wish to consider the 
theoretical basis of the concept of diverse economies. 
6.1.2 The theoretical basis of 'diverse economies' 
In this section, I consider the theoretical basis of the concept of diverse 
economies as set out by JK Gibson-Graham. In particular, with the theme of 
'opening the economy to difference' as a backdrop, I will describe how Gibson-
Graham harness two theoretical insights relating to 'language as representation' 
and a critique of 'binary logics' to a broader (perhaps more practical) concern 
with social justice. Indeed, the strategies for social change that follow from these 
theoretical insights are integral to the overall development of diverse economies. 
I begin this section by setting out their position on 'language as representation' 
and 'binary logics' before proceeding to consider the strategies that follow from 
this theoretical position. 
Language as representation 
The first theoretical insight that I believe is important to Gibson-Graham's 
development of diverse economies is the recognition that language and discourse 
are representations of economies, rather than something that mirrors a 
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'reality'.262 I begin by picking up from a point made earlier: that what we 
understand to be 'the economy' is a socially constructed representation of 
contingent combinations of the discursive and material. Gibson-Graham devote 
most of their attention to representations and point out that 'capitalism' is a 
representation of the economy and not the economy itself (Friedland and 
Robertson 1990b; Mitchell 2002). Capitalism is a representation of the economy 
because language, discourses, practices and images are constitutive of the thing 
we call 'the economy', rather than mirroring the 'reality' they wish to represent. 
In this sense, this understanding is anti-foundationalist in refusing to see 
knowledge as grounded in 'reality'. Capitalist hegemony is a 'discursive artefact' 
that is a "complex effect of a wide variety of discursive and non-discursive 
conditions" (Gibson-Graham 1996, 4). This does not mean that Gibson-Graham 
believe that we can merely 'think' our way out of capitalism (Disch 1999), but it 
does point powerfully to how we are implicated in (re)presenting 'the economy'. 
The theoretical basis for this is traced back to a translation of Ferdinand de 
Saussure's (1966, [1915]) classic work (Gibson-Graham 2000, 95). Saussure 
suggested that a word should be seen as a sign constituted by the signifier 
(acoustic or visual image) and the signified (concept invoked). The effect of this 
insight was to break the relationship between language and the 'reality' it was 
meant to represent. Social meaning, then, emerges from the socially constructed 
relations of difference between signs, rather than through a connection to 
something outside oflanguage. Saussure proposed that a fixed relationship exists 
between the signifier and signified within social structures (Gibson-Graham 
2000). However, what marks post-structural theories from the more structuralist 
accounts such as Saussure's is the denial of a fixed relationship between signified 
and signifier and the suggestion that language exists as a system of difference 
among multiple sets of signs. This means that the creation of meaning must 
262 I am pres~nting this the~retical. insight first becau~e I believe it makes an understanding of the 
concept of dlverse economles eaSler to grasp. In domg so, I am not suggesting that it is more 
fundamental in any way. Indeed, in practice both theoretical insights are much more entangled 
and intertwined than I am presenting here. 
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always remain open to being recontextualised in a multiplicity of signs, As n 
result, Gibson-Graham (2000, 96) suggest that, "the creution of meaning is un 
unfinished process, a site of (political) struggle where alternntive meanings ure 
generated and only temporarily fixed", The pro('ess of ('ontinuously 
recontextualising language and representation opens the wuy to destnhilising till' 
order that seeks to inhabit the fixity of meanings, The rl'("ont('xhlulisntion of 
language is one of the strategies that Gibson-Graham pursllt.' nnd I will rt'hlrn to 
it below. I now want to turn to consider what, for Gibson-(;raham. is ont' of till' 
key representations of the economy, 
Binary logics 
Gibson-Graham note the prevalence and importan<.'l~ of hinary logit's ill 
constructing meaning in Western thought. It is not thut thl'y wish to hunish 
binary logics as a way of creating social meaning. but rutlll'r thut binary logi('s 
can essentialise and singularise the identity of complex sodal phenOl1ll'nn, TIll' 
net effect of the dominance of binary logics, for thl' PUfJ)()Sl'S of my nrgullll'nt. is 
that they close down the opportunities for seeing differlJnt al'tivitil's us pnrt of tilt' 
economy. 
Gibson-Graham (2000) apply Derrida's critique of hinaril's to thl' pn'vnll'nt 
hegemonic understanding of the economy and lISl' it as a Wlly of sl,tting up till' 
possibility for diverse economies to emerge, Derrida argm's that hinary logics ('un 
secure meaning in Western thought far wider than the simple diffl'l'l'ntiatiol1 of 
opposites. More difficult to detect thun the supl'rfidal diffl'l'l'ntiatioll of 
opposites, binary logic typically invokes both a hierar<.'hit-lll fl'lationship hl'twl'l'n 
the two terms and relies on the stability of u singular umtl'rstanding of l'udl tt'rlll 
in the pairing that can admit no in-between state of lJitlll'r It'rm. Tht' hit'I"HI'('hil'al 
relationship emerges because the first tl'rm in thl' binary pail' is lypkally 
endowed with agency, positivity and fullness whilt' tlw Sl'('OIul tl'rlll is l'l'gul'dt'd 
as passive, negative and empty, Consequently, in tlll' hinary pail'in~ dl'finl'd by 
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capitalism/noncapitalism, capitalism, as the primary term, is represented with 
positivity and fullness. Gibson-Graham (1996) coined the term 'capitalocentrism' 
to convey the fundamental ways in which capitalism is defined with positivity 
and force and all other economies and aspects of economies, as the complement, 
absence or negative of capitalism. Thus, through the privileging of capitalism, the 
hierarchical relationship is reinforced by the process of simultaneously depriving 
other economies of vitality and suggesting that they function as the complement 
to capitalism, waiting to be filled or transformed by capitalism. 
The possibility of establishing a hierarchical relationship between two terms in a 
binary pair relies on each term being considered as insulated and autonomous 
from the other, yet dependent on each other. The singularity of the 
understanding that results means that there can be no forms of contamination 
between the terms that results in hybrid states. When this singularity is applied 
to representations of capitalism it means that it has no "peer or equivalent, of 
existing in a category by itself; and also when it appears fully realised within a 
particular social formation, it tends to be dominant or alone" (Gibson-Graham 
1996, 256). Unlike socialism, which has to be struggled over to bring into 
existence, capitalism is viewed as taking "on its full form as a natural outcome of 
an internally driven growth process" (Gibson-Graham 1996, 257). 
Closely related to this sense of singular identity is a process that results in the 
terms of the binary pairing being seen to have unchanging immutable qualities. 
Impervious to new contexts or recontextualisations, the qualities attributed to 
the terms become essentialised. In the case of capitalism, its essential quality 
means that it appears unchanged and fully formed in each concrete instance. But, 
in addition, these essential qualities secure a unity and totality for capitalism that 
is difficult to dislodge. The sense of unity means that capitalism appears to be 
closed to local or partial attempts at transformation (Gibson-Graham 1996, 256). 
Gibson-Graham suggest that this unity confers an integrity on capitalism through 
which "capitalism becomes not an uncentered aggregate of practices but a 
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structural and systemic unity, potentially co-extensive with the national or global 
economy as a whole" (1996, 255-256). Its organic unity gives it the peculiar 
power to regenerate itself and because it is co-extensive with the economy as a 
whole, we cannot get outside of it (Gibson-Graham 1996, 258). As Antonio 
Callari (2004, 114) suggests, this leaves no room for un decide ability, no liberty 
for other economies to imagine their own conditions of being. 
This analysis of dominant representations of the economy as capitalist can also 
be applied to an understanding of how strategies to resist the exploitation 
associated with capitalism emerge. This is because as the master term, 
representations of capitalism are also a "potent constituent of the anti-capitalist 
imagination, providing images of what is to be resisted and changed as well as 
intimations of the strategies, techniques and possibilities of changing it" (Gibson-
Graham 1996, 4). 
The theoretical basis of the concept of diverse economies rests on identifying and 
displacing the dominance of binary logics between key economic categories such 
as capitalism and noncapitalism and other binaries such as formal/informal, 
public/private and so on. It requires deconstructing these binaries, representing 
them as not inevitable, and being open to difference and multiple identities. The 
notion of diverse economies emerges to suggest that there are many different 
economies and each economy is less pure and less singular than is made out. 
Diversity exists across economies and within economies.263 The strategies that 
Gibson-Graham suggest to recognise diverse economies are an integral part of 
their theoretical analysis and are developed further in the next section. 
263 Gibson-Graham generally work within the context of advanced capitalist countries where 
capitalism is considered to be hegemonic and stifling of diverse economic activities. In other 
contexts diversity within economies is widely accepted, such as the global south (cf. Gregory and 
Altman 1989; Preston-Whyte and Rogerson 1991; Bromley 1979; Berner 2001' Tranberg Hansen 
and Vaa 2002) and those studying post-socialist economies (cf. Mandel and Hu~phrey 2002). 
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Strategies 
There are a number of new poverty reduction strategies for poverty scholars to 
consider that the notion of 'diverse economies' opens up. These strategies start to 
cut across the strategies for poverty alleviation of 'absorption', 'connection', and 
'inclusion' that follow from the theories of poverty considered in Chapter Three. 
In the previous section, I suggested that strategies are important to Gibson-
Graham because they emerge from the theoretical basis of the concept of diverse 
economies. However, strategies are also important to Gibson-Graham because 
their work engages "somewhere between research and political action" (Smith 
2004, 10). Here I focus on three strategies that I think are relevant to 
considerations around poverty. These strategies involve deconstructing binary 
logics, the development of new subjectivities, and spatialising diverse economies. 
In practice, these strategies are less singular and more difficult to disentangle 
than I will present here. Nonetheless, I will attempt to consider them in turn. 
In attending to the binary pairing of capitalism/noncapitalism, Gibson-Graham 
draw inspiration from feminist insights that seek to (re)theorise sexual difference 
in the face of the man/woman binary. As noted, the singular identity of terms in 
the binary logic of capitalism/noncapitalism creates the conditions that make it 
impossible to think of a state in-between and ensures a closure that prevents the 
identity being disrupted. The identity can then be counter posed and invested 
with unchanging qualities or abilities and the unity and totality of capitalism can 
be secured. 
It is thus necessary to both decentre and avoid essentialising identity. In 
feminism a response to male/female binaries has been to consider the identities 
of 'man' and 'woman' as constituted by a contingent set of specificities. The result 
is that there can be no unchanging identity that materialises every time the terms 
are invoked. Hence, there can no longer be any singular (negative) identity for 
'woman'. 'Woman' can emerge as her own set of (positive) specificities. Gibson-
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Graham extend these insights to the way that binaries are seen to operate in 
representations of the economy. Thus, ''by analogy ... the specificity of capitalism 
- its plural identity, if you like - becomes a condition of the existence of a 
discourse of noncapitalism as a set of positive and differentiated economic 
forms" (Gibson-Graham 1996, 14). In order to achieve this, Gibson-Graham 
suggest that capitalism must be seen as a contingent set of specificities rather 
than infinitely replicable. This is because once capitalism's identity is considered 
inevitable it will necessarily be seen to operate as a constraint or a limit (Gibson-
Graham 1996, 14). Once, capitalism is seen as a set of specificities it is more 
difficult to consider capitalism in an essential way. Its concrete manifestations 
can no longer be read off from a set of qualities and characteristics that pre-exist. 
Instead, it is possible to "think the radical emptiness of every capitalist instance" 
(Gibson-Graham 1996, 15)· 
The strategy for resisting a move to essentialising capitalism is to continually see 
capitalism as constituted by its 'outsides', rather than having an invariant core 
(Gibson-Graham 1996, 15-16). The task is therefore to specify and explore these 
constitutive relations that 'overdetermine' sites, practices, processes or events. 
The complexity of overdetermination encourages Gibson-Graham to adopt class 
(as derived from a Marxian analysis) as their entry point of analysis (Smith 
2004). However, to remain with this (Marxian) sense of class would inevitably 
lead back to a privileging of capitalism and so Gibson-Graham widen the 
conventional Marxian notion of class. For Gibson-Graham, class refers to 
processes that relate to the appropriation of surplus labour and distribution of 
this surplus264 (1996, 17). In their account, class is freed from the traditional 
Marxian understanding of being determined by property relations (Maroney 
1998). This frees up the analysis to suggest that class processes of exploitation 
and surplus distribution can occur in any sites where work is performed and 
undermines the "inherent dominance of capitalist class relations" (Gibson-
264 This where a problem begins for this is the basis for the new register that tends to flatten all 
the activities in a diverse economy into a single (binary) register of exploitation/care. 
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Graham 1996, 18). Moreover, class identities can be multiple and shifting at any 
point (Gibson-Graham 1996,19). 
This process of relinquishing and understanding of class relations as necessarily 
deriving only out of the exploitation of surplus labour in the production process 
is critical to later developments in their argument. Through this expanded notion 
of class, Gibson-Graham foreground the 'community economy' and suggest an 
alternative register of exploitation/care to evaluate activities within diverse 
economies. These are both issues to which I will return. For the moment, I 
consider Gibson-Graham's strategies relating to economic subjectivities. 
The suggestion that subjectivities or identities are assumed by economists (and 
poverty theorists) in the process of representing economies is appealing to the 
project of establishing diverse economies because it suggests that subjects of the 
(capitalist) 'real' economy are 'made' in and through various, but specific 
discourses and practices (Gibson 2001, 641). Drawing on Foucault's insight that 
power is experienced both as domination and as productive of particular 
subjects, Gibson-Graham look towards feminism for ways in which subjects can 
be empowered. Gibson-Graham are not suggesting that we can escape subjection, 
but rather they are invested in developing new, more egalitarian subjectivities. 
Importantly, the question of subjectivities and the strategies for generating new 
forms of subjection relate both to 'economic agents' and theorists of 'the 
, 
economy. 
Judith Butler's work is especially useful to Gibson-Graham because it offers a 
way of thinking about how subjects might become different and assume new 
identities, despite the apparently overwhelming power of hegemonic discourses. 
Butler has drawn attention to the way in which identities must be repeatedly 
constituted. Citing Butler's Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex" 
(1993, 2), they note that 'performativity' is the "reiterative and citational practice 
through which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Gibson-Graham 
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2000, 100). The concept of perjormativity provides a means of rejecting the 
dominant characteristics of a subject - such as the (capitalist) economy or 
dominant gender ideologies - as stable, and emanating from some pre-given, 
immutable and pre-determined nature or structure. This is because the identity 
of the (capitalist) economy is "practiced through the repetitive performance of 
certain acts ... and must be re-enacted in order to secure its seeming fixity 
(Gibson-Graham 2000, 101). However, "the process of repetition by which 
discourse produces its effects is characterised by hesitancies and interruptions" 
(Gibson-Graham 2000, 104). This introduces new insights into the politics of 
knowledge and, in the "inevitable differences between performances, the slippage 
between iterations" suggest that the identity of the (capitalist) economy is always 
unfinished and open to subversion (Gibson-Graham 2000, 101). 
Gibson-Graham draw on the observations by Butler that through the ability to 
speak on behalf of a subject we assume the power of that subject. These insights 
enable Gibson-Graham to raise questions about how theorists of the economy are 
themselves implicated in (re)presenting the assumed power of capitalism. 
Gibson-Graham suggest that the differential power of capitalism to 
noncapitalism emerges from discourses that are "produced and purveyed by 
theorists" (Gibson-Graham 2002, 33). Recognising this becomes the starting 
point for a new more emancipatory politics "outside the binary frame" (Gibson-
Graham 2002, 33). The task they identify is to encourage existing subjectivities 
and emergent subjectivities, despite the dominance of capitalism, to challenge 
the singular representations that seek to represent the 'reality' of the economy as 
being only capitalist. 
The issue of subjection is an important point and it chimes with my own 
methodological experiences in Durban. In refusing to speak in the name of the 
'real' economy amongst officials, my research was not seen as important or 
offering a 'real' solution. Importantly, participants in my fieldwork site also 
assumed particular subjectivities in relation to what was understood to be the 
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economy. I will return to these issues in the next chapter and now focus on 
Gibson-Graham's spatial strategies. 
There is a well developed, if partial, geography consistently running through 
Gibson-Graham's development of the concept of diverse economies that, I argue, 
is both a strength and a weakness. The spatiality is perhaps clearest in questions 
of strategy and so I briefly present it as a strength of their analysis here. 
The spatiality of the concept of diverse economies appears, in the first instance, 
to be mapped onto/against a key disciplinary debate within geography. By this, I 
mean that the capitalism/noncapitalism pairing Gibson-Graham take issue with 
is aligned against a spatiality arising from the global/local distinction. This may 
not be surprising: the concept of globalisation and its effects are often presented 
as synonymous with capitalism. Globalisation is seen to be both driven by 
capitalism, and capitalism necessitates and requires globalisation. Hence, when 
Gibson-Graham address capitalism, an assumed global spatiality also comes into 
focus. By association, a focus on capitalism seems to necessitate a focus on 
globalisation.265 
The effect of aligning the capitalism/noncapitalism binary against the 
global/local pairing has two effects. The first effect is that the theoretical 
manoeuvres of deconstruction and decentring that are applied to the concept of 
capitalism and noncapitalism, and which seek to empty capitalism and 
noncapitalism of any intrinsic qualities, are applied to the concept of global and 
local. It is based on an assumption that our understanding of space, like our 
understanding of the economy, is the coming together of the discursive and 
265 There are parallels here with some of the dominant understandings of globalisation within 
sustainable livelihoods theory. Although in the case of sustainable livelihoods theory the focus is 
on globalisation rather than capitalism. Or rather, globalisation is a means to bring a critique of 
capitalism into view. This relates to the ubiquity of the view that capitalism and globalisation are 
very closely intertwined. As with sustainable livelihoods theory where the dominant 
understanding of globalisation obscures the agency of the local economy, I note a similar 
tendency here. But unlike sustainable liveli~<>?ds theory (where the local tends to be subsumed), 
Gibson-Graham seek to restore the effectlVlty of the local and not within the terms of the 
capitalist economy. 
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material. The second effect is that in countering the presumed dominance and 
authority of the capitalism/global alignment, Gibson-Graham seek to restore or 
(re)value the effectivity of the local. This strategy is consistent with their focus on 
the subjectivities that are generated and assumed in economies. As we shall see, 
the revaluing of the local takes shape in their use of the concept of the 
'community economy', a point that I return to in a discussion of the 'diverse 
economies framework' below. Of course, while this mapping of the economy 
against space is an important one, it is not the only one, as I hope to show. This 
mapping or understanding of space itself raises new questions about the 
spatiality of diverse economies and how relationships between different activities 
could be important for economic growth. To anticipate the analysis in the next 
chapter, the revaluing of the effectivity of the local provides an alternative to 
policy maker's binary assumptions about Durban's economy and the view that 
poor peripheral areas are simply 'dormitory' areas that do not contribute to the 
economic growth of the city. 
First, however, I wish to consider how the concept of diverse economies, its 
theoretical basis, and the strategies enacted come together in the establishment 
of a diverse economy framework. I turn to this now as it brings into focus why 
the notion of diverse economies is useful to my argument and how it might be 
developed further. 
6.1.3 Diverse economy framework 
The 'diverse economy framework' (as reproduced in Figure 13) develops from 
and succeeds the 'iceberg economy' representation described earlier. The second 
row of the figure represents the 'visible' capitalist economy (above the 
'waterline') and what, Gibson-Graham argue, is (mis)taken as the 'real economy'. 
Below the 'waterline' is the alternative and noncapitalist economies that are 
typically invisible. 
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The total diverse economy is made up of this 'visible' layer and the bulk of 
'invisible' economic activities. The main difference between the 'iceberg' 
representation and the framework I want to highlight is that the framework now 
incorporates the theoretical basis and strategies I have just outlined. 
Gibson-Graham advises that this representation of the 'diverse economy' is 
always provisional.266 As readers, we are encouraged to read Figure 13 down the 
columns rather than across the rows. This is to highlight the fact that an 
economic activity can be composed of a diverse range of elements rather than 
being confined to a single row. The example given by Gibson-Graham (2004, 411) 
is used here to illustrate this reading: 
" ... a non-capitalist enterprise, such as a worker-owned collective, is a communal form of 
business organisation that employs alternative paid (cooperative) labor and engages in 
production for a market." 
The shaded area of Figure 13 is used to denote "economic activities associated 
with the community economy in which the sociality of economic relations is fore 
grounded" (Gibson-Graham 2004, 411). As pointed out in the presentation of 
strategies earlier, Gibson-Graham identify the 'community economy' as an 
important terrain for change. The notion of the 'community economy' is 
important because it suggests that not all economic practices have been colonised 
by capitalism, some are a deviation from capitalism, whilst others are in the 
process of becoming capitalist. Such a view also begins to "highlight all those 
'silent' or 'invisible' sites and forms of labor whose effectivity in 'the economy' are 
usually ignored .. , [and foregrounds] ... the interdependence of 'capitalist' and 
diverse 'non-capitalist' economic practices" (Gibson-Graham 2002, 40). 
266 Indeed Gibson-Graham (n.d., 6) offer the framework as the basis for conversations that "might 
help specify other processes around which economic multiplicity is generated". 
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Figure 13. A diverse economy framework 
Transactions Labour Organisational form 
MARKET WAGE CAPITALIST 
ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE PAID ALTERNATIVE 
MARKET CAPITALIST 
Local trading systems Cooperative Environmental ethic 
Alternative currencies Self-employed Social ethic 
Underground market Indentured State enterprise 
Coop exchange In kind 
Barter 
NON-MARKET UNPAID NON-CAPITALIST 
Household flows Volunteer Communal 
Gifts Housework Independent 
Indigenous exchange Family care Feudal/Peasant 
Theft Slave 
Source: Cameron and Gzbson-Graham (2003, 152) 
The 'community economy' brings together earlier points that relate to Gibson-
Graham's expanded notion of class (de-coupled from necessarily deriving from 
forms of capitalist exploitation) and the deconstruction of the capitalism/ 
noncapitalism binary. Prior to the deconstruction of the capitalism/ 
noncapitalism binary and the expansion of the notion of class it would have been 
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possible to simply read off a binary logic of exploitation/care that respectively 
corresponded to the logic of capitalism/noncapitalism (white row/shaded rows) 
in the framework. With the deconstruction of the binary logic however, and an 
expanded notion of class, the analysis of exploitation and/or care can be found 
(potentially simultaneously) in any part of the framework. Faced with the 
dissipation of an easily identifiable source of (capitalist) exploitation, Gibson-
Graham turn to the exploitation inherent in their expanded notion of class to 
inform new ethical practices in a community economy (Gibson-Graham n.d.). 
Their notion of class therefore appears to establish a new binary register of 
exploitation/care in terms of which economic activities can be evaluated 
irrespective of where they may be located in the framework. These insights, in 
turn, raise new questions, to which I will return. For now, I continue the 
examination of the framework they offer. 
Figure 13 is structured in terms of three categories: <transactions', <labour', and 
<organisationalform'. Indeed, a diverse economy is summarised as a totality in 
which there is the coexistence of: 
• different kinds of transactions with their multiple calculations of 
commensurability; 
• different ways of performing and remunerating labour; 
• different modes of economic organisation or enterprise with their multiple 
ways of producing, appropriating and distributing surplus labour (Cameron 
and Gibson-Graham 2003, 153, my emphasis). 
What is less clear is how Gibson-Graham arrive at the three key categories 
italicised. To provide an answer, I trace my own route back to their (Marxian) 
description of capitalism to account for the origins of the categories and why they 
might be important to Gibson-Graham. It seems that they are somewhat 
reluctant to provide a definition of capitalism because they consider the debates 
surrounding Marxian definitions of capitalism to be a diversion from the central 
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aim of their project. Thus they proffer a relatively general description of 
capitalism as: 
" ... a system of generalised commodity production structured by (industrial) forces of 
production and exploitative production relations between capital and labor. Workers, 
bereft of means of production, sell their labor power for wages and participate in the 
labor process under capitalist control. Their surplus labor is appropriated by capitalists 
as surplus value. The capitalist mode of production is animated by the twin imperatives 
of enterprise competition and capital accumulation which together account for the 
dynamic tendencies of capitalism to expand and to undergo recurring episodes of crisis" 
(1996, 3, footnote 4). 
The term 'Transactions' captures the sense of exchange conveyed through the 
selling of labour power and commodities produced. The category 'Labour' is 
referenced to the forms of work and the conditions under which work is 
performed, rewarded and exploited, and 'Organisational form' can be traced back 
to the 'modes of production' stated in the description. It is in this sense that the 
categories forming the columns are derived from a Marxian understanding of 
capitalism. 
Gibson-Graham are more explicit about the categories forming the rows of 
Figure 13. The distinctions in the 'Organisational form' column are attributed 
directly to an inspiration from Marx's work where he distinguishes between 
capitalist and non-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation and distribution 
(Gibson-Graham 2002, 39). Thus, the categories that grid the figure seem 
thoroughly determined by a Marxian understanding of capitalism.267 Even if it is 
accepted that in their view, capitalism has been emptied of an inherent capacity 
to dominate our understanding of economies, this still seems somewhat 
267 This has two effects that are worth noting. Firstly, despite proliferating the range of activities 
we might consider as part of diverse economies, it is hard to see where 'consumption' -or for that 
matter, distribution-might fit into the representation of Figure 13. It is surprising that 
consumption does not feature more prominently given its significance in the types of economy 
that Gibson-Graham are committed to revaluing. Economies such as the 'care economy', 
'economies of generosity'; and in the context of this thesis, the importance of the consumptive 
economies of poor people. The second effect appears to elevate 'production'. This is also 
surprising when 'production' is considered by Gibson-Graham as generally (though not 
essentially) bound up with notions of masculinity (Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003, 150). In 
the future it would be interesting to think through how this representation of the diverse 
economy might adapt to accommodate different categorical axes, and/or an equal emphasis on 
consumption. 
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surprising given their intention to acknowledge diverse economies. Conceivably, 
we can ascribe Gibson-Graham's emphasis on capitalist descriptors of the 
economy and an emphasis on 'production' to their commitment to an 
engagement with the Marxian Left. This is a broader question, which I do not 
want to pursue here. What I think is important to address is how 'capitalism' 
continues to shape their understanding of diverse economies, despite aims to the 
contrary, and perhaps not in the way intended. I will return to this issue in 
section 6.2. 
Despite these caveats, Gibson-Graham's representation of a diverse economy 
does suggest that a diverse range of hitherto 'invisible' activities are interrelated 
with the 'real' economy. Gibson-Graham are effectively representing difference 
without dominance within a diverse economy through this particular framework. 
The representation of diverse economies shown in Figure 13 makes it clear that 
capitalist relations are only a small set of the overall activities within an 
economy. Or, to put it another way, the activities comprising the economy are 
more numerous. It also makes visible that there are many different ways of 
provisioning and that people engaged in economic activities can have many 
different identities, sometimes simultaneously (cf. Narotzky 2005). It follows 
that economies must overlap. This suggests that economic identities are no 
longer fixed and power is conceptually equalised between and across different 
economies, if temporarily. What does seem fixed, though, are the different 
segments that make up the 'diverse economies framework'. Gibson-Graham 
suggest that relations can be traced in any direction across the framework. What 
remains constant however, is the identities/qualities of each segment in the grid. 
At the very moment that the grid is established by delineating the segments, the 
relations between the segments are reified. Although we are encouraged by 
Gibson-Graham to see Figure 13 as always provisional, the effect of delineating a 
grid is to shift the representation of the economy from a binary pair to a series of 
segments. Rather than having two segments, there are now many. Below, I 
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present a summary of the Gibson-Graham's argument before considering some 
questions that the notion of diverse economies raises. 
Following Gibson-Graham, I have identified five key terms/processes that 
together provide a means of theorising diverse economies. In sum, they suggest 
that our understanding of the economy is constituted by representations and 
that our representations of the economy are specific and particular. They draw 
on the notion of performativity to think about how representations are 
(re)produced. And in particular, they focus on the performativity of binary 
representations of the economy. They point out that these binary representations 
have an important effect; namely that the capitalist economy is framed as having 
a singular identity and is stable. Closely related and intertwined with this binary 
representation and its effects is that the capitalist economy is essentialised as 
having unchanging qualities. 
The overall effect of this analysis is to suggest three insights about how we may 
understand contemporary economies. First, that the analysis sets out explicitly to 
disrupt the binaries that operate in our understanding of an economy (in 
general) and specifically, to equalise the power relations between the terms, if 
only temporarily and partially. Second, that the concept of diverse economies 
decentres the identity of the economy and its singularity in its capitalist form. 
Thirdly, it attempts to avoid essentialising the capitalist economy as inherently 
progressive, triumphant and propulsive. The result is that we have a theorisation 
of 'diverse economies' that enables us to think of the informal economy, the 
household economy, dependence of the natural resource base, and the formal 
economy of Durban as contributing to one economy without anyone element 
inherently dominant or seen as more significant. Since capitalism has no 
inherent mode, economic growth cannot be attributed solely or necessarily to the 
'real' (capitalist) economy. This theorisation provides the productive basis for a 
number of new questions. 
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6.2 New questions 
In thinking about the potential of the notion of 'diverse economies' I want to 
return to a distinction noted at the outset of this Chapter. I suggested that the 
potential to see poor people's economic activities as contributory to economic 
growth lay, first, in admitting difference in 'the economy' and then resisting the 
temptation to ascribe any inherent quality to a particular set of activities such as 
dominance to those activities identified as capitalist.268 Although these two 
moments are intricately related, I insist on the need to hold them apart, for 
reasons I will explain. 
I think that the way in which the notion of 'diverse economies' comes together in 
the 'diverse economy framework' tends to collapse these two moments of analysis 
into one. I pointed out earlier that the categorical grid of the 'diverse economies 
framework' (See Figure 13) appears derived from a Marxian analysis of 
capitalism. But, at the same time as capitalism is omni-present in the categorical 
grid, its dominance which stems from binary understandings of the economy 
must be denied to allow different economic activities to become 'visible' and 
'sayable'. This effect is reinforced because, through the grid of the 'diverse 
economies framework', the different identities of parts of diverse economies are 
bounded, and hence frozen in relation to each other. There is the possibility of 
seeing a multiplicity of relations between the different parts of diverse 
economies, but the identity of each part remains fixed and unchanged by the 
interrelationships. Thus when these unchanging identities of different elements 
in diverse economies are situated within an overall categorical grid of capitalism, 
the result is a tendency to conflate the two analytical moments and only see 
'difference' without 'dominance'. 
268 It is important to resist ascribing any inherent, unchanging qualities to any part of diverse 
economies. For example, it is important to avoid mythologizing any qualities of an informal 
economy (Samers 2005). Nonetheless, for the purposes of illuminating the argument I will 
continue to focus on the example developed most fully by Gibson-Graham. 
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There are three issues raised by this analytical conflation that work towards 
exploiting the potential of the theoretical basis of diverse economies. These three 
issues suggest new questions that retain the potentialities raised by the 
theoretical basis of diverse economies.26g The first issue is that it becomes 
difficult to see dynamics between the differences brought into view by diverse 
economies. The second issue concerns the possibilities of ope rationalising the 
notion of diverse economies - particularly in relation to delineating different 
economies and hence, their interrelated dynamics. The last issue is related and 
focuses on how the dynamics themselves might shape and constitute the identity 
of differences within and between diverse economies. I will consider each in turn. 
The first issue arises because through the 'diverse economies framework' there is 
a tendency to default to a view that we can only see difference in diverse 
economies if we do not see dominance. This makes it very difficult to account for 
those moments when dominance within or between elements of diverse 
economies may indeed be important. It also leads on to a broader point that the 
differences between all elements are apt to be flattened (cf. Samers 2005)· 
Inevitably, once the differences in dynamics have been flattened, a new register 
of difference is needed to be able to differentiate activities within and across 
diverse economies. Thus a new singular (binary) register of exploitation/care is 
introduced through Gibson-Graham's expanded notion of class to differentiate 
economic activities. The register of exploitation/care is used by Gibson-Graham 
to foreground those economic activities that strengthen "the viability of non-
capitalist activities in which social surplus is communally produced and 
distributed on the basis of ethical principles to collectively decided-upon ends" 
(Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003, 153). While I am fully in support of these 
ethical views, the point I want to make is that this is not the only register of 
difference that exists and should be seen as the beginning of the analysis rather 
than the end. 
269 Indeed, Gibson-Graham (n.d., 7, emphasis original) invite analysis that seeks to "move beyond 
the issue of representing economic identity to that of representing economic dynamics". 
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In sum, Gibson-Graham focus on how representations of capitalism tend to erase 
all other economic registers except its own. Through the notion of 'diverse 
economies' we have the ability to resist this process of erasure and make different 
economies 'visible' and 'sayable' and, in so doing, see these diverse economies as 
interdependent in different ways. However, the representation of diverse 
economies in the 'framework' ultimately results in all the diverse economies 
being brought back into a single (binary) register of exploitation/care and 
flattening the differences between the relationships of the different elements. The 
second issue relates to difficulties in operationalising the notion of diverse 
economies and follows on from this. 
Gibson-Graham succeed in pluralising the universe of economic activities. 
However, they simultaneously multiply the number of economies that are visible. 
Multiplying the number of economies raises a number of operational difficulties. 
For example, how is possible to identify the boundaries of an economy? How is it 
possible to distinguish one economy from another? Inevitably it seems the 
answers to these questions lead back to an essentialised view of each economy 
having a 'core' set of characteristics. Given that the term 'economy' is still 
needed, I propose the notion of a differentiated economy that retains the 
diversity of activities but brings a bounded and singular economy into view. This 
proposal raises fresh problems since it suggests a singular and bounded economy 
- two of the features of economic understanding Gibson-Graham's notion of 
diverse economies has been at pains to disrupt. In order to retain the potential of 
Gibson-Graham's notion of diverse economies I propose to spatialise the notion 
of a differentiated economy which might not entail a single boundary for all 
economic activities in a place. In sum, I retain the term 'economy' for what might 
be considered the 'whole' and use the terms aspects, registers, and activities to 
highlight diversity. I return to this issue in moving beyond diverse economies 
below. 
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The third issue requires a return to the theoretical basis of diverse economies: 
specifically to the insights that emerge from the deconstruction of dominant 
binary logics. Through the de construction it becomes possible to think of the 
identity of different terms as less bounded and less pure and more open to being 
constituted by multiple identities. These possibilities, in turn, suggest that the 
relationships and dynamics between terms could be important in themselves, 
contributing to the identity of activities. However, in the 'framework' the 
identities of different elements of diverse economies are bounded and it becomes 
difficult to see how the relationships or dynamics between different elements 
might themselves have a level of agency in constituting diverse economies. A 
consideration of the agency of the relationships between elements is important 
here because it offers a way of holding the 'framework' open to difference. As a 
consequence of these two issues, it is important to find ways of separating the 
two analytical moments. I argue that one way of doing this is to elaborate the 
spatiality of diverse economies, since the spatiality of activities animates and 
embodies different relationships amongst elements. 
To suggest the need to explore the spatiality of diverse economies may seem odd. 
After all, as I suggested above, Gibson-Graham consistently attend to the 
geography of diverse economies. They are acutely aware that space 'matters' 
(Gibson-Graham 1996) and the concept of diverse economies offers the potential 
to "reread the economy to open up the entire economic space to resignification ... 
[rather than] simply investigating the interstices and bringing minority practices 
to light" (The Community Economies Collective 2001,4). Put in these terms, 
spatiality is highlighted and appears integral to any analysis of diverse 
economies. I have two concerns, however, that suggest that the current 
representations of spatiality may not be able to deliver on the potential analysis 
of diverse economies. 
My first concern is that Gibson-Graham's spatiality of diverse economies remains 
too abstract. Gibson-Graham (1996, 5) have, I believe, shown how capitalism is 
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represented as heroic, triumphant, unitary and phallic, structuring "social space 
and conferring meaning upon social practices and positions", and that this is part 
of the binary relationship to non-capitalism. They suggest ways to escape these 
binary relationships, if only partially and temporarily. However, what seems to 
have remained beyond the purview of their analysis is that by engaging with 
capitalism as a spatially abstract, universalising concept, they have remained at 
this level too. Consequently, the concept of the diverse economy appears spatially 
abstract and universal too. The result is that there is little sense of the spatiality 
of the diverse economy or how space could make a difference to the constitution 
of diverse economies and we lose the ability to attend to the relationships or 
dynamics that both constitute and work across/between aspects of diverse 
economies. 
My second concern is that where the spatialities of diverse economies are 
specified, they tend to be developed only in one (albeit important) dimension: 
the contrast between the global and the local. As I suggested in the section on 
strategies above, Gibson-Graham's spatial strategic response is to revalue the 
effectivity of the local. In so doing, they are sensitive to theoretical developments 
that point to the ways in which spaces are relational, in the sense of being co-
constitutive of each other (for example, Gibson 2001; Gibson-Graham 2002). 
Thus it is not that Gibson-Graham deny the possibility of a relational sense of 
space (that might demonstrate some of the effects of the relationships), but that 
the spatiality of diverse economies appears only relational in one dimension: the 
global/local. It is almost as if the development of their understanding of the 
spatialities of diverse economies has become snagged up in the deconstruction of 
the capitalism/noncapitalism binary and now lags behind the main thrust of the 
analysis. 
These concerns around the spatiality of diverse economies raise the following 
questions: once we consider the spatialities of diverse economies, how does space 
alter our appreciation of the effects of the relationships between different 
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elements? And, how can we see difference within diverse economies without 
flattening all relationships into a single register of calculation? 
6.3 Moving beyond 'diverse economies' 
In the previous section I suggested that the notion of 'diverse economies' as it 
currently stands opens the possibility of seeing difference within the economy by 
deconstructing representations of capitalism and the economy as co-extensive. 
For Gibson-Graham, difference in the economy cannot emerge because it is 
entrapped in the hierarchical relationship of capitalism to noncapitalism. The 
condition under which difference can emerge is without dominance. The result is 
that we have the possibility of seeing difference only when the dominance of 
capitalism is refused. However, this 'diverse economies framework' appears to 
cramp the potential of the concept of diverse economies. This is because the 
'framework' tends to fix the identities of the different elements, only allows 
difference to emerge when not seeing the dominance of capitalism, and hence, 
tends to reduce the calculation of difference to a single register of 
exploitation/care. In this section, I suggest some ways in which attention to the 
spatiality of diverse economies might hold these two analytical moments 
(analysing diversity and dominance) of the concept of diverse economies apart. 
I suggest that drawing on a relational understanding of space requires attending 
to how economic activities relate to each other. In a relational understanding of 
activities, it is not the physicality of space that is privileged - distances, areas and 
nodal points - but how different activities co-constitute each other across space 
even if the physical distance between the activities is very large.27o 
Attention to the relational spatiality of activities offers a means of seeing a 
differentiated spatial economy as unbounded and porous - open and continually 
270 We should bear in mind AbdouMaliq Simone's (2005a) counsel that not all relations are 
potentially stretchable and that the activities that make local survival possible can be difficult to 
mobilise on a larger stage. 
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being remade and (re)presented. This makes it possible to think of economic 
spaces as being discontinuous and internally variable (AlIen et al. 1998). 
Differences within an economy emerge through the relationships that exist 
between different activities and economic registers, rather than because of any 
formal boundary plotted on a juridical map. Thus we could admit any number of 
relationships that could differentiate the spaces of an economy. We can think 
how the effects and understandings of activities that make up a differentiated 
spatialised economy might, for example, displace, separate, permeate, isolate, 
and overlap with other activities. Or, we could consider how the relations are 
transitory, ephemeral or sometimes invisible (Simone 2004). 'Assemblages' of 
activities may come into view as moments in a relational structure of meaning 
(Amin and Thrift 2002). Or, how 'trans-Iocal' relations might shape the nature of 
economic activities that make up a differentiated spatial economy (Smith 2004). 
Additionally, we can think how the spatiality of the relationships themselves 
might co-constitute different activities in a differentiated spatialised economy. As 
Massey (2004, 5) points out, this includes relations which are non-relations, 
hiatuses and absences. 
Attention to the enactment and embodiment of economic activities across 
different economic spaces requires attending to how activities are understood in 
terms of their relationships with other activities. It becomes possible to see 
dominance or separation or the interdependence between activities, not because 
of any inherent quality attached to a particular aspect of an economy, but 
because of the effect of the relationships themselves. These effects are likely to 
have different geographies, temporalities and will affect different people in 
different ways (AlIen et al. 1998). I am far from claiming that capitalism is never 
or even rarely dominant in a diverse economy. It is also not my intention to 
suggest that other economic activities can also be dominant. It is important to 
note though, that capitalism exists in different relations to other aspects of 
economies and that these relations are themselves important to understand the 
many activities that make up different economies. This directs attention to two 
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areas of inquiry. It requires attention to the way in which economic agents 
differentiate economic activities because this points to which activities are being 
made 'visible' and 'sayable' in different contexts. It also requires that the way in 
which activities are measured and calculated need to be flexible enough to work 
across different aspects of the economy rather than flatten the calculation of 
activities and their effects into a single register and thus make only a limited 
range of activities 'visible' and 'sayable' (Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003; 
Wood 2003). In sum, a differentiated, spatialised economy emerges from a focus 
on a diversity of economic activities in different economic registers, the changing 
nature of the relationships between activities, and a decentring of the dominance 
of capitalist activities as the only locus of economic growth. 
6.4 Conclusion 
It is worth recalling that in this Chapter the balance of my analysis tipped to 
consider a broader view of the economy, as opposed to the narrow view of the 
economy invested in by theories of poverty. I have suggested what an alternative 
understanding of 'the economy' might look like; indeed, one that could be 
promoted in the interests of those considered poor. To address this task, I 
focused on one approach - that of 'diverse economies' - which has sought to 
admit difference in the economy and so widen the possibilities of poor people's 
economic activities being seen as contributory to economic growth. In this 
chapter, I presented Gibson-Graham's theoretical position of diverse economies. 
I did this by considering diverse economies as a concept and how the theoretical 
basis, strategies and diverse economies framework all work to underpin this 
concept. 
Threaded throughout this Chapter have been the themes of 'difference' and 
'dominance'. I noted how Gibson-Graham's strategies offered the possibility of 
opening our representations of the economy to difference and how assumptions 
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about the dominance of capitalism could be held at bay in analyses of the 
economy. However, it also seems as if the representation of a diverse economy in 
the 'diverse economy framework' works against the theoretical position Gibson-
Graham adopt. The 'diverse economy framework' appears to pose two problems. 
Firstly, the segmented (but diverse) economy tends to reify the different parts of 
the economy by bounding them and flattening the differences, thereby reducing 
them all to a new common (binary) register of exploitation/care. The second 
problem is that it tends to restrict a relational understanding of economic 
activities from emerging within economies. I proposed that as long as we hold 
'difference' and 'dominance' apart in analytical terms, we have a powerful and 
workable concept to move forward with. I suggested that spatialising the notion 
of diverse economies in terms of a relational sense of space could generate a 
notion of a differentiated spatialised economy, thus keeping these analytical 
moments apart. In the following chapter, I propose to utilise this notion of a 
differentiated spatialised economy to make poor people's economic activities 
'visible' and 'sayable' as contributing to economic growth in Durban. 
228 
seven 
Writing poor people's economic 
activities into a story of economic 
growth 
The aim of this chapter is to shift the dominant view of Durban's economy 
presented in Chapter Five by demonstrating how poor peoples' economic 
activities contribute to economic growth. In the previous chapter, I suggested 
that this involved 'seeing' and making 'sayable' a wider range of activities as 
economic, related, interdependent and overlapping in different ways. In Chapter 
Four, I introduced the research field site of C-Extension. There I drew upon the 
community history to illustrate how urban Apartheid contributed to poverty. 
Now I return to C-Extension to show how poor people's economic activities are a 
constitutive part of Durban's economy and of processes of economic growth. I 
suggest a number of ways in which poor people understand their economic 
activities in relation to other activities and actors and how this points to the 
overlapping of activities, sharing of infrastructures, and multiple forms of 
interconnectedness. 
In the previous chapter, I drew attention to Gibson-Graham's three 'strategies' 
that inform the notion of a differentiated spatial economy. To recap: these 
include generating new economic subjectivities, deconstructing (dominant) 
representations of the economy, and attending to the (extended) spatiality of 
economic activities. The organisation of this chapter in three parts broadly 
follows Gibson-Graham's three strategies. 
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For example in the first part, the issue of stimulating new economic subjectivities 
strongly informs the methodological considerations in locating the field site, 
research participants, and their activities within existing discourses. In the 
second part, I attend to the deconstruction of dominant representations of the 
economy. I show how the research participant's understandings of their activities 
disrupt the singular meanings of economic activities that lend themselves to 
binary representations of the economy. I approach the issue in four different 
ways, demonstrating different aspects of the interdependencies, entanglements, 
and interconnections that constitute Durban's economy. I then step back from 
the immediacy of C-Extension to pursue slightly broader claims that seek to 
avoid essentialising the capitalist economy as the centre of growth by dislodging 
and decentring activities assumed to be associated with economic growth. In the 
third part, I draw together the claims I am making under a broad sense of the 
spatiality of economic activities that emerges. I propose to use Gibson-Graham's 
strategies to critique the dominance of the existing poverty reduction strategies 
of 'absorption', 'connection', and 'inclusion'. 
Suggesting that poor peoples' economic activities contribute to economic growth 
is not the same as arguing that poor people are not in need of assistance. Nor 
does it suggest that benefits and services are distributed equally in Durban as the 
vast disparities in living standards (Nicholson 2000) and inequality (Casale and 
Thurlow 1999) show. Noting the ways in which poor people's economic activities 
are inside a story of economic growth is not the same as seeing them as equal or 
secure (Adato, Lund, and Mhlongo 2004). However, I aim to show that it is 
possible to bring a different view of the economy into view, to enable poor 
people's economic activities to be considered to contribute to the economic 
growth of the city in order to stimulate different policy thinking about how to 
address poverty. In terms reminiscent of the Monitor Group's analysis of 
Durban's formal economy, AbdouMaliq Simone writes that the aim is to consider 
how poor people's economic activities, "themselves might act as a platform for 
the creation of a very different kind of sustainable urban configuration" (200sa, 
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4, my emphasis). This will lead onto the final Chapter - the Conclusion - where I 
will outline some of the implications for theories of poverty and suggest ways in 
which this approach to the economy might begin to inform another view of 
economic growth for theories of poverty to draw upon. 
7.1 Generating economic subjectivities 
Gibson-Graham (2004, 417) note that performances of diverse economies 
"entails not only new understandings but new ways of talking, of being in the 
world, and thus new subjects, co-created along with a different 'objectivity'." One 
approach to this issue is to displace dominant discourses by talking about other 
ways of being in order to yield new possibilities of subjectivity and action 
(Gibson-Graham 2004, 407). Here I pay particular attention to the sUbjectivities 
of the research participants in the field site while briefly touching on issues 
relevant to municipal officials and policy-makers. In the Conclusion to the thesis, 
I return to consider the issue of municipal officials' and policy-makers' 
subjectivities more thoroughly. 
In this context the issue of an 'authentic poor voice' that was first encountered in 
Chapter Two is important. To some extent, the notion of an 'authentic poor voice' 
underpinned all of the five studies discussed in Chapter Two. However, it was 
particularly apparent in the three studies that sought to define and analyse the 
experiences of being poor - the Carnegie Inquiry, SA-PPA and Poverty Hearings. 
In Chapter Two I suggested that the appeal to an 'authentic poor voice' is 
ultimately a political manoeuvre since it rests on the (false) assumption that poor 
people somehow exist beyond discourses of poverty. Meinhof and Richardson 
(1994, 14) observe: 
" ... poverty is not now, nor has it ever been, just a matter of material existence for poor 
people. It is, too, a symbolic state, a state that must be appropriately embodied in its 
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representatives. The bodies and accoutrements of the poor must bear direct, 'true' 
witness to their poverty - just as much on the streets as on television or in the press". 
I propose that we could equally add, 'research' to this list of 'streets', 'television', 
and the 'press'. In this view then, it was not surprising that on my initial entry to 
the field site, and with a small group of people, the framing of my research as 
focusing on 'the economy' generated very specific subjectivities amongst both 
researcher and researched. These subjectivities were enacted through behaviours 
and responses in which all economic activities apart from full-time, permanent 
employment in the formal economy were erased. Since a fair proportion of 
people in the field site were not in full-time, permanent employment, economic 
activities in general tended to disappear from view! Fortunately, I was able to 
adjust the way in which the research was framed before it was introduced to the 
wider community and the research participants in particular. 
Gibson-Graham (2002) point out that performances of diverse economies 
require new subjectivities on the part of both the researched and researcher. As 
was acknowledged in reflecting on the motivation for the Carnegie Inquiry, 
engaging poor participants in the field requires a delicate balance. Timothy 
Mitchell (1998, 83) notes this is because poor people are "themselves caught up 
in these forms of representation - though only at the margins". The way that I 
maintained the balance was by seeking to continue to locate the research 
participants in broader discourses of urban poverty, but simultaneously, 
displacing the dominant discourse by invoking a discourse of 'valuing what 
people do'. To achieve this the methodology used a mix of data generation 
techniques. 
7. J. J Identifying and situating the research participants 
To locate the research participants within existing urban poverty discourses -
spatially and in terms of poverty - involved specific choices in selecting a field 
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site and a socio-demographic survey. In this section, I first explain the reasons 
for choosing C-Extension as a research area and identifying the research 
participants. I then proceed to briefly outline how the data was generated. 
Greater details of the methodology are included in the Methodological Appendix 
(Appendix 1). 
The methodological issues that frame the generation of the research data are 
crucial to the argument I am elaborating. Within the existing frameworks and 
systems of meaning, I deliberately set out to engage people in a place considered 
least likely to contribute to economic growth in Durban. The rationale was that if 
it can be shown that those considered least likely to contribute to economic 
growth (within existing discourses) are inside the story of economic growth, then 
other income poor and spatially marginalised people are also likely to contribute 
to economic growth as well. 
C-Extension was chosen for a mix of practical, academic, and strategic reasons. 
Practically, the area was stable and safe to work in, and offered ease of access. 
Academically, I wanted to minimise the chance of the argument I am proposing 
being dismissed because of 'location effects', and/or because the participants in 
the research were not considered to be amongst 'the poorest'. The urban poverty 
discourse that was presented in Chapter Four sets out very specific and certain 
understandings of the form of South Africa's post-Apartheid cities and the 
dynamics of poverty within them (cf. Todes 2000). In terms of 'location', it is 
already accepted in South Africa that poor people try to move closer to places of 
(formal) work and informal trading opportunities to improve their income 
(Rogerson 1996; Bouillon 2002a). The result is an acceptance of a general rule 
that the closer poor people are to the centre of the city (and economic 
opportunities), the more likely they are to contribute to the formal economy and 
the less likely they are to be poor. Thus, results that suggested that poor people in 
inner-city locations are contributing to economic growth would tend to confirm 
the general rule but critics could argue that this still left poorer people in more 
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peripheral locations outside of the economy. It is worth recalling from the 
description of C-Extension in Chapter Four, that the reasons noted for why 
formal economies have not developed in township areas are suggested to be 
because of low thresholds, which in turn, are consequent upon a spatially 
dispersed population and low incomes. Perceptions of crime and violence are 
also considered to deter economic investment. Economic activities that do arise 
in township areas generally face, poor infrastructure, a lack of support services 
and the problem of low thresholds (Harrison, Todes, and Watson 1997, 44). I 
therefore selected a peripheral area to the north of the city (2skm from the centre 
of the city) to minimise the possibility of this criticism. In 'income poverty' terms, 
the Black townships to the north of the city are generally estimated to be poorer 
than those to the south of the city (Casale and Thurlow 1999). As a result, the 
general milieu of the northern townships is likely to be the poorest (INK URP 
2004)· 
In Chapter Two, the figure of the 'poorest of the poor' emerged as a Black, rural, 
woman through the Carnegie Inquiry. Over the years the view has been refined 
and in terms of the 'poorest of the poor' discourse, the probability of being 
(income) poor is increased if the person is Black, a woman, unemployed or 
earning a low wage, having a low level of education, and living in an area 
peripheral to the city centre and formal economy (Bhorat, Poswell, and Naidoo 
2004; Budlender 1999; Casale and Thurlow 1999). These probabilities framed 
the process of selecting a research area and research participants. Accordingly, 
within C-Extension, a random, stratified sampling system was used to identify 
research participants in households most likely to be the (income) poorest (see 
Appendix 1). 
The final factor was strategic in that C-Extension is located within an eThekwini 
Municipality Area Based Management Pilot project and Presidential Lead Project 
area. A key concern of this project is to explore the possibilities for the economic 
regeneration of peripheral townships around Durban. This offers the potential 
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for the results generated in this research to feed into ongoing developmental 
initiatives. 271 
The practical and strategic reasons for choosing C-Extension as a field research 
site were made explicit to the research participants in the course of the research. 
However, the suggestion that C-Extension might be typical of one ofthe (income) 
poorest areas in the city was deliberately not made explicit when engaging the 
participants in the research because the research was seeking to displace the 
subjectivities that dominant discourses of poverty could potentially trigger. 
To identify the research participants in terms of conventional classifications of 
poverty a sodo-demographic survey component was extracted directly from the 
format of Statistics South Mrica's (2003b) Labour Force Survey questionnaire. 
The purpose was to generate data on economic activities in the same format as 
national surveys and as a result to make it possible to locate the participants in 
this research within dominant discourses. I describe the results in the section 
below. 
7.l.2 Existing representations of C-Extens/on and the 
research participants 
The houses that make up C-Extension are built into a steep hillside between a 
major arterial road and a river (see Figure 14). The steep slopes (characteristic of 
a large proportion of Durban's topography) make access to many houses 
extremely difficult and infrastructural servicing more expensive. They also result 
in very little useable space on each site. The chances of increasing the size of 
271 The concept of Area Based Management as a form of decentralised, better co-ordinated local 
government service delivery is currently being piloted in Durban with support from international 
donors - particularly the European Union. The Inanda-Ntuzuma-KwaMashu area which contains 
about 500,000 people (20 per cent of Durban's population) has been allocated additional funds 
after President Mbeki singled it out as a Presidential Project in his annual speech to Parliament in 
2000. 
useable space for each household is unlikely since retaining walls would have to 
be well constructed and hence, expensive. Most households live in dwellings 
constructed from concrete blocks. Some continue to live in dwellings made from 
corrugated iron or wattle and daub. 
The community benefits from a secondary school and a church within its 
immediate vicinity and has easy access to bus and mini-bus taxi routes. The area 
is located about 25 kilometres north of the central city in Municipal Ward 42. 
The closest clinic and post-office is about thirty minutes walk away. One 'formal' 
shop stocks very basic groceries. The area has recently benefited from additional 
National Housing Subsidy funding to provide waterborne sewerage to each site 
and 'consolidate' each dwelling. The peaceful air belies the violent history 
described in Chapter Four, the physical remnants of which are the burnt houses 
and sites that remain unoccupied. 
Figure 14. Photograph of Inanda Newtown Section C-Extension 
(2004) 
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Socio-demographic profile of participants 
The purpose of this section is to locate the participants in the research within the 
key features of the dominant discourses of urban poverty. The participants in the 
survey all declared a monthly household income below Rl,800. The median 
monthly household income in the surveyed households is between R800 and 
Rl,200. In Durban, the eThekwini Municipality calculates that in 2003 
households that earned less than Rl,741 per month were 'ultra-poor' and 
households that earned less than R2,762 per month were 'poor'.272 In income 
terms, the households that participated in the research can therefore be 
categorised as 'ultra-poor'.273 All of the participants in the research were Black 
and identified C-Extension as their place of residence. Certainly since the 
Camegie Inquiry, gender has been an important component of representations of 
poverty. In this research, 60 per cent of the participants are women. The 
participants declared the average number of years of schooling of the household 
head as 6 years, which means that these people have not attended high school. 
The implication is that their opportunities for competing in the formal labour 
market are extremely limited (Casale 2002). 
In sum, the demographic profile of the participants and their households are 
located firmly in the grid of probabilities that increase the chances of being 
considered among the poorest. The participants live in a peripheral location, they 
are mostly women, not in full-time and permanent employment, the household 
heads have low education levels, have low household incomes and in terms of 
South Mrica's racial categories, are Black. If the demographic profile suggests 
that in terms of dominant accounts of poverty, these people are unlikely to be 
272 Brian O'Leary, Interview 29/03/04. 
273 For indicative purposes only the per capita income of the households was in the range of a 
little over US$l and US$2 per day. This figure is indicative because the (notoriously unreliable) 
income data collected is based on an income range, and the calculation is based on an assumption 
of adult equivalent expenditure ratios and average figure for the US dollar/South African Rand 
exchange rate in 2004. 
able to contribute to economic growth, then the time-use methodology that 
displaced these discourses and subjectivities by 'valuing what people do' suggests 
something quite different. 
7.1.3 Displacing dominant economic subjectlvlties 
Perceiving poverty as a multi-dimensional discursive and material condition 
means that the subjectivities of poverty can be triggered in many ways. 
Consequently, to minimise the unseen ways in which the materiality and 
symbolism of poverty might influence participant's responses the research was 
never framed in terms of 'poverty'. Care was also taken to minimise the use of the 
term 'the economy' which also triggers sUbjectivities of poverty. What counts as 
'the economy', what is an 'economic activity' and how this is expressed is part of 
much bigger discourses about 'unemployment', 'poverty' and 'development'. As 
Friedland and Robertson (1990a, 27) observe people's ideas, preferences and 
understandings "are formed not simply in response to the opportunities that are 
available, but through the discourse through which people understand what 
choices are available, what is legitimate or socially appropriate to want, and 
according to the particular metric in which its costs and benefits are to be 
evaluated". As such, 'the economy' and what counts as an economic activity is 
intricately imbued with all manner of values, behaviours and attitudes (cf. Kaneff 
2002; Humphrey and Mandel 2002). To minimise the ways in which this could 
influence participant responses, the research was framed in terms of 'valuing 
what people do'. 
A time-use survey was used to record what activities participants' engaged in 
over the previous 24 hours.274 Participants then identified their most important 
274 The utilisation of time-use survey methodologies is officially accepted in South Africa (see for 
example, StatsSA (2001)) and widely drawn upon in gender studies for its value in bringing 
unpaid work into view (see Methodological Appendix for more details). 
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activity during recorded period and were then asked a tailored set of in-depth 
questions based on, but not limited to, a prepared list. The process was generally 
conducted in isiZulu and the responses translated into English. 275 The result was 
a confidential dataset comprising detailed information on 20 households and 30 
participants. By valuing what the participants did a range of economic activities 
were made 'visible' and 'sayable'. In the next section, I describe these activities as 
a basis for the analysis to follow. 
Examoles of diverse economic activities 
There are many examples of economic activity that occur in C-Extension. These 
include, the consumption of household goods, the movement, circulation and 
remittance of goods, people, vehicles and money, exchange of commodities and 
labour, participation in the formal labour market; small scale agricultural 
production, the production of building materials and clothing, the provision of 
credit; recycling and repair of items to extend their productive life; and 
engagement in the government's Extended Public Works Programme. That poor 
people engage in such activities is consistent with the view of poor people's 
economic activities as economic and part of the broader economy as established 
through sustainable livelihoods theory (see also EDD 2000). 
There are also many examples of activities that are the source of debate amongst 
economists as to whether they are economic, productive or relate to profitability, 
for instance (Wood 1997; Massey 1996). These include household reproduction 
and caring, securing of pension income, the exchange of gifts, associational 
activity, investments in children's education and cooperative activity. To my 
mind, all of the activities listed here are 'productive' (cf. Barker and Kuiper 2003; 
Ferber and Nelson 2003; Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004). However, for the 
purposes of the argument being made here, it is not necessary to include these 
275 The time-use survey was complemented by the generation of a 'community time-line' 
conducted with elder members of the community and members of the local development 
committee. The purposes of the community time-line were to contextualise and inform the 
responses of the participants within the individual households. 
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more debatable economic activities. Here I focus on activities that it is agreed fall 
squarely within the 'production boundary' of the economy as defined by the 
System of National Accounts (Jhabvala, Sudarshan, and Unni 2003; Wood 1997) 
To provide a greater appreciation of this myriad of activities I have selected five 
activities from the overall research sample. They relate to exchange/selling, 
production, consumption, service provision, and investment. Most of these 
activities are a composite set of activities and could be drawn on to demonstrate 
different aspects but for each I highlight one aspect. As the chapter proceeds I 
will draw on other examples from the participants in this research and other 
research in Durban that supports my analysis. 
The example of exchange/selling that I elaborate is that of Ms J who identified 
her most important activity as selling iziqeda276 to children "from the house and 
on Sundays ... [I] ... stand by the road and sell to people who come from church. 
Sometimes if there is a soccer match I sell on the playgrounds".271 Ms J has been 
doing this for a few years and contributes income to a household of seven. She 
started after realising she "cannot rely on [her] brothers and sisters to provide 
[her] with even basic stuff like milk, bread, etc." Ms J also produces the iziqeda 
that she sells from her house. The flavoured powder is purchased from formal 
shops or outlets. After boiling five litres of water on a gas cooker in her spartan 
one room house, Ms J lets it cool before adding the powder and decanting the 
mixture into small plastic packets. The individual packets are sealed and placed 
in a freezer and after one hour are ready for sale. Sales of iziqeda are seasonal 
and well suited to Durban's hot summer climate. Her sales of iziqeda are 
supplemented by selling industrially produced small snacks. In winter, when Ms 
J "cannot sell iziqeda, only sweets and chips keep going".278 Sales of all items 
276 lziqeda is the isiZulu word for 'ice-lollies' in small, clear plastic bags (isiqeda, singular). 
277 Three of the participants in the research sold iziqeda in C-Extension although the other two 
did not list this as their most important activity. 
278 This is a common economic activity amongst small township based traders (cf. Cross et al. 
2001). 
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decrease in the holiday period "because parents don't give children pocket 
" money. 
There are two participants who are engaged in the production of items of 
clothing in C-Extension. The example set out here relates to Ms D who looks to 
"magazines and the exhibition centre ... [to produce] ... traditional and casual 
wear". On the day she participated in the research, she had walked for 30 
minutes to make use of a cheaper phone system. She was having problems 
securing payment from a customer for an "evening dress ... [for a] ... nurses' 
graduation party". She owns a domestic sewing machine on which she builds up 
stock during the month and in a good month, she will make a turnover of 
approximately R2,000. She purchases her supplies of material in town at formal 
shops along with many other informal clothing producers (cf. Motala 2000). At 
month-end she travels to a small rural town, to the north of Durban, to sell her 
stock since this town "attracts customers" and she does not have to rent space in 
this market. However, there she faces fierce competition and admits that "prices 
are lower at Mandeni, to fit the other hawkers". Her participation in the research 
evoked palpable distress about her circumstances as she worried that "the 
situation is getting worse" and feared that "maybe my designs are not good 
enough". 
The example of investment that 1 cite is equally an example of productive 
activity, but here 1 draw attention to the investment necessary to engage in the 
production. The example relates to Mr B who manufactures concrete lintels that 
are placed above windows and doors in the process of constructing buildings. 
Faced with unemployment and with experience working in a block yard, Mr B 
decided to walk through a formal industrial area looking for inspiration and 
opportunities. "I walked to Briardene ... 1 saw the mould and realised that was 
the thing 1 needed to do", Mr B recalled. The moulds for casting the lintels are 
made with fibreglass. It took some persistence, but Mr B finally located a formal 
manufacturer of the lintel moulds. Believing in his ability to produce lintels (with 
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only general experience) Mr B "chose four moulds and paid Rl,800". He also 
invested in a space near to his home to produce the lintels, the first delivery of 
cement, steel and stones, and paid R25 for the first delivery from a nearby outlet. 
He states that he now has "five to six customers a month". 
Mr V is engaged in providing a catering service in C-Extension and the adjacent 
areas. Seemingly, with very little of his own equipment and infrastructure Mr V 
was able to cater for "300 people at a funeral" the week before participating in 
the research. For each catering event, Mr V draws on a diverse network to fulfil 
the needs of the event. The catering service is run through an overlapping 
network of friends and teammates in a local football club that provides a flexible 
and immediate supply oflabour. Mr V advertises through word-of-mouth and by 
making notes on cardboard and pinning the "advert on electricity poles" and 
"uses his aunt's phone because he does not have one". He "borrows [his] 
mother's equipment ... [or] ... sometimes lends from a friend who has catering 
equipment like gas stoves, knives and forks, serviettes, etc." 
The example of consumption is that of Ms T who identified her most important 
activity as cooking for the household. Ms T lives in a household of five where the 
sole source of income is a State Old Age monthly grant. She remarks that she 
purchases the cooking ingredients of "curry powder, spices and rice ... [and] ... 
potatoes, onions, tomatoes, oiL." at a nearby formal wholesaler "because it's 
cheaper". However, buying in bulk requires that Ms T "pay for another seat to 
put my goods" in the mini-bus taxi on her way home. Taking note of a radio 
advertisement she goes slightly further afield to purchase the paraffin she uses 
for fuel. Despite the house being connected to the electricity reticulation system, 
Ms T prefers paraffin to electricity and supplements the household energy needs 
with gathered wood if paraffin is unaffordable (cf. Jones, Aitken, and Luckin 
1996; Mehlwana 1997). The difference in price between local outlets and formal 
outlets is appreciable although it takes more time to obtain the paraffin in this 
way. She states that paraffin in Phoenix "costs about R3 per litre and in nearby 
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stores, one litre is Rs". She purchases "20 litres every two weeks and brings along 
her own container". Ms T cooks once per day and notes she "normally cooks at 
lunchtime to eat at supper time". She cooks in the daylight so saving money on 
lighting and in two big pots because she wants to "have remaining food for 
breakfast and lunch the following day". 
To understand these activities as economic is a necessary initial step and 
confirms what sustainable livelihoods theory has established, that poor peoples' 
economic activities are part of the economy. However, it does not resolve the 
problems that because their output and income flows are small and because they 
are in a peripheral spatial location, they are perceived by policy makers as being 
unable to contribute to, and disconnected from, the processes that relate to 
economic growth. I therefore turn to consider ways in which Durban's economy 
can be represented to include these activities as part of the processes of economic 
growth. 
7.2 Economic activities in Durban's economy 
In this section, I propose to write poor people's economic activities into the story 
of Durban's economic growth. In two interrelated parts, I elaborate on the 
suggestion from the previous chapter that it is necessary to bring 'difference 
without dominance' in the economy into view. In the first part, I intend to 
continually unsettle the basis of binary representations of Durban's economy. I 
propose to do this by firstly, examining how the research participants understood 
their activities in relation to other economic activities and how this suggests 
particular ways in which economic activities across the city can be thought of as 
co-constituting interdependent networks. Secondly, I will draw out the material, 
temporal, and spatial aspects of the research participants' activities and examine 
how this results in ways in which economic activities overlap and are 
interconnected within, and beyond, the city of Durban. In referring to these 
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activities, I am attempting to draw attention to the ways in which diverse 
economic activities are entangled, interdependent, and interconnected and that 
this proliferation of interrelationships is integral to a successful growing 
economy. 
In the second part, I aim to show that poor people's economic activities are 
integral to Durban's economy and its economic growth by decentring and 
dislodging the activities that are associated with economic growth from the 
formal (capitalist) register. It is worth recalling that this aim is based on a shift in 
focus, noted in Chapter Six, from outputs and income to activities. As sustainable 
livelihoods theory has shown, a focus on activities has a positivity and draws 
attention to what is being done rather than what is deficient. Contrast this with a 
singular focus on outputs and income that, although important, only draws 
attention to the ways in which poor peoples' activities are constrained and 
deficient because of their lack of access to equipment, credit, and so on. 
7.2.1 Related economic activities 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the research participants 
understand their economic activity in relation to other economic activities. The 
understanding of an economic activity in relation to other activities suggests that 
economic activities are dependent on each other. 
Earlier in Chapter Five, I noted how 'value chain' type analyses provided a means 
of connecting different economic activities together in Durban's Informal 
Economy Policy (EDD 2000). The evidence of connections between economic 
activities serves to erase a supposed formal/informal economy 'divide' and, 
consequently, promotes the view of a single economy of which poor people are a 
part. I propose to build on 'value chain' analyses by showing how economic 
actors understand their activities in relation to other activities is contingent 
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rather than pre-defined and that the economic activities that co-constitute each 
other do not necessarily have their wellspring in the formal, capitalist economy. 
To demonstrate how the research participants understand their activities exist 
contingently in relation to other economic activities, I return to the example of 
Mr B's investments in moulds to make concrete lintels. I now focus on his 
activities of producing and selling the lintels. In recalling that he "felt that this 
place will have demand for this thing [lintels]", Mr B is aware that his production 
of lintels is related to the activity of selling. In terms of selling lintels, he notes 
that "people are getting used to it now" and making 'sense' of purchasing from 
him. He is "the only one doing this" and it is clear that this absence of other local 
producers and merchants is important in customers "telling each other" about 
his activities. The meaning of his productive activities is also related to other 
forms of exchange such as bartering "a lintel for a window frame because you 
have to work hand-in-hand with people". To draw together the points of this 
example, I point out that Mr B's productive activity is contingent on whether it is 
related to the absence of other producers, selling, or bartering. In this way, the 
contingent relation between different activities co-constitutes both economic 
activities. The difference inheres in the relationship and thus, difference binds 
diverse economic activities together across the city. 
The 'value chain' approach draws attention to the complex ways in which 
different activities are connected, but tends to do this along one axis. However, it 
is not just that economic activities connect along a 'ladder' of the 
informal/formal spectrum. They are also always inevitably traced back to the 
formal centre of the 'real' (capitalist) economy. I turn to consider a different 
example from C-Extension, which builds on the 'value chain' approach, but seeks 
to illustrate how activities are related in many different directions and not 
necessarily always back to the formal (capitalist) economy. 
Mr H has been selling fruit and vegetables next to bus and mini-bus taxi ranks 
for about ten years and supports a household of six people through this activity. 
He recently obtained a formal stall, developed by the eThekwini Municipality at 
Bester's Shopping Centre.279 He takes pride in listing his product range as 
including: "cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, apples and oranges" according 
to their seasonal availability. He usually purchases new stock from the (formal) 
Clairwood market and sometimes directly from farmers or suppliers who bring 
their products to the Bester's Shopping Centre. In this way, his supply chain is 
conventional and is replicated by many other informal fruit and vegetable traders 
throughout the city (cf. Witt 2000). The fruit and vegetable sellers face continual 
storage problems, have no access to refrigeration, and theft is a constant concern 
(cf. Cross et al. 2001; Witt 2000). Consequently, Mr H and the other fruit and 
vegetable sellers rely on continually replenishing their stock. This in turn, 
generates a daily need for a means of transporting the new stock. Apart from 
generating this need for transport, what is perhaps more interesting is that Mr H 
cooperates with a number of the other fruit and vegetable sellers around the 
Shopping Centre to hire a van to pick up the day's supply of stock. This 
cooperation extends to the collective preparation of lunch amongst the traders 
and the way in which Mr H's economic activities are entangled in relationships 
amongst the fruit and vegetable traders. 
A 'vertical' value chain analysis of Mr H's economic activity draws attention to 
the ways in which the fruit and vegetable traders are 'trapped' in an activity that 
does not earn enough income to propel them into higher earning activities (cf. 
Posel 2001). Extensive analysis of the informal fruit and vegetable trade has 
confirmed that many fruit and vegetable sellers neither know their daily profits 
nor earn enough income to escape seemingly desperately overtraded market 
conditions (cf. Cross et al. 2001; Skinner 2005). However, the example of Mr H's 
279 Mr H pays "R25 per month to eThekwini Municipality" for rental, cleaning and access to 
water. 
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'collective' pricing system for selling tomatoes suggests that economic activities 
can co-constitute other economic activities 'horizontally' as well as 'vertically'. 
According to Mr H, the best time for sales is "in the afternoons". Mr H 
understands that his activity is related to the formal shops in the shopping 
centre. He and his fellow traders compete for sales with the formal shops. That is, 
the competition is not his fellow traders who are selling more or less the identical 
items at similar prices in the stalls immediately next to him and around the 
shopping centre. Not surprisingly, it is very difficult to differentiate prices when 
there is a common source of supply amongst the traders. Therefore, the prices at 
which Mr H sells tomatoes are determined by their quality. Thus, the traders 
tend to collaborate so that the price remains more or less the same and the 
quantity of tomatoes at that price is adjusted according to the quality. The better 
the quality, the lower the quantity that are offered for the same purchase price. In 
a context where storage of a perishable item is an issue, the economic activity of 
selling is differentiated according to quality/freshness. It follows that widening 
the range of tomatoes for sale to suit different household budgets will depend on 
differentiating the quality of the tomatoes. The greater the differentiation, the 
greater the choice and more likely it will be to attract a wider range of customers 
and thus, in turn, support a wider range of sales. 
Indeed, if the location of the fruit and vegetable sellers next to the Shopping 
Centre and bus/mini-bus taxi rank is taken into account, there are ways in which 
the selling of fruit and vegetables is more tangibly related to the public 
transportation 'sector' than to the formal fruit and vegetable wholesale market in 
the value chain. The location of the fruit and vegetable traders reflects 
interdependence with the spatiality of township resident's lives and their travel 
needs. The widespread lack of private transport means that it is difficult for 
individual households to buy fruit and vegetables in bulk. When the fruit and 
vegetable customers have to walk long distances it is neither easy, nor 
comfortable to walk far with heavy purchases. At the same time, these customers 
do not want to purchase goods too early in their journey in case they spoil or are 
required to pay for an extra seat for their purchases. The cost of purchasing an 
additional seat in a mini-bus taxi pushes up the cost of the items prohibitively. 
Even if households could afford to transport their fruit and vegetables in greater 
quantities, they would then be faced with the requirements to store the produce 
securely and to minimise deterioration. This problem is overcome by purchasing 
the fruit and vegetables in smaller, daily amounts. The ideal point at which to 
purchase vegetables is therefore at a point where the mode of transport changes 
and the customer is close to their final destination. The location of the fruit and 
vegetable sellers shows a keen awareness of this spatiality and of people's daily 
rhythms across a city that is fragmented and segregated. The existence of the 
market reinforces the area as a point to which bus and mini-bus taxi customers 
are attracted and where taxis converge and depart. In drawing attention to the 
perishability of tomatoes (their materiality), the location of the economic activity 
of selling (at the rank) and the times (in the afternoons and seasonal changes in 
supply) I start to anticipate other ways in which poor people's economic activities 
in C-Extension are interconnected and overlap with other activities in the city. 
Before moving on, I pause to summarise this section. 
In sum, I have suggested that the research participants understand that their 
activities exist in relation to other activities and actors. The differences between 
activities are contingent on the interactions between these activities and inhere 
in the perceived relationship rather than in an understanding of the activities as 
independent and pre-formed. It follows that understandings of economic 
activities are diverse and cannot be bounded. Difference, in this sense, binds 
activities together in networks of interdependence that do not necessarily have 
their locus in the formal (capitalist) economic register. This yields a view of 
Durban's economy where activities, even very small ones such as those in C-
Extension, are a 'constitutive power' of the economy (The Community Economies 
Collective 2001). Ronald Burt (1995) argues that economic activities are 
generated when agents can get between overlapping networks of activities. 
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Following this line of thinking it is possible to hypothesise that the greater the 
diversity of economic activities in Durban, the greater the possibility of economic 
actors to generate new economic activities. 
7.2.2 Overlaps and interconnectedness 
The research participants drew attention to at least three different elements of 
their economic activities. They talked about the material qualities or physical 
attributes of the objects they produced or worked with. For example, this 
included the weight of concrete lintels that meant they were difficult to steal, the 
speed of assembling items such as sewing church uniforms, the 
perishability/durability of commodities, or the tools and equipment needed to 
dig trenches. They also remarked upon the spatial distance they had to 
walk/travel to obtain inputs for their activities such as LP gas, the places and 
boundaries of their operations both inside the neighbourhood and further afield 
in the centre of the city or rural towns, or the location of suppliers typically in the 
central city or competitors. Finally, they related their activities to the times of the 
day, their durations, frequencies, suspensions, or disruptions. Examples include 
the best times to sell, how the rhythms of the school day and year affected 
activities, or how activities fluctuated according to the seasons and annual cycles 
within the year. 
The ways in which economic activities have a materiality, spatiality, and 
temporality and how these aspects overlap and interconnect demonstrate 
another way that poor peoples' economic activities are part of the city and inside 
a broader story of economic growth. I now return to the example of Ms J's 
production and sales of iziqeda. As a number of scholars have pointed out, 
economic activities such as Ms J's provide a convenient service in poor areas due 
to their accessible location in the immediate neighbourhood (cf. Cross 2000; 
250 
Markewicz English, Mander, and Mbokodo 2000).280 However, the production 
and sale of iziqeda is related to more than spatial proximity to a market. The 
physical properties of the iziqeda (that it must be frozen) are an important part 
of this convenience that contributes to their production and sales. The quick 
freezing properties of the flavoured mixture minimises the amount of electricity 
required and the availability of free water means that the barriers to entry for this 
type of economic activity are low.281 Since the iziqeda must be frozen (and 
remain frozen) they must generally be distributed/sold from a house or structure 
with affordable electricity and a freezer. In instances where Ms J packs her 
iziqeda into a cooler box and sells at the local bus-stop or football match, she 
must be sure of relatively quick sales in a big enough market on a hot enough 
day. Equally, the long travel times in the searing temperatures of Durban's 
summer means that it is very difficult for people to purchase these items from 
'formal' /industrial sources of ice-lollies and transport them home for their 
children. Industrial suppliers appear unwilling to invest in a distribution system 
in peripheral township areas, possibly because of a general fear of crime (cf. 
Harrison, Todes, and Watson 1997). The spatial distance and widespread lack of 
private transport means that industrially produced ice-lollies purchased in a 
formal shop are unavailable in C-Extension. Even if people could transport 
iziqeda home, they are likely to face a storage and/or refrigeration problem. 
Homemade production is similarly constrained by the lack of refrigeration. This 
means that children buy iziqeda on demand. The temporality of iziqeda 
production and sales extends beyond the time it takes to make the items or the 
seasonal changes in sales volumes. 
The sale of iziqeda relies on the amount of cash circulating through the activities 
that make up Durban's economy (Cross et al. 2001). This is evident as Ms J's 
280 Although, as noted in Chapter Four, it is necessary to constantly bear in mind that this 
'convenience' arises because of Durban's fragmented, inefficient urban form makes access to 
wider opportunities, amenities and facilities difficult. 
281 As discussed in Chapter Five, eThekwini Municipality's block rising water tariff structure 
subsidises the free provision of the first 6 kilolitres per household per month. 
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sales peak cyclically at the end of the month when workers in the formal 
economy are paid. Nevertheless, other factors beyond a focus on the amount of 
cash circulating also influence her activities. These include the school calendar 
that determines the availability of her market. It also includes the annual leave 
cycle and working conditions (determined by labour legislation) of the parents of 
the children that make up her main market because the parents are the conduit 
through which the cash flows. Thus the seasons, school calendar and leave cycles 
overlap and intersect in different ways to produce peaks and troughs of sales in 
relation to the monthly flows of cash generated in the formal economy. In this 
case, Ms J's activities are intertwined with, and follow, the infrastructural 
networks of roads, electricity and energy, water and sanitation. This underscores 
Philip Amis' (2004) observation that it is much easier for urban governments to 
destroy livelihoods through the non-provision of infrastructure than create 
employment. 
The material, spatial, and temporal aspects of Ms J's economic activity are 
neither reducible to each other nor fixed. This suggests that both her economic 
activities and others in Durban result from the combination of these aspects that 
are at times uneven, fleeting, enduring or even contradictory. The overlaps and 
interconnections emerge as the activities share spaces, infrastructures, seasons, 
cycles, daily rhythms and enable Ms J to engage in economic activity. Equally, 
however, these same issues prevented homemade and industrial production from 
occurring in C-Extension. This raises a more general issue about how the 
material, spatial, and temporal aspects of activities might displace, supplant, 
isolate, or insulate particular economic activities from others even though they 
overlap or are interconnected, and how the lack of infrastructure enables certain 
economic activities. 
It follows from the notions of overlap and interconnectedness that economic 
activities can be multiply related to other activities and their associated 
materialities, spatialities, and temporalities. Attentiveness to how these different 
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aspects relate and combine arguably enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of 
economic activities (Miller 2002; Callon 1998). This in turn hints at the 
complexity of how economic activities are interrelated but also provides a 
different basis for starting to think about how the 'propulsive' dynamics of 
economic growth might be produced and 'transmitted' or sustained across the 
city. 
7.2.3 Networks of interdependenc/es 
When considering Mr B's lintel production earlier, I deliberately restricted the 
attention to a singular relationship with other activities even though the example 
threatened to overflow the limits I was imposing. I did this to draw attention to 
the way that relational difference binds economic activities together. Now I more 
fully represent the way in which the research participants understood their 
economic activities as being multiply related to other economic activities. Indeed, 
it is difficult to think of an example of the understanding of an economic activity 
only being related to one other economic activity. I turn to the example of Ms M 
(selling hats, scarves and so on) to illustrate the how economic activities are 
multiply related to other activities and how this is important for allowing Ms M 
to elaborate many different stories within the city and beyond. The implication of 
activities being multiply related is that it proliferate the possibilities for overlaps, 
interconnectedness and interdependencies of activities that make diverse 
economic activities possible in the first instance. 
Ms M started selling hats and socks in the absence of similar activities, when she 
did not observe anyone else selling these items in C-Extension. Her economic 
activity of selling hats, handkerchiefs, scarves, umbrellas and socks is related to 
he part-time employment as a domestic worker (two days per week). In an 
environment where people spend lots of time outdoors (walking or waiting for 
public transport) sometimes on unmade roads, hats that offer "protection from 
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the sun and the cold, and sometimes go with a style" and socks which wear out 
quickly have a ready market. Small items such as socks are also sub divisible 
from the bulk packs in which they are found in shops and can therefore be 
offered on a more affordable and accessible basis to people as the seller goes 
door-to-door. The affordability and accessibility are more likely to ensure a cash 
flow for the seller (cf. Cross et al. 2001). She notes, "people don't have money in 
the middle of the month, so they pay me at month end". Ms M knows that credit 
and convenience are important aspects that co-constitute her activity and will 
"let people buy on credit" if it will help her make a sale. Selling these items from 
door-to-door has a specific temporality because the best time for sales is the 
"afternoons and weekends" when people are more likely to be at home. Her 
ability to offer credit and/or convenience however, is restricted to "around C-
Extension [and adjacent] B-Section" where it is easy to locate customers in 
networks and follow-up for payment. She is not restricted by previous sales 
because the same person "might like to buy for someone else, or want another 
colour". She started selling socks and so on from door-to-door with a capital of 
R100 and in a good month has a turnover of "between R350 and R400". This 
contributes nearly half of an overall monthly household income of between RSoo 
and R.1200. However, she prefers domestic work and is always seeking to secure 
additional work of this type. For this reason her activity of selling hats and socks 
and her domestic work are simultaneously related to her acknowledged inability 
to engage in another economic activity selling perishable commodities such 
"vegetables [which] can get rotten". The durability of hats and socks in 
combination with her preference for domestic work is multiply related to another 
activity of selling vegetables and have multiple meanings. 
It follows from this view that economic activities are part of networks of 
interdependencies with other economic activities, and their materialities, 
spatialities, and temporalities. Thus, activities can simultaneously have multiple 
identities and consequently, can overlap. Given that this interdependence is co-
constituted it is difficult to bound the processes of interaction. Nonetheless, the 
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process of establishing the identity of economic activities is not infinitely 
boundless. Although in theory, the establishment of relationships between 
activities could proliferate endlessly, the meaning of economic activities is 
neither so unstable nor uncertain to make categorisations impossible. 
Understandings of activities are restricted, confined, channelled, and ranked in 
many ways (Graeber 2005; Gudeman 1986). One of the ways that 
understandings of economic activities are contained is in the categories of 
production, consumption, investment, services and exchange/selling that I used 
to illustrate the range of economic activities in C-Extension. Another is through 
the generation and maintenance of different economic registers. I return to the 
notion of different economic registers, first raised in Chapter Five as another 
means of both bringing some order to the endless proliferation of relationships 
between activities and at the same time, sustaining forms of difference. 
7.2.4 Maintaining different economic registers 
Chapter Five drew attention to the local government policy maker's recognition 
of a number of different aspects to the local economy. It is worth recalling that 
these included aspects such as the natural resource base of the city, self-help 
housing construction processes, and the informal economy. I suggested in 
Chapter Five, that the recognition of these different aspects offered potential to 
rethink Durban's economy, even if in their conceptualisation in the LTDF they 
reinforced the dominance of the formal (capitalist) economy as the source of 
economic growth. Here I extend this view and while I retain the term 'economy' 
for a sense of the whole, the different aspects, registers, and economic activities 
draw attention to the diversity of the economy. The term 'registers' is used here 
to refer to the metrics in which value is made measurable and expressed in 
different ways and how social activities are interpreted in different aspects of the 
economy. 
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Now I return to these diverse aspects and the different 'registers' they suggest to 
point to certain ways in which these aspects are an important feature of Durban's 
economy and integral to its economic growth. There are two points that emerge 
from the research participant's economic activities. The first is that the different 
aspects add to the diversity, that I have suggested above, is integral to the 
prospects for economic growth in Durban. The second is that in conventional 
views of the economy, it is expected that the assumed organicism of capitalist 
activities will expand and transform other aspects of the economy (cf. Gibson 
2001). Accordingly, in this view, all economic interactions and activities are 
reduced or flattened to a single register. However, the ways in which the research 
participant's in C-Extension engage in economic activities suggests sensitivity to 
these different aspects and an ability to move between them without necessarily 
flattening different activities into a single (capitalist) register. This is not to deny 
that there are powerful interests in Durban such as those contained in neo-liberal 
adjustments enacted through the economy (Mosoetsa 2004) or commodification 
of municipal services (Desai 2002) that precisely seek such a flattening or reduce 
all economic activities into a capitalist register. 
There are two different ways in which these different registers add to the 
diversity of Durban's economy. The first is to add diversity within the different 
aspects of the economy by proliferating the number of registers that could 
potentially be called upon by economic actors to interpret and understand 
economic activities. The second is to add diversity across the different aspects of 
the economy by increasing the permutations of different overlaps between 
economic activities. I will now provide examples of these. 
The first example of creating diversity within different aspects of Durban's 
economy is suggested by the informal sales of iziqeda in C-Extension. Two of the 
three sellers of iziqeda amongst the research participants based their activities on 
a motive or 'logic' other than that of profit maximisation. For example, although 
Ms S could continue to sell iziqeda in winter, she chooses not to because she 
believes that "children will get the flu". Another example is Ms J who generates 
enough money to "pay her electricity ... buy credit for [her] mobile phone ... buy 
food ... and sometimes pay [her] sister's bus fare". Ms J knows she could make a 
lot more if she "sold cigarettes", for example. The sale of cigarettes is usually 
highly profitable (cf. Cross et al. 2001). However, Ms J chooses not to and 
ensures she is not disturbed at night. This is because children do not purchase 
iziqeda at night, while adults would be attracted by the convenience of 
purchasing cigarettes. As a single woman, living with her sister and child, she 
chooses not to attract customers at night that would most likely be men. 
Ms H who is temporarily employed by eThekwini Municipality as a fieldworker to 
update the city's property valuation roll provides an example of working across 
different registers.282 Ms H was recommended for the position because of her 
experience in processing household application forms for the recent allocation of 
national government Housing Subsidies for households in C-Extension. 
The enrolment of properties in the city's property valuation roll serves two 
purposes and points to the fact that dwellings in C-Extension circulate according 
to a diverse range of values. Ms H points to these two purposes by explaining 
that: 
" ... by what I am doing, people with houses under the value of R90,OOO are able to get a 
discount on their accounts and if they want to sell the house they will know its value". 
The first purpose related to eThekwini Municipality's active 'indigence policy':.!8::l 
in terms of which property taxes levied below RIOO,OOO are progressively 
discounted. Thus in 2004, properties with a value less than R30,000 received the 
highest rebates.284 Since almost all the properties in C-Extension fell into the 
category it was in the interests of residents/owners to obtain an up to date 
282 The valuation roll is the basis upon which local property taxes are levied. 
283 Brian O'Leary, Interview, 29/03/04. 
284 'Lifeline' property tax rebates are available for dwellings valued at less than RlOO,OOO. The 
highest rebates are provided to dwellings valued at less than R3o,ooo and the lowest rebates to 
those valued between R90,ooO and RIOO,OOO. 
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valuation. The second purpose is to allow the dwelling to circulate in a 'housing 
market'. Dwellings in places such as C-Extension circulate in very different 
registers of kinship and household relations to that of 'the market' (cf. Nell, 
Gordon, and Bertoldi 2004). 
There are a number of examples that emerged of sensitivity to different aspects 
to the economy. One example is 74-year old Ms C who grows vegetables for sale 
and household use, on "a place on the bank of the river ... [which] ... does not 
belong to anyone". She depends on access to the river and seasonal rain for 
irrigating although she notes, "if she could get a dry piece of land, I can grow 
carrots, potatoes and tomatoes". Within this natural resource base of the 
economy she: 
" ... sells and saves all the money. I then take it to the bank when I am finished what I am 
selling. It varies from R600-RIOOO per year. I am saving this money so I will have 
something to rely on when I'm too old and can't go to the garden or if I die, my children 
can use the money to bury me". 
The final example of sensitivity to a different register relates to the exchange of 
gifts. I return to the household where Ms T's cooking for the household provided 
an example of consumption activities. As noted earlier the household's sole 
source of cash is a State Old Age pension grant. Despite this, the household had 
contributed a crate of beers to a kinship celebration the day prior to the 
interview. The beers had been purchased in the formal economy and physically 
carried to the celebration to be communally consumed. At the celebration, a 
written tally of all contributions was recorded to ensure equality of reciprocity in 
the future. 
It is not easy to straddle the different trajectories of these diverse aspects of the 
economy (Simone 2001). However, the point about these diverse aspects of the 
economy and the registers they offer up is that poor people in C-Extension have a 
sensitivity to them, and operate within and across the multiple understandings 
that can be generated. That they are important to both make sense of difference 
and create it.28s They do not try to flatten the differences into a single register but 
instead provide a basis for new forms of difference to emerge. The difference is 
critical to being able to have multiple meanings, elaborate different stories and 
generate new activities. In this way, these aspects and registers add another 
dimension, brought into view by sustainable livelihoods theory, to the strategic 
choices available to households in composing livelihoods. 
This section has presented the complexity of the research participant's economic 
activities in C-Extension and I pause to gather the suggestions I have made 
before proceeding with the second process which is dislodging the concept of 
economic growth from the formal (capitalist) economy and that is necessary to 
write poor peoples' economic activities into the story of economic growth. Based 
on simple descriptions of poor peoples' economic activities in C-Extension, I 
elaborated the complex ways in which these activities make up a differentiated 
spatialised economy in Durban by examining it in four different, but interrelated 
ways. The first step is to see economic activities as relationally constituted. The 
implication is that difference between activities is established through the 
relation between economic activities thus binding diverse activities together 
rather than separating them. The second step is to suggest that the materialities, 
spatialities and temporalities of economic activities are integral to generating 
relationships between these activities. Consequently, because materialities, 
spatialities, and temporalities of economic activities are uneven, discontinuous, 
and combined in different ways a picture of a tangled enmeshed economy 
emerges. This brings to mind the 'interlocking potential' of diverse activities 
(Simone 2ooSb). This potential proliferates as economic activities multiply co-
constitute each other. The research participants understand their activities 
285 Often these registers are ranked in prestige (Graeber 2005). It appears that it is just important 
to engage in activities that move up the hierarchy, as it is to secure a material output. The 
hierarchies of prestige vary in space and time but commonly circulate around kin religion care 
culture or 'the market'. The research participants choose when to activate them', rank th~m i~ 
different ways and convert activities up the rankings according to different social and personal 
criteria. 
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across and within these diverse aspects of Durban's economy and at the same 
time generating the basis for new forms of diversity. 
Having generated a view of Durban's economy that consists of proliferating 
relationships binding activities together through networks of interdependencies, 
with entanglements of interconnections and overlaps, the task remains to ensure 
that economic growth does not remain locked within the capitalist/formal aspect 
of this differentiated spatial economy. 
7.3 Dislodging and decentring economic growth 
Before poor peoples' economic activities can be written into the story of 
economic growth it is necessary to dislodge and decentre the activities associated 
with economic growth from a singular capitalist economic register and specific 
(confined) locations within Durban. The purpose is to show that activities such as 
innovation and productivity that conceptually underpin economic growth can 
potentially occur anywhere within the networks of interdependencies, overlaps, 
and interconnections in Durban. 
I propose to begin the task of dislodging and decentring economic growth from 
the spatial and conceptual confines of a capitalist aspect of Durban's economy in 
two progressive steps. The first step works from the existing and dominant 
understandings of economic growth and sets out the means of disrupting these 
understandings. The second step looks to the role of the relations and 
interconnections amongst different activities and how these relate to innovation 
and productivity and in so doing start to shift our understanding of the basis of 
economic growth. 
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7.3.1 Unsettling economic growth 
It is worth recalling from Chapter Three that the dominant theories of economic 
growth involve the different ways in which the levels and combinations of capital, 
labour, and technology can increase productivity and innovation. The theories, in 
turn, are based on a conceptualisations of activities that are generative, 
propulsive, and/or innovative and importantly, confined within particular 
physical spaces and 'spaces' of homogenous rationalities or logics. However, in 
this chapter, I have suggested ways in which diverse economic activities are 
interdependent and interconnected. To my mind, economic activities throughout 
the city (and beyond) are bound together by (discontinuous) differences and the 
diverse interconnections that arise through the sharing of infrastructures and 
overlaps of the material, spatial, and temporal aspects of economic activities. 
Therefore, there is an argument to be made that all economic activities are less 
pure and singular than they are made out to be and cannot be captured through a 
binary understanding of the economy as capitalist/non-capitalist or 
formal/informal. 
Since it is virtually impossible to limit or determine the point at which the 
interdependencies, interconnections, and overlaps of economic activities end -
either physically or in terms of meaning - it is possible to suggest that the 
activities associated with economic growth are less bounded, internally coherent, 
and independent than they are represented as being in dominant accounts of 
economic growth (and for that matter, poverty studies). If different economic 
activities are in fact related then it suggests that it is certain configurations of 
activities which are responsible for economic growth and it is more difficult to 
identify a single activity as the locus of economic growth with any certainty or 
precision. It is within configurations of activities, rather than through the 
isolation of single activities that it would be possible to identify propulsive or 
generative activities for example. 
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This is an important first step in dislodging and decentring economic growth 
from its perceived current location in particular formal, well-developed spaces of 
the city and within the rationality of the capitalist economic register. The 
limitation of this view is that it suffers from what Cameron and Gibson-Graham 
(2003) describe as an 'added-on approach'. Thus, while the approach suggests 
ways that diverse economic activities are endlessly linked, the linkages remain 
conceived within the existing dominant systems of representing and measuring 
economic growth. As a result poor people's economic activities remain 
marginalised because they are perceived as too small, fragmented, lacking in 
equipment, credit and so on, to be measured and hence, to contribute to 
economic growth. It is necessary to take a further step. 
7.3.2 Reconceptualising innovation and productivity 
A concept/phenomenon such as economic growth can be reconceptualised in 
many ways. Here I look to the relations and interconnections of economic 
activities and how they make economic growth 'visible' and 'sayable'. To arrive at 
a view of the economy and economic growth which is based on a new 
understanding of productivity requires stripping away the concepts that buttress 
the dominant view. 
I begin by distinguishing between profitability and productivity to offer 
possibilities for measuring economic growth beyond a capitalist register of 
profitability. I continue by focusing on the dominant argument that economic 
growth is spatially confined and bound by a homogeneous rationality/logic. It is 
the view of a bounded space of economic growth that this dominant argument 
marshals that offers the possibility of reconceptualising innovation and 
productivity and ultimately, the means by which poor people's economic 
activities can be considered as contributing to economic growth. By turning this 
bounded view of space on its head, it emerges that economic growth (as 
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dominantly conceived) has as much to do with the extra- or non-economic power 
to fix, immobilise, isolate, and lock-in advantage across spaces in the city, as it 
does with innovation and productivity. 
I begin by suggesting one way in which to reconceptualise economic growth is to 
widen the registers in which economic growth is measured by broadening the 
current singular focus on 'profitability'. Castells and Portes (1989) observe that 
poor people's economic activities in informal economic networks have 
contradictory effects on the growth of capital, labour, and productivity. Thus, 
they introduce doubt to the view that poor people's economic activities cannot be 
profitable and hence, contribute to economic growth. They point out that on the 
one hand, the productivity of poor peoples' labour may be lower because the 
production technologies they utilise are less advanced, and it is suggested that 
poor peoples' economic activities are over-represented in consumer type services 
where gains in growth tend to be lower. On the other hand, poor peoples' 
productivity of capital may be higher because their overhead and labour costs are 
lower (Castells and Portes 1989, 30).286 Consequently, to dismiss poor peoples' 
economic activities tout court appears unwise. However, Massey (1996, 249) 
takes the argument a step further and makes the point more clearly - although 
productivity and profitability are related, they are not the same.287 
In hegemonic accounts of the economy, profitability is generally regarded as an 
'engine of growth'. Capitalism as arguably one of the most efficient means of 
generating profit has therefore come to be seen as the most effective way of 
ensuring increases in productivity. Massey (1996) notes that there is not an 
286 Indeed there may be merit in pursuing this argument in the future. An initial observation of 
the economy that comes into view in C-Extension is one where there is very little room for error. 
Activities are enacted/stocks are replenished on demand/'just-in-time'. However, in this efficient 
economy, there is little capacity to absorb the inevitable delays that arise from the complexity of 
these economic relations. 
287 While more subtle and complex calculations of productivity exist (cf. Bhorat and Cassim 
2004) these tend to be focused on only the formal, capitalist economy and their mathematical 
bent are generally less popularly accessible than the (assumed neutrality and universality of the) 
concept of profitability. 
automatic link between profitability and productivity. Some activities may be 
profitable but not productive (e.g. the armaments industry), some activities may 
be productive but not profitable (e.g. public transportation systems), and some 
activities may be indirectly productive and not linked to profitability at all (e.g. 
unpaid domestic household reproductive labour). The implication is that the 
conflation of the concept of productivity with the concept of profitability contains 
discussions about productivity within the (capitalist) aspect of the economy 
equated with generating profits. If the concept of productivity is at the heart of 
economic growth then it is important to distinguish it from profitability to allow 
for the growth contribution of diverse economic activities. 
I now turn to consider the view that economic growth occurs in bounded spaces 
in the city and within particular 'spheres of (capitalist) rationality'. Against this 
dominant view, I hold up the analysis developed in this chapter. In particular, if 
economic activities, such as those described in C-Extension, have multiple 
meanings that emerge from their interconnections and relations with other 
activities, it follows that they have no inherent meaning or characteristics. That 
an economic activity can be 'seen' or 'said' to contribute to economic growth is 
dependent on its location in the networks of interdependencies, interconnections 
and overlaps rather than its physical location. For example, the same activity 
(such as Mr V's catering service in C-Extension) in a different network of 
economic relationships (such as the formal/capitalist register) would 
conventionally be considered to be contributing to Durban's economic growth. 
That said, it is the power to fix, immobilise, isolate and lock-in economic 
activities across the spaces of the city and to 'see' these activities as contributing 
to economic growth that determines the economic growth of the city. It is the 
spatiality of this power that reveals the extra- or non-economic power that is 
brought to bear to immobilise, fix, networks of interdependencies and 
interconnections rather than the ability to be innovative (cf. Mitche112002; Zein-
Elabdin 2004). The involvement of extra- or non-economic power in 
conventional analyses of the economy alerts us the way in which the concept of 
economic growth is reductionist. Economic growth is what and where it is 
measured to be. 'What' and 'where' economic growth is considered to be are in 
turn a function of the power within networks to make social phenomena 'visible' 
and 'sayable' (de Boeck and Plissart 2004; Simone 2004; Powell1990). 
Thus, and alternatively, for an economic activity to be considered as productive 
or innovative does not only have to do with its profitability/output or location in 
particular spaces in the city or 'spheres or economic rationality'. Instead, it also 
depends on its location in overlapping, interdependent, and interconnected 
networks. In this new view, economic growth is based on innovation which 
involves generating multiple economic meanings, sharing infrastructures in new 
and more intensive ways, creating generative overlaps, all alongside using 
equipment and assets more productively, intensively, and sustainably. 
To conclude, I return briefly to C-Extension to illustrate this view of productivity 
and innovation. In terms of generating new meanings in relation to existing 
economic activities, it is possible to think of Ms H's involvement in the valuation 
of dwellings in C-Extension as diversifying the aspects of the economy in which 
the dwelling could be perceived as an asset and creating the basis for new 
interconnections with financial institutions. Ms S's production of sewing church 
uniforms, using sewing machines donated by a Chinese charity to her 
associational group, to diverse customers within and beyond the city288, 
demonstrates the initiation of new interconnections. There are a number of 
examples of using infrastructures more intensively. The obvious examples 
include the production of iziqeda and lintels that both depend on the (limited) 
supply of free water. However, another example could also be the informal fruit 
and vegetable sellers, who until recently, used the road-side to conduct their 
288 Ms S takes orders for church uniforms at the annual Easter celebration of her church when 
large numbers from all over the province congregate at Maphumulo. The orders are paid for up-
front and the uniforms delivered the following Easter. 
activities or the informal traders selling small snacks to school-children during 
their breaks on the school grounds. 
7.4 Durban's differentiated spatialised economy 
In this final section, I draw together the claims that I have been making, which 
suggestively write poor people's economic activities into the story of economic 
growth in Durban. 
I have suggested that economic activities are understood by the research 
participants to be multiply related to other economic activities across, and 
beyond, the city. This is based on an understanding that the difference between 
economic activities is contingent on the perceived relationship between activities. 
In this sense, all economic activities can be seen as constitutive of the economy. 
The research participants in C-Extension highlighted sensitivities to differences 
between economic activities by operating within and across different aspects of 
the economy. This multiplied the possibilities for different understandings to 
emerge between economic activities and served to make economic agents 
available to elaborate many different economic activities across the city. In 
addition the material, spatial, and temporal aspects of economic activities point 
to diverse interconnections, overlaps and the sharing of infrastructures which 
generate an interlocking potential for economic growth. 
I proposed a view where diversity, entanglement and interrelations amongst 
economic activities are key contributors to innovation and, in turn, the 
generation of new activities. Whether these innovations prove to be propUlsive or 
multiplicative is dependent on which assemblages or configurations of activities 
they are part of as much as on the characteristics of the activities themselves. The 
example of Mr Vs catering service was an example of this. In this way, I pointed 
to the mobilisation of resources that are external to particular economic activities 
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to show how networks of interdependencies are fixed and immobilised and thus 
securing only certain activities as being considered as contributing and 
benefiting from economic growth. In relation to this last point, it is necessary to 
return to the caveat stated in the introduction that to make the contribution of 
poor people's economic activities to economic growth 'visible' and 'sayable' is not 
the same as seeing these activities within and across the economy as equal to 
each other. 
There is a crucial distinction to be made between suggesting that economic 
activities are overlapping, interconnected, and interdependent and the ways in 
which the results of these relationships distribute resources and assets. Not all 
overlaps or interconnections work to allocate resources, commodities and people 
in the same way. This underscores an earlier point in relation to the capitalist 
economic register that it is not always dominant but that it is important to be 
attentive to the times and places where it is. The ability to convert innovative 
economic activities into a propulsive force appears to have much to do with 
existing inequalities in the distribution of resources as well as the extra- or non-
economic power to spatially fix the reach of particular activities. As Friedland 
and Robertson (1990a, 12) comment, "if the determinants of state policies that 
shape costs and profitability, investment and growth, lie outside of the 
marketplace, then analyses that bracket off the market are likely to be 
misspecified" . 
Not all economic activities can be part of growth in the same way, 
simultaneously. By definition, the activities that are associated with economic 
growth must be randomly and unevenly distributed. This, to recall Chapter 2, is a 
key feature of Lewis' (1976) model of economic growth and poverty. But, unlike 
the model described in Chapter Two, the generative activities that can be 
considered to result in growth are no longer found solely in the 'modern 
(capitalist) sector' of the economy. Now, since the generative activities that cause 
growth are contingent rather than predetermined (AlIen et al. 1998; Massey 
1996) or, to use Gibson-Graham's (1996) terminology - overdetermined - the 
impetus for economic growth (and different forms of economic growth) could be 
located anywhere in a differentiated spatial economy. A similar point can be 
made for activities that transmit or sustain processes of growth. The implication 
of this view is that in some cases an activity could generate/transmit/ sustain a 
growth dynamic because of the actualisation of certain qualities and in some 
cases the location of the activity in a network could be more important in terms 
of the growth dynamic. If a differentiation between diverse economic activities 
cannot be made within hegemonic accounts of the economy, it is necessary to 
direct the attention to the extra-economic power that is brought to bear on 
defining what is 'seen' or made 'sayable' as part of economic growth (Charusheela 
2004; Friedland and Robertson 1990b). 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to shift the dominant understanding of the economy to 
show how poor people's economic activities can be written into a story of 
Durban's economic growth. I noted that enabling this shift required generating 
new economic subjectivities. Poor people are not outside of discourses of poverty 
and economic growth. I intentionally located the research participants and 
research area squarely within existing poverty discourses that suggest that poor 
people's economic activities are unable to contribute to economic growth. 
Nonetheless, by adopting a different subject position and 'valuing what people 
do' a diverse range of economic activities was brought into view. 
Through drawing attention to the spatiality of economic relationships I built up a 
view of the Durban's economy in which poor people's economic activities were 
'visible' and 'sayable' in relation to economic growth. Thus I analysed how the 
research participants understood economic activities in relation to other 
activities. This built on a 'value chain' analysis by showing that economic 
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activities are related in diverse ways that go beyond the 'verticality' of the concept 
of chain. I noted also that the wellspring for such diverse chains was not always 
the formal capitalist economy. The diverse ways in which activities were 
understood to be related suggests that these activities are a constitutive part of 
Durban's economy - even if policy makers are unable to recognise this. 
I pointed to the research participant's keen awareness of three different elements 
of their activities. This related to factors such as the timing and duration of 
activities, the material qualities of goods and commodities, and the physical 
spaces in which they operated. This signalled ways in which economic activities 
follow infrastructural networks that shape the patterns of daily life and how the 
relationships between the activities must inevitably overlap and be 
interconnected. These overlaps and interconnections start to shift our 
understanding of how activities might be considered propulsive and the 
importance of infrastructure in transmitting such dynamics across (and beyond) 
Durban as a city. 
These overlaps and interconnections provide the basis for thinking how an 
understanding of such economic activities could be multiply related to other 
activities. This, in turn, suggested a complex and discontinuous network of 
interdependencies exist across the different aspects and registers of Durban's 
economy. I showed how these different aspects are productive of difference 
(within and across the economy) and provide for the possibilities of economic 
agents elaborating many different economic trajectories. Despite such a diverse 
view of Durban's economy, the analysis still left the possibility that the locus of 
economic growth could be considered as residing in the formal capitalist 
economy. 
Stepping back from the immediacy of economic activities in C-Extension, I 
proposed that the diverse and multiple understandings that co-constitute 
economic activities means that these activities are likely to have less pure and 
singular meanings than they are conventionally made out to have. As a result, it 
is more difficult to locate economic activities within binary understandings of the 
economy and the perceived conditions for economic growth. Taking this further, 
I began to reconceptualise the concepts of innovation and productivity by casting 
doubt on the dominant view that poor people's economic activities are neither 
profitable nor productive. I continued by noting the differences between 
profitability and productivity. I argued that if productivity is not necessarily 
related to profitability and economic activities have no inherent characteristics 
that relate to their ability to be productive and innovative, then any activity 
within a diverse economy could potentially be considered as productive and 
innovative. I observed that assumptions about which activities in the 
interdependent networks contributed to economic growth were determined by 
extra- or non-economic power to discursively (and ultimately materially) fix and 
immobilise the spatial relationships between economic activities and, in so 
doing, 'lock in' assets and resources. 
Finally, I proposed a different view of productivity and innovation that involved 
generating multiple economic relationships and sharing infrastructures in more 
intensive ways. Thus economic growth might be supported by policies 
encouraging generative overlaps between activities and supporting the more 
intensive use of equipment and assets. To that end, I outlined how poor people's 
economic activities in C-Extension do indeed suggest ways in which poor 
people's economic activities provide a 'platform' for a different form of urban 
economic growth in Durban. 
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Conclusion 
How can our understanding of economic growth be broadened to include the 
contributions of poor people's economic activities? This is a fundamental 
question because the concept of economic growth has such a purchase on notions 
of social progress and well-being and, as part of this, Poverty Studies considers 
economic growth to be a necessary, if not the sufficient condition, for the 
ultimate eradication of poverty. There is thus good reason to ensure that we 
thoroughly interrogate the concept of economic growth and that any form of 
growth is as inclusive as possible. In this light, my question gains added weight 
because dominant theories and approaches to poverty are unable to consider 
how poor people's economic activities might contribute to economic growth. 
The current dominant policy understandings of the relationship between poverty 
and economic growth suggest that for economic growth to reduce poverty levels, 
poor people's economic activities must be absorbed, connected or included in the 
formal economy. On the one hand, these strategies stand in stark contrast to the 
diversity of poor people's experiences of poverty that are acknowledged in 
Poverty Studies. On the other, such strategies make the profound and implicit 
assumption that poor people's economic activities and processes of economic 
growth are somehow separated or divorced from each other. It is clear that there 
are indeed many ways in which poor people are divorced, disconnected and/or 
excluded from formal economic processes and I am neither seeking to discount 
the brutality of these exclusions, nor claiming that such exclusions do not obtain 
in far too many circumstances. But what if the 'obviousness' of this assumption 
obscures the ways that poor people's economic activities are already part of 
processes of economic growth? What if we did not gloss over the assumption that 
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poor people's economic activities are separated from processes of economic 
growth? Consequently, at the core of my argument has been the view that 
questioning the 'obviousness of poverty' in South Africa offers the basis for a new 
'poverty politics' as a means of starting to think of more effective ways of 
reducing urban poverty. 
My argument has been based on the assumption that the 'obviousness' of poverty 
represents the sedimentation and stabilisation of a set of power relations that 
delineate the parameters of claims to the 'truth'. The truth about poverty is 
therefore an effect of power that holds together what is 'visible' and 'sayable' 
about poverty. This suggests that 'obviousness' is produced through a 
combination of discourses and practices. In order to question this obviousness, I 
looked for ways in which poverty was made 'visible' and 'sayable'. That the 
obviousness of poverty is made 'visible' and 'sayable' in different ways suggests 
that it is as important to pay attention to the processes which produce these ideas 
as to what is claimed because the two facets are intricately related. 
To provide the basis for an alternative view of poverty I sought to prise apart the 
relations of power that hold together what is currently 'visible' and 'sayable' 
about poverty, and specifically about the relationship between poor people's 
economic activities and economic growth in Poverty Studies. My aim was to 
critically engage with the construction of accounts that have been 'productive' of 
dominant understandings of poverty. The chapters traced some of the power 
relations that hold the 'visible' and 'sayable' together across different 'sites' of 
Poverty Studies: processes of defining poverty in national poverty studies, 
broader theories of poverty, and institutional practices around local policy 
making in the city of Durban. I set out to interrupt the taken-for-granted, to 
unsettle dominant terms and to pose questions against the grain in order to shift 
what is 'visible' and 'sayable' about poverty in relation to economic growth. This 
cleared the way for new understandings of poor people's economic activities to 
emerge. I suggested that considering poor people's economic activities as a 
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component of dispersed networks in a diverse economy allows for these activities 
to be made 'visible' and 'sayable' in relation to economic growth in new ways 
which, in turn, encourages a new 'poverty politics'. In conclusion, I highlight the 
implications of this 'poverty politics' for researching, theorising and policy 
making, and assess the potential for shifting the dominant view of the economy 
through analyses that broaden our understanding of economic growth and 
spatialise economic activities. 
8.1 'Poverty poliHcs' 
In discussing the implications of the 'poverty politics' I have identified, I begin to 
outline an agenda for changing the ways in which researchers and activists 
understand poverty. In sketching this outline I specifically focus attention on the 
issues, factors and subjectivities that are potentially within the control of poverty 
researchers and policy makers. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate the possibilities 
for incremental but effective discursive and practical changes. 
B.l.l Poverty research 
By highlighting the inevitable partiality of definitions of poverty I was able to 
draw attention to the ways in which poverty researchers have been thoroughly 
implicated in constituting the phenomena of poverty that they described. This 
was useful because it began to disrupt the sense of objectivity that the appeals to 
the 'obviousness' of poverty rely upon. The recognition of the ways in which 
definitions of poverty were inevitably partial was also important for highlighting 
the effects of this partiality for poor people. These effects have consequences for 
what is made 'visible' and 'sayable' and who can legitimately state the 'truth' 
about poverty. Bringing together a new subjectivity on the part of poverty 
researchers and a focus on the effects of the partiality of definitions for poor 
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people provides the basis for recognising that poverty researchers are well placed 
to initiate changes in discourses and practices around poverty. The 
acknowledgement that the power relations that hold together the 'visible' and 
'sayable' operate across many different sites of Poverty Studies means that the 
task of developing new discourses and practices will not be easy. Nevertheless, 
there are strong precedents in South African poverty research to draw upon. 
The rich empirical history of five national poverty studies (the Carnegie Inquiry, 
PSLSD, SA-PPA, PIR and Poverty Hearings) demonstrated that implicitly, if not 
explicitly, the researchers developed many different definitions of poverty that all 
had certain effects for poor people. The definitions developed in the five studies 
had effects that were related to whether poor people's voices were heard or 
silenced in particular ways. Thus, for example, the Carnegie Inquiry (de)defined 
poverty to silence expert, white (racially discriminatory) voices to allow poor, 
black voices to be heard as part of the struggle against Apartheid. By contrast, the 
PIR tended to silence poor people and authorise and legitimise the voice of the 
state in addressing poverty. Whereas the Poverty Hearings took a different 
approach and, by conceptualising the definition of poverty around basic human 
rights, provided a powerful platform for all poor people to exercise their right to 
speak out and be heard. 
The acknowledgement that definitions are inevitably partial and that this 
partiality has effects for poor people should encourage a general sensitivity to 
such issues and which, in turn, could provide more opportunities for them to 
emerge and be considered in Poverty Studies. An issue that is currently not 
'visible' and 'sayable' in dominant theories of poverty is how poor people's 
economic activities contribute to economic growth. 
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8.1.2 Poverty theories 
My review of the five national poverty studies revealed that three theories of 
poverty have predominated. These theories of poverty are income poverty, basic 
needs, and sustainable livelihoods. The theories have all offered significant 
insights into the nature, experiences, causes and effects of poverty. Such insights 
inform current national and city development policies to reduce poverty. 
However, all three theories rely heavily on a specific conception of economic 
growth. This conception is strongly biased toward notions of innovation and 
productivity that can be measured in terms of outputs and profitability. While 
each theory emphasises different aspects of this conception of economic growth 
and brings poor people's economic activities into view in different ways, they all 
faithfully import the core assumptions that are seen to underpin the economy 
and economic growth. 
As a result, researchers and policy makers firstly consider poor people's 
economic activities to be separated from economic growth processes. Secondly, 
there is an implicit hierarchy between poor people's economic activities and 
those activities which are thought to contribute to economic growth. Working 
with these assumptions the strategies to reduce poverty are restricted to the 
relatively narrow approaches that seek to 'absorb', 'connect' and/or 'include' poor 
people in the formal economy. Clearly, secure employment and reliable 
infrastructural connections, informed by respect for citizen and employment 
rights are worthwhile goals for any society to strive for so I am not arguing that 
these are unimportant processes. I am claiming, however, that attempts to 
reduce poverty should not be restricted to these three strategies - however 
encompassing they might be considered. 
The view that poor people have no direct claim on the proceeds of economic 
growth has the result of requiring others to bridge the perceived separation 
between poor people and the proceeds of economic growth. The ability and 
perceived responsibility to speak 'for' poor people (Bracking 2005) in respect of 
claims on the benefits of economic growth, depends on a view that poor people 
are divorced in some way from this process and unable to press their claims 
directly. The investments in this view of economic growth therefore draw poverty 
researchers into adopting a subjectivity that mediates between poor people and 
economic growth and hence, perpetuates the perception of a separation between 
poor people's economic activities and economic growth. As Maia Green (2003) 
has noted, the ability to mediate claims on the wealth of society is also the ability 
to police these claims and tends to institutionalise such processes in the state 
(Sandbrook 1982). Institutional poverty practices such as policy making at the 
city level, therefore have a powerful role to play in shaping a new 'poverty 
politics'. 
8.1.3 Policy making 
A shift in analytical focus, from broader processes, to exploring urban poverty 
policy in the city, made it possible to bring together a view of institutional 
poverty practices and the relationship between poverty and economic growth. 
This was because cities are increasingly considered as the 'engines of economic 
growth' and sites of increasing poverty, particularly in developing countries such 
as South Africa. The analysis of institutional poverty practices reveals multi-
layers through which the power to hold the 'visible' and 'sayable' operates. 
The inability to consider poor people's economic activities as contributing to 
economic growth at a theoretical level is replayed in institutional poverty 
practices at a city level and this has spatial effects for stimulating economic 
growth and the equitable development of cities. This suggests that the view that 
poor people's economic activities are unable to contribute to economic growth is 
'hardwired' into wider institutional poverty practices so that poor people are 
'obviously' unable to contribute to economic growth. Thus many progressive 
policy makers in Durban became locked into privileging the formal economy and 
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looking for opportunities to connect poor people into this formal economy. This 
understanding of the economy and economic growth was most clearly presented 
in the Monitor Group's analysis of the city's economy, but such an understanding 
is not unique to this consultancy company. In terms of this understanding, the 
long-term development policy of Durban was based on a view in which the city 
(and increasingly, the nation) is dependent on economic growth found in 
spatially bounded areas where the formal/capitalist economy is predominantly 
located. I suggested that the effect of this understanding was that capital 
expenditure on infrastructure in the city would be skewed towards the 
formal/capitalist economy, while poor people's infrastructural needs would be 
met by relatively basic levels of infrastructure provision. 
Thus, Durban's current long-term development policy very clearly identifies 
specific areas of the city that are responsible for economic growth (formal, 
industrial) and those that are not (former townships, peripheral) and, 
respectively, differentiates infrastructure spending according to 'productive' and 
'basic needs' assessments. In effect, this (unintentionally) privileges the formal 
economy as the only source of economic growth and in the absence of an 
alternative view of economic growth at the level of local government, planners 
have no justification for extending the level of infrastructural provision to areas 
considered poor or marginal to processes of economic growth. As a consequence, 
historical forms of racial exclusion threaten to find new institutional expression 
in an exclusionary discourse of economic growth. 
Policy making around poverty in Durban in the late 1990S occurred in a period of 
unusual institutional change. It was perhaps not surprising that the concept of 
poverty provided policy makers with a reference point that was perceived as 
relatively stable. While this level of institutional change is unlikely to be repeated 
very often or in many other countries, I believe that the broader point remains 
valid: there are many different activities that are invested in the concept of 
poverty. The ranges of different activities are themselves the product and process 
of local histories and power relations. Hence, attempts to formulate poverty 
reduction policies are not just based on notions of poverty that emerge from 
Poverty Studies. Instead, such policies are the complex melding of a range of 
different activities and understandings. The power relations that inform these 
activities and understandings are therefore likely to shape the eventual form of 
any poverty reduction policies. Where there are powerful economic actors with 
specific economic discourses these are also likely to have an important impact on 
poverty, as I demonstrated in the case of Durban. 
However, there is a richly suggestive body of research work on different aspects 
of Durban's diverse economy. These different aspects included the natural 
resource base, self-help housing programme, and the informal economy. Despite 
the official acknowledgement of these aspects of the economy, they were not 
considered as contributing to the city's economic growth and tended to confirm 
the dominance of the formal/capitalist economy in growth terms. Examples of 
such practices included casting the economic activities of poor people in the 
image of formal/capitalist activities and considering economic activities to be 
initially aspatial. The former tended to result in these economic activities being 
considered a second best alternative to formal economic activities, while the 
latter consolidated a view of economic growth as occurring in the formal 
economy. Nevertheless, this body of work on these diverse aspects alongside the 
formal/capitalist economy offers a potential basis for broadening our 
understanding of diverse economies. 
However my account of poverty research is partial too. There are many issues 
and factors that have become obscured by privileging the effects of 'poverty 
politics' on poor people. I have deliberately used the term 'poor people' rather 
than 'the poor' throughout the thesis to refer to people who are considered by 
others to be poor rather than the more homogenising term of 'the poor' that also 
implies a certain objectivity and distance between 'us' and 'them'. But critics 
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would be correct to point out that the use of the term 'poor people' has 
homogenising effects of its own and does little to address the vast differences in 
experiences of poverty between poor women and men, for example. The point is 
that it is not possible to escape this partiality and in light of this recognition the 
best we can do is continually attend to its effects. There will always be pressures 
to fix the definitions of concepts and stabilise their meaning and this thesis is no 
different in that respect. I believe that from a social justice perspective this 
means maintaining sensitivity to the effects of partiality but always looking for 
opportunities to privilege the effects on people who are poor. 
8.2 Broadening the concept of the economy 
I drew inspiration from Gibson-Graham's concept of 'diverse economies' to 
widen the scope of activities that can be made 'visible' and 'sayable' as 
contributing to economic growth and to dislodge the notion that economic 
growth processes are confined to specific formal (and capitalist) areas of the 
economy and city. The concept of diverse economies rests on a belief that 
language is a representation of the social phenomenon we seek to describe and 
the continual need to question and deconstruct binary logics that underpin our 
understanding of the world. 
The advantage of the concept of 'diverse economies' is that it is built on the 
recognition that representations of the 'real' (capitalist) economy are 
fundamentally representations of only part of whole economy. The concept of 
diverse economies rests on the view that economic activities constitute 
economies and that an economy consists of many more activities than are 
currently 'visible' in the 'real' economy. When the economy is considered in 
terms of this broader view, the capitalist/formal economic activities associated 
with the 'real' economy represent a smaller proportion than is generally 
assumed. Finally, the concept of diverse economies suggests that the division 
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between those activities that are generally acknowledged as part of the 'real' 
economy and those that are not, is ultimately socially constructed and neither 
inevitable nor pre-determined. 
In order to recognise 'difference' within the economy I began by shifting the 
focus of attention away from immediate concerns with outputs and profitability 
per se to economic activities. This offers an outline for a wider appreciation of the 
economy, one that is able to 'hold' all of the diverse aspects of Durban's economy 
in a single framework without needing to flatten the activities into a single 
register of, for example, profitability. In the case of Durban, where the economy 
is being promoted by policy makers and politicians as important for the long-
term future of the city, there is good reason to work with a broad sense of the 
economy to maximise its growth potential and increase the inclusiveness of this 
growth. 
8.3 Spatiallsing economic growth 
Gibson-Graham offered a relational view of space that identified and allowed for 
activities in one place to co-constitute activities in another place. I suggested, 
however, that the application of the diverse economies framework tended to 
work against their original intention of understanding economic spaces as 
relationally constituted and that they tended to do this in one dimension - the 
global/local - in an attempt to give effectivity to local economic relationships. 
Picking up their invitation to examine the dynamics between diverse economies, 
I sought to extend the spatiality of the concept of diverse economies. 
Extending their view required a slightly different terminology, because the 
concept of diverse economies is difficult to operationalise. I therefore retained 
the term economy for the overall entity (in this case, Durban's economy) and 
introduced the notions of aspects and registers within the diverse economy to 
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appreciate the differences in economic activities. While Durban's economy has a 
particular spatiality that is contingent on a diverse range of economic 
relationships, the aspects and registers that constitute Durban's economy have 
their own spatiality that co-constitute diverse economic activities. These cut 
across and do not always have their origin in the capitalist aspects of Durban's 
economy. Attending to these spatialities and how they are dependent on 
infrastructures, daily rhythms and the materialities of economic activities 
introduces an appreciation of the dynamics between activities. 
Drawing on empirical material from an area in Durban's poorest northern 
townships, I showed how poor people's economic activities are a constitutive part 
of Durban's economy and of processes of economic growth, which could not 
function in the way they do without the involvement of poor people's economic 
activities. I drew attention to the ways that the research participants understood 
that their activities exist in multiple relations to other activities and actors. The 
differences between activities were contingent on the interactions between these 
activities and inhere in the perceived relationship, rather than in an 
understanding of the activities as independent and pre-formed. It follows that 
economic activities could not be spatially delimited. Difference, in this sense, 
binds activities together in networks of interdependence. This yields a view of 
Durban's economy where activities, even very small ones, were a 'constitutive 
power' of the economy. 
I proposed a view of the economy where diversity, entanglement and 
interrelations amongst economic activities are key contributors to innovation 
and, in turn, the generation of new activities. Whether these innovations prove to 
be propulsive or multiplicative is dependent on which assemblages or 
configurations of activities they are part of, as much as on the characteristics of 
the activities themselves. But, not all economic activities can be part of growth in 
the same way. By definition, the activities that are associated with economic 
growth must be randomly and unevenly distributed. But, unlike the current 
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understanding of economic growth, the generative activities that can be 
considered to result in growth are no longer found solely in the formal, capitalist 
sector of the economy. For an economic activity to be considered productive or 
innovative does not only have to do with its profitability/output or location in 
particular spaces in the city or aspects of the economy. Instead, it also depends 
on its location in overlapping, interdependent, and interconnected networks. In 
this novel view, economic growth is based on innovation which involves 
generating multiple understandings of economic activities, sharing 
infrastructures in new and more intensive ways, and creating generative 
overlaps, all alongside using equipment and assets more productively, 
intensively, and sustainably. 
A richer view of Durban's diverse economy revealed ways in which configurations 
of networked activities are responsible for economic growth, rather than single 
activities, as well as the complex interdependence of economic activities on 
infrastructure. It provided a way of looking for instances where different 
networks of economic activities might be dominant or seek to 'lock-in' 
advantages. As a result, I also identified dynamics that existed outside the 
'purely' economic realm and which sought to immobilise and lock-in advantage 
into economic networks. This suggested that an investment in narrow 
understandings of 'the economy' were likely to remain mis-specified because the 
power to determine what counts as economic growth, for example, is determined 
outside of what is commonly represented as 'the economy'. However, there are 
other consequences for local government in Durban for failing to consider poor 
people's economic activities as contributing to economic growth. 
By not being able to make 'visible' and 'sayable' the links between poor people's 
economic activities and economic growth, progressive planners do not have a 
justification for providing higher and greater levels of infrastructural and service 
provision to poorer areas. When compared with 'productive' areas of the city, 
these poorer areas are considered outside of, or marginal to, the economic 
growth processes of the city. In a context where cities are increasingly being 
pressured by national governments to stimulate economic growth, progressive 
planners have no evidence to counter the view that the existing formal capitalist 
areas of the city are always the sole locations of the city's economic growth. 
The city is restricted in its ability to stimulate and harness the innovations and 
creativity that is currently occurring in the poorer parts of the city. In the case of 
Durban, these poorer parts comprise approximately 40 per cent of households 
and thus, from the city's perspective, this is a considerable resource that is not 
being capitalised upon. Furthermore, local government planners are unable to 
work with a framework that holds together the diverse aspects of Durban's 
economy. In the context of an historically fragmented society, it is possible to 
argue that it is fundamentally important to develop conceptual frameworks that 
integrate both economic activities and the divided spaces of South Africa's cities 
- not least for the poorest residents in these cities. 
It is worth recalling from Chapter Seven that it was not surprising to the research 
participants of C-Extension that their economic activities are not considered by 
policy makers to contribute to economic growth. Poor people themselves are not 
beyond poverty discourses. However, the implication of my analysis here is that 
when poor people engage in the dominant discourses of poverty I have described, 
they are (perhaps unwittingly) participating in a process that is severing their 
direct claims on the benefits of economic growth. It is hard to imagine instances 
when it may be strategic for poor people to rely on others to mediate their claims, 
nevertheless it would be unwise to discount the possibility entirely. However, a 
consequence of operating within these dominant discourses of poverty is that one 
yardstick for the allocation of infrastructural resources will be their impact on 
productivity and profitability. When infrastructural investments are evaluated in 
this register it is not surprising that it is very difficult to argue against 
investments that are able to build on existing large-scale infrastructures which 
can be formally measured. The result is that investments will continue to be 
skewed to areas of the formal economy. 
A further consequence is that the ways in which poor people are already part of 
networks in the economy will be consigned to aspects that remain perceived as 
unimportant for economic growth. The implication is that the existing, and 
urgently needed requirement for support to poor people's economic activities will 
not be prioritised. Instead, support for poor people's economic activities (weU-
intended as it may be) will be confined to strategies that are aimed at absorbing, 
connecting, or including such activities within the formal economy. 
However, such consequences for local government can begin to be addressed and 
I conclude by providing suggestions for the ways in which local government may 
take advantage of the understanding of economic activities as networks of 
interdependencies. The first is to return to the basic concepts of innovation and 
creativity that underpin the notion of economic growth. This requires refraining 
from immediately imposing evaluative criteria associated with the formal 
economy, such as output rates and profitability, on poor people's economic 
activities. It is clearly important to measure economic growth but it is possible to 
change both the timescales and geographic scales at which economic growth is 
measured. This leads onto the second point, which is to invest in ways of 
understanding the economy as a series of networks. If economic activity is 
possible because of the contingent differences between economic activities, 
supporting the networks through which these differences become apparent 
should stimulate new economic activities. The third is to shift to a broader view 
of the role of infrastructure as enabling economic activities to overlap, 
interconnect and be interdependent on each other. In this view, a narrow 
concern with affordability of 'basic needs' infrastructure contains within it an 
inbuilt brake on South Africa's future prosperity, because it limits the potential 
for networks of interdependent activities to emerge that, in turn, underpin 
economic growth. 
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Thus, this thesis amounts to an attempt to show that poor people's economic 
activities are part of economic growth processes in Durban by building on 
debates in the 1970S about the informal economy and basic needs and by 
decentring understandings of the economy and economic growth. I have been 
arguing for more than an attempt to (simply) add poor people's economic 
activities into the existing dominant understandings of the economy and 
economic growth. Such an additive step would certainly suggest that poor 
people's economic activities are equal to activities associated with economic 
growth, but it retains intact the dominant conceptualisations and categorisations 
of the economy that I have argued has problematic effects for poor people. 
Rather, my intention has been to argue for the need to continually attend to the 
conceptual definitions of poverty and economy and their effects and work 
towards recognising, deconstructing or utilising these divisions for progressive 
purposes. 
8.4 Conclusion 
I have argued that attempts to substantially reduce poverty in Durban are 
ultimately thwarted because current research, theorising and policy making is 
conceptually trapped by a reliance on a particular conceptual and spatial 
understanding of the economy and economic growth. This understanding of the 
economy introduces conceptual differences that represent poor people's 
economic activities as separate from processes of economic growth and require 
poverty researchers and activists to fulfil certain subject positions that mediate 
between poor people and processes of economic growth. These forms of 
mediation evaluate and 'police' the claims of poor people on the benefits of 
economic growth, and make it very difficult to make 'visible' and 'sayable' how 
poor people's economic activities might already contribute to economic growth. 
Ironically, the more successfully poverty researchers and activists fulfil this 
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advocacy subject position, the more entrenched an understanding of the 
economy that separates poor people's economic activities from economic growth 
is likely to be. 
I suggest that for Poverty Studies to work itself out of its conceptual trap requires 
an attentiveness to both a different subjectivity on the part of the researcher and 
the simultaneous questioning of how the economy and economic growth is 
conceptually and spatially understood, including from the perspective of poor 
people. It requires continual attention on the part of poverty researchers and 
activists to their complicity in (re)producing the effects that inevitably arise from 
partial endeavours. Thus attention to the effects of knowledge, as much as the 
content, is constantly required. It requires continually evaluating the conceptual 
boundaries that are operationalised in research and working to deconstruct and 
understand them. Once Poverty Studies recognises that politics does not begin 
and end with poverty reduction strategies to absorb, connect, and/or include 
poor people in processes of economic growth, but that it is already present in 
how these strategies come to be seen as obligatory, then 'poverty politics' will 
never be the same. 
Appendix 1 
Methodology 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide greater detail to the brief outline 
provided in Chapter Seven. The methodology is divided into three sections that 
reflect the four 'empirical' chapters - Chapters Two, Four, Five, and Seven. 
Chapter Two 
The analysis of discourses reveals how definitions are implicated in constructing 
and sustaining 'systems of belief about the nature of social reality (Hastings 
1998). Thus, the methodology of this chapter required close readings of the key 
documents and transcribed interviews with the authors of the texts or research 
project leadership to contextualise the documents. 
Chapter One consisted of semi-structured interviews with the authors/project 
leaders of the five national poverty studies that have been undertaken since 1980 
in South Africa. The technique of semi-structured interviews was selected for this 
chapter and Chapters Four and Five to ensure that common themes were 
discussed with all the interviewees but to allow for some flexibility to pursue 
unanticipated lines of inquiry that emerged during the interviews. In the table 
below I set out the respective authors and key documents. 
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Study Documents Authors/project 
leaders 
interviewed289 
Second Carnegie Uprooting poverty. The South Prof Francis 
Inquiry into Poverty African challenge (1989) Wilson 
in southern Africa Mr Dudley Wilson 
Project for Statistics South Africans rich and poor: Dr Pundy Pillay 
on Living Standards Baseline household statistics 
Development (1995). 
Lessons from the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards 
Development (1996). 
South African Experience and perceptions of Prof Julian May 
Participatory Poverty poverty in South Africa (1998) 
Appraisal 
Poverty and Poverty and inequality in South Prof Julian May 
Inequality Report Africa. Meeting the challenge 
(2000). 
Poverty and inequality in South 
Africa (1998) 
National Speak-Out The people's voices. National Ms J acqui Boulle 
on Poverty Hearings speak out on poverty hearings 
(1998) 
The hundreds of original conference papers generated by the Carnegie 
Conference in 1984 were not revisited because the book summarising and 
integrating the conference papers is more accessible to researchers and policy 
makers and circulates in a wider domain and thus, is arguably more important 
discursively. The importance of the book is reflected in it being awarded the 
Noma Award for Publishing in Africa for 1990. It is the discursive power of the 
Carnegie Inquiry as reflected in the book that is of concern in this study rather 
than the accuracy with which the book reflects the original conference papers. 
The same argument holds for the PIR and Poverty Hearings. 
The interviews with the authors of the studies were supplemented with 
interviews with academics working on urban poverty (Professor Sus an Parnell, 
University of Cape Town) and a senior government official (Mr Goolam 
Aboobaker, The Presidency, Pretoria) who had been party to commissioning the 
289 See Bibliography for dates and locations of interviews. 
PIR. These interviews were recorded and transcribed to enable a policy analysis 
to be undertaken on the texts of the interview and documents. 
A limitation of ex-post recall of events is that it is inevitably filtered through the 
present and intervening experiences and insights and the ability of respondents 
to remember all issues that may have been important in what were incredibly 
complex research exercises. It was perhaps unusual that, over a twenty year 
period, the five studies were led by such a small group of people - Francis 
Wilson, Julian May, and Jaquie Boulle (with assistance from Dudley Horner and 
Pundy P ill ay ). Nevertheless, all of these individuals are widely respected in 
southern Africa and internationally, and their current interpretations of 
historical research processes on poverty are influential in contemporary debates 
and circulate widely given their institutional locations in universities and policy 
circles. This research deliberately takes the lead researcher's views at face value 
and as representative of the ways in which their understandings of their studies 
have evolved and should now be presented. What is important in my research is 
not whether the lead researchers provide a 'truthful' account of what happened 
but how these accounts are currently constructed as legitimate and authoritative 
and thus how they are implicated in producing authoritative understandings of 
poverty in different ways. 
Chapters Four and Five 
A mix of semi-structured interviews and an analysis of key documents informed 
these chapters. Below is a list of interviewees and their institutional location in 
relation to the Long Term Development Framework process and/or the Inanda-
Ntuzuma-KwaMashu area-based management project. 
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Interviewee PositionJreason290 
MsVidhu Ex-CEO South Central Local Council, Durban and 
Vedalankar Project Manager: LTDF 
Prof Dan Smit Ex-CEO Metro Housing, eThekwini Municipality and 
consultant: LTDF 
MrLinda Project Manager: Inanda-Ntuzuma-KwaMashu Lead 
Mbonambi Presidential Project and convenor of the Social 
Development group of the LTDF. 
Mr Kisa Dlamini Ex-Manager: Transformation Office, eThekwini 
Municipality. 
Prof Francie Lund Lead consultant: Informal Economy Policy, North and 
South Central Councils, Durban. 
Ms Caroline Consultant: Informal Economy Policy, North and South 
Skinner Central Councils, Durban. 
Mr Eric Watkinson Ex-Project Manager: Informal Economy Policy, 
Economic Development Department, eThekwini 
Municipality. 
Mr Sogen Moodley Participating planner in LTDF, Geographic Information 
and Policy Office, eThekwini Municipality 
Mr Glen Robbins Ex-Acting Director of Economic Development 
Department, eThekwini Municipality 
Ms Jacqui Subban Deputy City Manager, Geographic Information and 
Policy Office, eThekwini Municipality 
Mr Ken Breetzke Planner, Geographic Information and Policy Office, 
eThekwini Municipality. 
Mr Brian O'Leary Researcher, Geographic Information and Policy Office, 
eThekwini Municipality 
Mr Aman Maharaj Deputy Manager, Economic Development and 
Facilitation 
Mr Nhlanhla Zondi Deputy Head: Projects and programmes - Community 
Participation and Action Support unit, eThekwini 
Municipality 
Mr Adrian Masson Planner: Inanda-Ntuzuma-KwaMashu Lead 
Presidential Project 
Mr Andrzej Kiepiela Consultant and secretary to Durban Growth Coalition 
Ms Soobs Deputy City Manager, Development Planning, 
Moonsammy eThekwini Municipality (Interview conducted by 
Jennifer Robinson and Debbie Bonnin, 23 July 2004) 
Key documents include: 
Long Tenn Development Framework (2001) 
Integrated Development Plan (2003) 
290 See Bibliography for dates and locations of interviews. 
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Durban's Infonnal Economy Policy (2003) 
Durban Metropolitan Council Green Paper on Economic Development (1996) 
Durban Economic Review (2001) 
eThekwini Municipality: Development Profile (2002) 
Durban's economicfuture. Why help the invisible economy? (2000) 
Employment issues and opportunities in the infonnal economy (2001) 
Chapter Seven 
The research relating to Chapter Seven was conducted with the approval of the 
Ward Councillor and local Development Committee. The Development 
Committee subsequently delegated responsibility for the smooth and safe 
implementation of the research to a working group consisting of four members. 
Through respected ex-colleagues working on a housing upgrading project, I was 
ensured of a smooth introduction to, and quick acceptance by, the local 
residents.291 
The data generation methodology for this Chapter included a brief socio-
demographic profile drawn exactly from Statistics South Mrica's Labour Force 
Survey (see StatsSA 2003b); a time-use survey methodolo~92 and tailored, in-
depth and unstructured interviews of individual members of poor households. 
291 However, the introduction of the research raised concerns. The concerns arose from the 
knowledge that the first people met and their subsequent 'claim' to introduce the research to 
others, has important bearings on how the research will be initially perceived and more generally 
welcomed. This issue was particularly important in the C-Extension community because the NGO 
working in the area was embroiled in highly contested community dynamics. If people had 
chosen to use my personal association with this NCO/ or particular community members, for 
their own purposes, the research project and access to people would have been blocked and it 
would have been impossible for the research to continue in the area. I was also unsure about how 
and when I should approach the Ward Councillor. As it turned out, I was able to make contact 
with the councillor quite quickly and also be introduced to the entire local development 
committee. Although people in this committee thoroughly interrogated my credentials and 
history I was able to satisfy them and, at the same time, make sure that I was not aligned to one 
group or another. 
292 Although time-use survey's wer~ initi~ly .developed to understand people's lifestyle, they have 
been adapted to capture economIC actiVIties (Greenwood and Hoffman 2003) and informal 
economic activities (Hirway 2003). 
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The information at a household level was complemented by the participatory 
production of 'community timeline' by a mix of long-standing residents in the 
community and members of the current Development Committee. 
In the following section the factors that shaped the methodology are set out. This 
is followed by a description of the interview process. The household level 
interviews were framed in terms of five key factors - existing discourses, 
sampling, and the location, timing and the period of the participants' activities to 
which the questions should refer. 
Discourses 
I make reference to discourses throughout the thesis. However, I have not 
undertaken a formal discourse analysis of the different policy studies, policy 
documents and interview transcripts. Although discourse analysis has been 
productively applied to poverty issues (see for example, Meinhof and Richardson 
1994), my concern has been to focus on the power of statements, claims and 
pronouncements rather than the specific details of texts (Yapa 1998; Whitehead 
2000; Destremau 2001; Du Toit 2004; Silver 1996; Mawdsley and Rigg 2002, 
2003). I have adopted a more interpretive methodology of policy analysis to 
bring the relationships between poverty researchers, institutions and specific 
contexts into view. 
The power of discourses of 'poverty' and 'the economy' are a consistent theme 
throughout the thesis. Discourses of 'unemployment' also emerged at times -
particularly as a result of the PSLSD (Chapter Three) and as a priority issue in 
Durban (Chapter Four). But it is in relation to the empirical methodology of 
Chapter Seven that 'unemployment' discourses are a specific issue. For this 
reason, I spend a little time describing the situation in Durban. 
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To be unemployed in terms of South African labour statistics, a person cannot 
have done more than one hour's worth of work in the last seven days (see the list 
of questions to determine work, below). The rate of unemployment then varies 
according to the calculations take into account whether people are actively 
searching or not for work, respectively producing a 'strict' or 'broad' definition of 
employment. In Durban in 1999, Daniela Casale (2002, 287) calculated the 
number of people willing to accept work within a week and having taken action 
to find work over the preceding month (i.e. the strict definition) was 30.4 per 
cent of the official working age population. When the discouraged work seekers 
are included (Le. the broad definition) the rate of unemployment rises to 36.5 per 
cent. In terms of absolute numbers, she translates these percentages into 
383,500 strictly unemployed people and 501,200 broadly unemployed people. 
In addition, Casale (2002, 292) notes that 27 per cent of employment in Durban 
is informal.293 This equates to 252,000 people (Casale 2002, 292). Although 
statistics of this nature are never exact, the official statistics suggests that one in 
three people in the working age population (age 15-65) are employed in the 
formal economy (Skinner 2005, 6). This raises the question of how unemployed 
people support themselves. The statistics are provided in Table 2 and suggest 
that the bulk of people are supported by people who are employed in either the 
formal or informal economy. 
However, my concern is not with the accuracy of these statistics, but how such 
statistics and the discourses that they are part of, and contribute to, powerfully 
intersect to produce specific subjectivities. As Katherine Gibson (2001) clearly 
shows, such subjectivities are bound up with the broader understandings of the 
economy and economic activity. Thus the overriding concern in the research into 
poor people's economic activities was to avoid the key discourses of 'poverty', 
'unemployment' and 'economy' since these generate powerful economic 
293 This figure includes domestic workers. 
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subjectivities on both the part of researchers and those researched (Gibson-
Graham 2002). 
Table 2. Types of financial support drawn on by the unemployed in 
Durban 
o. 
0.6 
100.00 
Source: Casale (2002, 293) 
A time-use methodology offered the best possibility of ameliorating this concern. 
This is because a time-use survey focuses on peoples' activities as they are 
distributed within (in this case) a 24-hour period. The frame of reference is the 
day rather than 'the economy', form of 'employment' or characterisation of the 
activity as 'survivalist', 'marginal' or 'informal'. 
Nevertheless, it was considered useful to be able to describe the participants' 
socio-demographic characteristics in conventional categories. The Labour Force 
Survey is a fundamental component of the way in which participation in the 
economy is measured in South Africa (see Devey, Skinner, and Valodia 2004; 
Muller and Pose I 2004). It therefore made sense to base socio-demographic 
questions on the Labour Force Survey. This would facilitate the location of the 
participants' profile in broader statistical information and also make 
comparisons possible between how participants' responded to the Labour Force 
Survey approach and the qualitative approach of in-depth interviews. Therefore 
questions relating to sex, age, population group, level of education, amount of 
post-school training, sources of household income, source of most household 
income, and monthly household income were extracted. In addition the key 
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question that defines economic activity was drawn upon (StatsSA 2003b, 12). 
Thus participants were requested to indicate whether they had spent at least one 
hour in the last seven days: 
• Running or doing any kind of business, big or small 
• Helping unpaid in a family business 
• Doing any kind of work on a household plot, food garden, etc. 
• Catching any fish or wild animals for food or sale 
• Doing any domestic work for another household for payment in cash or in 
kind 
• Doing any other work for wage, salary, piecework pay, commission or 
payment in kind 
• Begging for food or money in public. 
The socio-demographic data generated describes the participants in conventional 
terms and categories. The location of the participants in broader national surveys 
and comparisons between the subjectivities co-created by different discourses 
and the production of unemployment statistics has fallen outside the scope of the 
study. 
Sampling 
The intention of sampling was to select those members of households most likely 
to be considered as not engaging in economic activities or to be engaged in 
activities that were unlikely to be perceived as contributing to economic growth. 
Twenty households were randomly selected from among the approximately 230 
households that make up the C-Extension area. However, the primary purpose of 
the sample was to be perceived by the 'community at large' to be selecting 
households to participate in the research on a fair and objective basis rather than 
to generate a representative set of results. 294 
Each household was immediately requested to state whether any member of the 
household was employed in a full-time, permanent position in the last four 
weeks.295 The interview only proceeded if the respondent answered that there 
were no members of the household engaged in full-time, permanent 
employment. In this way, the households further stratified the sample to ensure 
that the research would be based on the data generated by those households 
where members were calculated as either unemployed or informally employed.296 
There is a strong correlation between working in the informal economy and 
being poor (Meth 2003; Posel 2001). The presence of unemployed members in 
the household also increases the probability of household poverty (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt 1998; Bhorat, PosweIl, and Naidoo 2004; Woolard and Klasen 2005). 
As indicated in Chapter Seven, the result of this selection process was to ensure 
that all of the participants were located in households that could be defined as 
ultra-poor in terms of Durban's income poverty lines and hence, most unlikely to 
be engaged in economic activities that could contribute to economic growth. 
Location 
The location of the interview in relation to economic activities is an important 
factor that was taken into account. This is because requesting to interview people 
at their place of 'work' would immediately introduce subjectivities about 
'employment'. There were three possible options - in the household, at the site of 
294 In order to avoid being seen to b~ favouring some households over others and thereby 
generating suspicions ~at co~d pote~tIally make the area un~afe for the research or, at the very 
least disrupt progress, It was lmperatlve to present the selectIon of households as an objective, 
random process. 
295 This follows the conventions of the official Labour Force Survey (StatsSA 2003b). 
296 In two cases, although respondents had initially indicated that there were no members of the 
household engaged in full-time, permanent empl?yment? it transpired through the interview that 
there was indeed, at least one household member ID full-time, permanent employment. 
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the economic activity or at a neutral third location. The household was chosen as 
the location for the interviews even though many participants in the research 
were engaged in home-based work and home-based work is extensive in Durban 
(Cross 2000). The household also provided the greatest privacy, convenience and 
confidentiality to participants. Travelling to the diverse locations of people's 
economic activities would have made the research much more difficult and time 
consuming. Awareness of the presence of other household members biasing 
responses was maintained and in one case this was clearly an issue and noted. 
Timing 
The last factor that was taken into account was when the interviews were 
conducted. Existing evidence suggests that members of poor households work 
incredibly long hours (Adato, Lund, and Mhlongo 2004). In addition because of 
unequal gender responsibilities in household reproduction, sensitivity was 
maintained to ensure that the time of the interview was suitable and convenient. 
The result was that the interviews were conducted at a range of times throughout 
the day and night. 
Framing 
In recording people's (economic) activities the key methodological differentiation 
is based on whether the data generated is based on 'participant recall' or 'direct 
observation' (Gregory and Altman 1989). This research is based on a 'participant 
recall' methodology. 'Participant recall' allows for a wider coverage of people's 
activities in a limited amount of time. It is also generally less intrusive in people's 
economic activities because it is not based on participant observation. The 
implication of this data generation technique is that relies on participants' 
accuracy of recall and the subjectivities co-created in the interview process. 
A key issue to be resolved was the period against which the activities would be 
recorded. Research suggests that what people do on a Monday is very different to 
a Friday, or near the end of the month when people are paid, or around cyclical 
events such as paying school fees and seasonal changes (Cross et al. 2001; May 
1998a). Only interviewing participant's once raised the critical question of 
whether the day's activities that people map could be considered 'representative' 
or typical. It was important to maintain a sense of what people considered to be 
their most important activity in the week as a whole, particularly if it did not 
happen on the day being recorded or the previous day was on a weekend. For 
example, a woman may work as a domestic worker but only for one day a week. 
This may be her most important economic activity but may not fall on the day 
recorded in the activity clock. The chosen solution in cases where the previous 
day was not typical was to request participants to record an 'average' day. An 
attempt was made to avoid resorting to this option as it introduced a larger scope 
for participants to interpret what they had done. As it turned out, it was utilised 
in one case only. 
Tailored, in-depth and unstructured interviews 
In-depth and unstructured interviews were selected as the best technique for this 
element of the research. The unstructured format allowed the research 
participants to guide the direction of the process and elaborate on the issues that 
they raised without a sense that their responses would be compared or calibrated 
against any other participant's responses. This was a crucial part of 'valuing what 
people do'. In cases where participant's responded with confidential information 
(for example, related to their ability to compete in particular markets) or the 
process provoked emotions of stress or anxiety, this technique allowed for an 
exploration of issues from another tack or an ability to respond more sensitively. 
The interviews proceeded as follows. An appointment would be made prior to the 
interview with the selected household. Following a standardised, brief 
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introduction by the isiZulu-speaking research assistant and myself, a check 
would be made to see whether there were any fulltime, permanent workers in the 
household. If there were, the household member was thanked and the next 
household was randomly selected. If there were no fulltime, permanent workers 
and the household was in agreement, an appointment would be made for the 
interview. 
At the start of the interview (conducted in isiZulu and English), a fuller 
introduction was made and the household alerted to what was proposed. On 
completion of the socio-demographic profile (preferably with the household 
head), participant's were provided with a blank clock face on a sheet of paper and 
requested to fill out their activities for the morning and afternoon, starting from 
the time they woke up. It was intended that all available household members 
over the age of ten years would be requested to complete an activity sheet.:l97 In 
the implementation however, this proved difficult to apply consistently and the 
focus remained on adult members of the household. The socio-demographic 
questionnaire was based on the interviewer posing a standard set of questions to 
the participating member of the household in relation to the rest of the 
household members. In contrast the time-use survey was designed to be 
produced by the participants' themselves.298 
Once the activity clock was completed, 2 adult members were asked to identify 
their most important activity and then a checklist was used to tailor questions 
around the specific activity.299 The participants were thanked and given a small 
gift as a token of appreciation for their interest, assistance and time. 
297 The Labour Force SUIvey (StatsSA 2003a) includes people 15 years and older and the Time 
Use sUIvey (StatsSA 2001) includes the possibi!i~ of respondents being 10 years or older. 
298 Participants generally completed the actiVIty clock face by themselves. However, in some 
cases it was completed under direction by the interview team. 
299 A' checklist of common factors, issues and processe~ that could influence an (economic) 
activity were drawn up to ensure some degree of commonahty across the households. 
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'Community timeline' 
The 'community timeline' was based on participatory action research 
methodologies and was designed and implemented to benefit from, and 
contribute towards, a collective history of the area. The process consists of 
collectively inviting participants to identify key events and processes within a 
particular period. The method seeks to benefit from the collective memory and 
experiences of participants and therefore generally develops a fuller historical 
account. This data was used in Chapter Four to demonstrate the effects of urban 
Apartheid on impoverishing Black people in C-Extension in particular, and in 
Durban generally. 
Contributors to the 'community timeline' history 
Recorded on 6 July 2004 in Sifunimfundo School, C-Extension. 
Mrs Sarah Mhlongo 
Mrs Thoko Zwane 
Mr Ndoda Dlamuka 
Mr Thembe Mzobe 
Ms Hlengiwe Ndwandwe 
Mr Masosha Mzwilini 
Mr Vusi Buthelezi 
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